Return-Path: <sentto-279987-1578-997388544-fc=all.net@returns.onelist.com> Delivered-To: fc@all.net Received: from 204.181.12.215 by localhost with POP3 (fetchmail-5.1.0) for fc@localhost (single-drop); Thu, 09 Aug 2001 13:24:10 -0700 (PDT) Received: (qmail 3067 invoked by uid 510); 9 Aug 2001 19:24:42 -0000 Received: from n10.groups.yahoo.com (216.115.96.60) by 204.181.12.215 with SMTP; 9 Aug 2001 19:24:42 -0000 X-eGroups-Return: sentto-279987-1578-997388544-fc=all.net@returns.onelist.com Received: from [10.1.4.54] by ej.egroups.com with NNFMP; 09 Aug 2001 20:22:24 -0000 X-Sender: azb@llnl.gov X-Apparently-To: iwar@yahoogroups.com Received: (EGP: mail-7_3_1); 9 Aug 2001 20:22:23 -0000 Received: (qmail 99657 invoked from network); 9 Aug 2001 20:22:16 -0000 Received: from unknown (10.1.10.26) by l8.egroups.com with QMQP; 9 Aug 2001 20:22:16 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO smtp-2.llnl.gov) (128.115.250.82) by mta1 with SMTP; 9 Aug 2001 20:22:16 -0000 Received: from poptop.llnl.gov (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by smtp-2.llnl.gov (8.9.3/8.9.3/LLNL-gateway-1.0) with ESMTP id NAA05365 for <iwar@yahoogroups.com>; Thu, 9 Aug 2001 13:22:15 -0700 (PDT) Received: from catalyst.llnl.gov (catalyst.llnl.gov [128.115.222.68]) by poptop.llnl.gov (8.8.8/LLNL-3.0.2/pop.llnl.gov-5.1) with ESMTP id NAA27780 for <iwar@yahoogroups.com>; Thu, 9 Aug 2001 13:22:15 -0700 (PDT) Message-Id: <4.3.2.7.2.20010809132329.00b541c0@poptop.llnl.gov> X-Sender: e048786@poptop.llnl.gov X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 4.3.2 To: iwar@yahoogroups.com In-Reply-To: <FMEBKCCNDNLCDGCDNJAOCEMKCAAA.jsforza@isrisk.net> References: <4.3.2.7.2.20010809103958.00b515a0@poptop.llnl.gov> From: Tony Bartoletti <azb@llnl.gov> Mailing-List: list iwar@yahoogroups.com; contact iwar-owner@yahoogroups.com Delivered-To: mailing list iwar@yahoogroups.com Precedence: bulk List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:iwar-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com> Date: Thu, 09 Aug 2001 13:33:22 -0700 Reply-To: iwar@yahoogroups.com Subject: RE: [iwar] Computer and Network Security vs. Information Privacy and Confidentiality Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit At 03:06 PM 8/9/01 -0400, you wrote: >Tony wrote.. > > >"Anonymized" also offered the general observation that, due to the > >complexity of the technology, infrastructure management is gaining De Facto > >peer rights to information content. Since there is (IMHO) no practical way > >to avoid this situation, the only remedy would appear to be laws that > >prohibit infrastructure management from taking any actions, based upon > >revealed content, that are not aimed directly at infrastructure integrity. > > >In this digital age, the fact that "data" to one process can be "process" > >to another process makes the "content vs infrastructure" distinction > >increasingly problematic. > >Tony, I love it when somebody says "no practical way". Those should be >fighting words to a competent group of OS architects. I am willing to accept >even a partial solution in this space so how about the following: > >An OS that grants inital admin rights only to the data creator. The inital >rights are restricted to creator eyes only and no transport. The creator >determines the data classification and establishes rules of modification and >channels of exchange. Ok, so I admit that an individual will have to add >some process to data creation, but hey I remember PAPER and the issues of >control and distribution before Xerox appeared on the scene. Speaking of the >big X, remember GlobalView.. they were on the right path for a while there. > >On an aside - we often use the example of the bin diving janitor when >talking of covert information gathering but in my experience I know the >janitor's face better than I know some SA or network geek (pardon to the IT >community) in the bowls of the building. A least the janitor says hello and >knocks on the door. I stand corrected ;) No practical way, besides pervasive content encryption. Unless and until most all applications support strong end-to-end encryption as a rule, rather than as an exception, I cannot see how infrastructure management can investigate a network or system problem without consequent access to the content being stored or transported. Perhaps there are methods of which I am unaware, but I suspect that the system you outline (very reasonable, sounds like a system built upon "E"; see "Erights.org",) must rely upon encryption for enforcement. Cheers! ___tony___ Tony Bartoletti 925-422-3881 <azb@llnl.gov> Information Operations, Warfare and Assurance Center Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Livermore, CA 94551-9900 ------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor ---------------------~--> Small business owners... Tell us what you think! http://us.click.yahoo.com/vO1FAB/txzCAA/ySSFAA/kgFolB/TM ---------------------------------------------------------------------~-> ------------------ http://all.net/ Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.2 : 2001-09-29 21:08:39 PDT