Return-Path: <sentto-279987-1650-998929845-fc=all.net@returns.onelist.com> Delivered-To: fc@all.net Received: from 204.181.12.215 by localhost with POP3 (fetchmail-5.1.0) for fc@localhost (single-drop); Mon, 27 Aug 2001 09:32:08 -0700 (PDT) Received: (qmail 18156 invoked by uid 510); 27 Aug 2001 16:30:49 -0000 Received: from n34.groups.yahoo.com (216.115.96.84) by 204.181.12.215 with SMTP; 27 Aug 2001 16:30:49 -0000 X-eGroups-Return: sentto-279987-1650-998929845-fc=all.net@returns.onelist.com Received: from [10.1.4.55] by mk.egroups.com with NNFMP; 27 Aug 2001 16:30:45 -0000 X-Sender: fc@big.all.net X-Apparently-To: iwar@yahoogroups.com Received: (EGP: mail-7_3_2); 27 Aug 2001 16:30:44 -0000 Received: (qmail 18662 invoked from network); 27 Aug 2001 16:09:20 -0000 Received: from unknown (10.1.10.26) by l9.egroups.com with QMQP; 27 Aug 2001 16:09:20 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO big.all.net) (65.0.156.78) by mta1 with SMTP; 27 Aug 2001 16:09:20 -0000 Received: (from fc@localhost) by big.all.net (8.9.3/8.7.3) id JAA05665 for iwar@yahoogroups.com; Mon, 27 Aug 2001 09:09:11 -0700 Message-Id: <200108271609.JAA05665@big.all.net> To: iwar@yahoogroups.com In-Reply-To: <9mdpq3+rjc1@eGroups.com> from "ellisd@cs.ucsb.edu" at Aug 27, 2001 03:42:59 PM Organization: I'm not allowed to say X-Mailer: don't even ask X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.5 PL1] From: Fred Cohen <fc@all.net> Mailing-List: list iwar@yahoogroups.com; contact iwar-owner@yahoogroups.com Delivered-To: mailing list iwar@yahoogroups.com Precedence: bulk List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:iwar-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com> Date: Mon, 27 Aug 2001 09:09:11 -0700 (PDT) Reply-To: iwar@yahoogroups.com Subject: Re: [iwar] Re: Why 'conventional' terrorist groups Not utilizing Cyber Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Per the message sent by ellisd@cs.ucsb.edu: > Agreed. So an analysis of what makes them more complex is necessary? If you say so - necessary for what? > >This raises the cost, likelihood > > of getting caught, and likelihood of failure. All things identified > > groups avoid for the most part. > Non sequitor. Does an increase in complexity lead to higher costs, an > increase in attribution, or likely of failure? All of the above. > Higher costs are likely to be bounded by the amount of human effort > required, which is a very low-order function. Not for complex attacks. > Attribution is only more likely as the heinousness of the attack > grows. The more heinous, the more man power will be thrown at it > from the victim to discern who to blame. However, even here, the > law of diminishing returns plays a significant role. There is a tight > asymptotic upper bound for attribution given conventional methods of > traceback. The more complex, the larger the infrastructure in support of it, thus the larger the footprint. Most terrorist acts involve a very small number of individual actors - part of their operations security. > > Several to many orders of magnitude more expensive for a strong IW > > attack than a pipe bomb. > How did either of us come to our conclusion? Like I said, I have studied this in some depth over an extended period of time using specific examples. How did you come to your conclusions? FC --This communication is confidential to the parties it is intended to serve-- Fred Cohen Fred Cohen & Associates.........tel/fax:925-454-0171 fc@all.net The University of New Haven.....http://www.unhca.com/ http://all.net/ Sandia National Laboratories....tel:925-294-2087 ------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor ---------------------~--> Secure all your Web servers now: Get your FREE Guide and learn to: DEPLOY THE LATEST ENCRYPTION, DELIVER TRANSPARENT PROTECTION, and More! http://us.click.yahoo.com/VihfLB/nT7CAA/yigFAA/kgFolB/TM ---------------------------------------------------------------------~-> ------------------ http://all.net/ Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.2 : 2001-09-29 21:08:40 PDT