Re: [iwar] - Sword cuts both ways


From: Tony Bartoletti
From: azb@llnl.gov
To: iwar@yahoogroups.com
Tue, 20 Feb 2001 11:14:47 -0800 

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From: Tony Bartoletti 
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Date: Tue, 20 Feb 2001 11:14:47 -0800
Reply-To: iwar@yahoogroups.com
Subject: Re: [iwar] - Sword cuts both ways
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>At 10:33 AM 2/20/01 -0800, Tony Bartoletti wrote:
> >I don't want to tell some father that his child was abducted or killed
> >because an email between relatives detailing the child's itinerary was
> >not allowed to be strongly encrypted.
>
>One could use this as an argument in favor of government-managed key escrow
>of strong encryption, of course... you shouldn't have anything to fear from
>the FBI alone having the means to break your encryption, and goodness
>knows, what if both parties to the e-mail were run over by trucks and a
>third relative needed to get access to the note to successfully pick up the
>child at the airport?  What then, huh? :-)

Good point.  Of course, similar mishaps can occur (regularly) with
ordinary un-encrypted email.  Encryption is not yet used so ubiquitously
that folks are in the habit establishing good use-protocols, such as
a personal "key-escrow" regime among family or close friends.

Of course, the FBI has never abused its power in harassing law-abiding
citizens for political reasons ... and never will. :)

>I think it's a weak argument in support of free strong cryptography (there
>are many better), as the folks who are going to be breaking weak crypto are
>more likely to be governments, and criminal enterprises seeking financial
>or political gain... Joe Pedophile won't be hacking code, though perhaps if
>I were a criminal wanting to want to kidnap, say, Kathy Lee Gifford's kid
>for ransom, it might be worth the trouble.  So perhaps better to say that I
>don't want to tell the shareholders of Boeing that its stock was driven
>through the floor because an e-mail outlining its proposed bid for a
>multi-billion dollar contract with the government of the PRC and
>intercepted by the French was weakly encrypted.

Granted, such arguments are valid, and will carry more weight in congress.

Still, with CPU power still rising, the ability to break the currently-weak
cryptographic methods will become as trivial for individuals as it is today
for governments.

I suppose my reason for making the comment in the first place was a sense
of insult at the "pull-at-your-heart-strings" form of argument put forward
in the Shelby quote.  Clearly, the great bulk of such "useful" intercepts
would be domestic, and thus speak not to the laws on "export" but rather
hint at restricting domestic civilian access to strong cryptography.

The "really bad people" are not restricted to weak cryptography in any
practical sense.  I tend to believe that efforts to slow the spread of
strong cryptography aim to protect an investment in "fishing nets".

___tony___


Tony Bartoletti 925-422-3881 
Information Operations, Warfare and Assurance Center
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Livermore, CA 94551-9900


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