[iwar] No Easy Battle

From: Robert W. Miller (snooker3@mindspring.com)
Date: 2001-09-14 15:04:56


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From: "Robert W. Miller" <snooker3@mindspring.com>
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Date: Fri, 14 Sep 2001 16:04:56 -0600
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Subject: [iwar] No Easy Battle
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No Easy Battle
2000 GMT, 010914

Summary

In the wake of this week's terrorist attacks in the 
United States, the U.S. government is trying to decide 
how it can defeat its new style of enemy. The key to 
victory is finding the enemy's center of gravity, or 
what enables it to operate, and destroying it. But what 
has worked for the U.S. military in the past may not be 
enough this time around.

Analysis

The foundation of any successful military operation is 
defining and attacking the enemy's center of gravity: 
the capacity that enables it to operate. A war effort 
that does not successfully define the enemy's center of 
gravity, or lacks the ability to decisively incapacitate 
it, is doomed to failure. 

The center of gravity can be relatively easy to define, 
as was the Iraqi command and control system, or 
relatively difficult to define, as was Vietnam's 
discovery of America's unwillingness to indefinitely 
absorb casualties. In either case, identifying the 
adversary's center of gravity is the key to victory.

In the wake of this week's terrorist attacks in the 
United States, this question is now being discussed in 
the highest reaches of the American government. The 
issue, from a military standpoint, is not one of moral 
responsibility or legal culpability. Rather, it is what 
will be required to render the enemy incapable of 
functioning as an effective force. Put differently, what 
is the most efficient means of destroying the enemy's 
will to resist?

This is an extraordinarily difficult process in this 
case because it is not clear who the enemy is. Two 
schools of thought are emerging though. 

One argues that the attackers are essentially agents of 
some foreign government that enables them to operate. 
Therefore, by either defeating or dissuading this 
government from continuing to support the attackers, 
they will be rendered ineffective and the threat will 
end.

Such a scenario is extremely attractive for the United 
States. Posing the conflict as one between nation-states 
plays to American strength in waging conventional war. A 
nation-state can be negotiated with, bombed or invaded. 
If a nation-state is identified as the attackers' center 
of gravity, then it can by some level of exertion be 
destroyed. There is now an inherent interest within the 
U.S. government to define the center of gravity as Iraq 
or Afghanistan or both. The United States knows how to 
wage such wars.

The second school of thought argues that the entity we 
are facing is instead an amorphous, shifting collection 
of small groups, controlled in a dynamic and 
unpredictable manner and deliberately without a clear 
geographical locus. The components of the organization 
can be in Afghanistan or Boston, in Beirut or Paris. Its 
fundamental character is that it moves with near 
invisibility around the globe, forming ad hoc groups 
with exquisite patience and care for strikes against its 
enemies.

This is a group, therefore, that has been deliberately 
constructed not to provide its enemies with a center of 
gravity. Its diffusion is designed to make it difficult 
to kill with any certainty. The founders of this group 
studied the history of underground movements and 
determined that their greatest weakness is what was 
thought to be their strength: tight control from the 
center. 

That central control, the key to the Leninist model, 
provided decisive guidance but presented enemies with a 
focal point that, if smashed, rendered the organization 
helpless. This model of underground movement accepts 
inefficiency -- there are long pauses between actions -- 
in return for both security, as penetration is 
difficult, and survivability, as it does not provide its 
enemies with a definable point against which to strike.

This model is much less attractive to American military 
planners because it does not play to American 
capabilities. It is impervious to the type of warfare 
the United States prefers, which is what one might call 
wholesale warfare. It instead demands a retail sort of 
warfare, in which the fighting level comprises very 
small unit operations, the geographic scale is 
potentially global and the time frame is extensive and 
indeterminate. It is a conflict that does lend itself to 
intelligence technology, but it ultimately turns on 
patience, subtlety and secrecy, none of which are 
America's strong suits.

It is therefore completely understandable that the 
United States is trying to redefine the conflict in 
terms of nation-states, and there is also substantial 
precedent for it as well. The precursor terrorist 
movements of the 1970s and 1980s were far from self-
contained entities. All received support in various ways 
from Soviet and Eastern European intelligence services, 
as well as from North Korea, Libya, Syria and others. 
From training to false passports, they were highly 
dependent on nation-states for their operation.

It is therefore reasonable to assume the case is the 
same with these new attackers. It would follow that if 
their source of operational support were destroyed, they 
would cease to function. A bombing campaign or invasion 
would then solve the problem. The issue is to determine 
which country is supplying the support and act.

There is no doubt the entity that attacked the United 
States got support from state intelligence services. 
Some of that support might well have been officially 
sanctioned while some might have been provided by a 
political faction or sympathetic individuals. But 
although for the attackers state support is necessary 
and desirable, it is not clear that destroying involved 
states would disable the perpetrators.

One of the principles of the attackers appears to be 
redundancy, not in the sense of backup systems, but in 
the sense that each group contains all support systems. 
In the same sense, it appears possible that they have 
constructed relationships in such a way that although 
they depend on state backing, they are not dependent on 
the support of any particular state.

An interesting development arising in the aftermath is 
the multitude of states accused of providing support to 
the attackers: Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, 
Algeria and Syria, among others, have all been 
suggested. All of them could have been involved in some 
way or another, with the result being dozens of nations 
providing intentional or unintentional support. The 
attackers even appear to have drawn support from the 
United States itself, as some of the suspected hijackers 
reportedly received flight training from U.S. schools. 

The attackers have organized themselves to be parasitic. 
They are able to attach themselves to virtually any 
country that has a large enough Arab or Islamic 
community for them to disappear into or at least go 
unnoticed within. Drawing on funds acquired from one or 
many sources, they are able to extract resources 
wherever they are and continue operating.

If such is the case, then even if Iraq or Afghanistan 
gave assistance, they are still not necessarily the 
attackers' center of gravity. Destroying the government 
or military might of these countries may be morally just 
or even required, but it will not render the enemy 
incapable of continuing operations against the United 
States. 

It is therefore not clear that a conventional war with 
countries that deliberately aided the culprits will 
achieve military victory. The ability of the attackers 
to draw sustenance from a wide array of willing and 
unwilling hosts may render them impervious to the defeat 
of a supporting country. 

The military must systematically attack an organization 
that tries very hard not to have a systematic structure 
that can be attacked. In order for this war to succeed, 
the key capability will not be primarily military force 
but highly refined, real-time intelligence about the 
behavior of a small number of individuals. But as the 
events of the last few days have shown, this is not a 
strength of the American intelligence community. 

And that is the ultimate dilemma for policymakers. If 
the kind of war we can wage well won't do the job, and 
we lack the confidence in our expertise to wage the kind 
of war we need to conduct, then what is to be done? The 
easy answer -- to fight the battle we fight best -- may 
not be the right answer, or it may be only part of the 
solution.
____________________________________________________

http://www.stratfor.com/COMPANY/info.htm

Det. Robert W. Miller
Colorado Internet Crimes Against 
Children Task Force
Pueblo High Tech. Crime Unit
Pueblo County Sheriff's Office
320 S. Joe Martinez Blvd.
Pueblo West, CO. 81007
Tel (719)583-4736
FAX (719)583-4732
mailto:snooker3@mindspring.com
http://www2.co.pueblo.co.us/sheriff/
PGP key available at: http://pgpkeys.mit.edu:11371/ 
search on snooker@iex.net

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