Return-Path: <sentto-279987-1957-1000734294-fc=all.net@returns.onelist.com> Delivered-To: fc@all.net Received: from 204.181.12.215 by localhost with POP3 (fetchmail-5.1.0) for fc@localhost (single-drop); Mon, 17 Sep 2001 06:46:06 -0700 (PDT) Received: (qmail 16093 invoked by uid 510); 17 Sep 2001 13:45:11 -0000 Received: from n22.groups.yahoo.com (216.115.96.72) by 204.181.12.215 with SMTP; 17 Sep 2001 13:45:11 -0000 X-eGroups-Return: sentto-279987-1957-1000734294-fc=all.net@returns.onelist.com Received: from [10.1.4.54] by cj.egroups.com with NNFMP; 17 Sep 2001 13:44:55 -0000 X-Sender: vstagg@deakin.edu.au X-Apparently-To: iwar@yahoogroups.com Received: (EGP: mail-7_3_2_2); 17 Sep 2001 13:44:54 -0000 Received: (qmail 80235 invoked from network); 17 Sep 2001 11:23:43 -0000 Received: from unknown (10.1.10.142) by l8.egroups.com with QMQP; 17 Sep 2001 11:23:43 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO deakin.edu.au) (128.184.136.2) by mta3 with SMTP; 17 Sep 2001 11:23:38 -0000 Received: from marmadas (marmadas.cm.deakin.edu.au [128.184.80.75]) by deakin.edu.au (8.11.4/8.11.4) with SMTP id f8HBNaE04361 for <iwar@yahoogroups.com>; Mon, 17 Sep 2001 21:23:36 +1000 (EST) Message-ID: <01fd01c13f6b$316dbb10$4b50b880@cm.deakin.edu.au> To: <iwar@yahoogroups.com> References: <200109170421.VAA21772@big.all.net> X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 5.50.4133.2400 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.50.4133.2400 From: "Vernon Stagg" <vstagg@deakin.edu.au> Mailing-List: list iwar@yahoogroups.com; contact iwar-owner@yahoogroups.com Delivered-To: mailing list iwar@yahoogroups.com Precedence: bulk List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:iwar-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com> Date: Mon, 17 Sep 2001 21:23:36 +1000 Reply-To: iwar@yahoogroups.com Subject: [iwar] US Counterterrorist policy strategy Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Quite a long read and back in 1994 although still has relevance today. Vernon (heres the pdf link for a more easier read) http://www.pitt.edu/~rcss/publications/viewpoints/mcrea.pdf RIDGWAY Viewpoints 941 Page 1 Brett A. McCrea U.S. COUNTERTERRORIST POLICY: A PROPOSED STRATEGY FOR A NONTRADITIONAL THREAT * 1. Introduction Discussions of terrorism during the last 25 years have yielded highly divergent prescriptions for counteracting what is a highly unpredictable form of violence. Many people, such as Benjamin Netanhyu, leader of the Israeli Likud party, contend that terrorists must be deterred through harsh reprisals. Others, focusing on the causes rather than the manifestations of violence, suggest more peaceful methods, such as addressing the grievances of the terrorist organizations. Both of these arguments have validity, but there are also weaknesses that need to be addressed if a coherent policy on terrorism is to be enacted. Accordingly, this article analyzes two problems in the field of counterterrorism. The first deals with gaps in the existing literature on the subject. Much of the literature on terrorism was seen in the context of the Cold War and identified either the Soviet Union or its proxies as the masterminds behind international terrorism. It fell into the trap of categorizing most, if not all, terrorist organizations as ``state sponsored.'' Now that the Soviet Union is gone, similar attempts are made to portray Iran as the new mastermind behind global terrorism. The problem with such an emphasis is its disregard for terrorist organizations that do not need state support in order to operate effectively. Moreover, the categorization issue has significant policy implications. In the pursuit of effective policies of counterterrorism, decision makers need to be able to distinguish among groups, and differentiate their policies accordingly. The second problem stems from the fact that deterrence has been the basic U.S. counterterror policy. Yet deterrence does not inhibit the resort to violence, particularly by those terrorist groups that do not receive state support. With these two problems in mind, a typology of terror organizations will be established and the weaknesses of past counterterrorist policies will be discussed. This article also proposes a counterterror policy that addresses the unique problems posed by terror groups without state sponsorship. The policy prescription is based on the idea that most terrorist organizations have a dynamic that results in a schism within the group. Once these schisms have been identified, the U.S. can use its political and intelligence assets to develop and perpetuate the splits in order to isolate the radical faction from the populace. This can be accomplished by attacking the legitimacy of the radical groups. As James Adams has stated ``legitimacy is....the Holy Grail of terrorism.'' (Adams, James. The Financing of Terror. (London: New English Library), 1986, p. 172. ) Hence, the strength and the weakness of terrorist groups lies in the perceived legitimacy of their cause. The United States must therefore make efforts to systematically destroy the legitimacy of the more radical factions by appealing to the moderate portions of the terrorist group's constituency. Once the most radical segments of terrorist organizations have been isolated, counterintelligence methods can be used to create suspicion in the ranks of the radicals in order to render them ineffective as an operating unit and/or force the group to resort to regular purges. While this article concentrates on Islamic terror groups, this approach can be expanded to other groups that employ terror. For present purposes, the definition of terrorism is the threat or the use of violence in order to draw attention to, or otherwise promote, a group's political agenda. Although many people may have problems with such a definition because of its restrictiveness, there is a general acceptance that terrorist groups have a political agenda of some sort and articulate their demands through the use of violence. Democratic societies, such as the United States, have ``special'' problems when trying to implement counterterrorist policies. Open societies are extremely vulnerable to terrorist attacks, partly because certain liberties and rights are held as sacred. Government infringement on these rights is not passively accepted by the general populace unless there is an immediate and overwhelming threat. For example, after the World Trade Center bombing, the need to collect and collate data on the followers of Sheikh Rahman was clear. However, there are legal as well as other issues that prevent democratic governments from violating the privacy of this group until an act has been committed. Yet, there is a serious need to develop proactive policies to prevent terrorist incidents before they occur. The development of an effective policy, before terrorism evolves to the point of threatening the style of our society, is a difficult task. Assuming that international terrorism will not have a significant presence in the U.S. because it has been relatively absent in the past is extremely dangerous. Not only can such an assumption lull the nation into a false sense of security but, if a serious incident were to occur, decision makers run the risk of rushing to implement a rash and ineffective policy based on popular demand for retribution or for positive protection. Such public pressure could provoke the government to enact policies which could exacerbate the existent situation. An alternative scenario is that decision makers could be paralyzed into inaction. 2. Classifications Before discussing countering terrorism, it is necessary to distinguish the types of groups that exist. There has been a tendency in the U.S. to categorize all terrorist groups as being ``state sponsored.'' Although this is done for the sake of simplicity, it is inappropriate. It is also understandable. If the U.S. has a target such as a state to confront, it is easier to hold that state responsible rather than some amorphous organization in a sea of people. Nevertheless, labelling all groups as ``state sponsored'' is a misleading assumption on which to base a policy. The three categories of terrorist groups used in this article are: 1)state sponsored 2)state relevant and 3)state irrelevant. State Sponsored Terrorism State sponsored terrorism is defined, for the purposes of this article, as involving the use of state apparatus to aid terror groups. A prime example would be Libya's extension of diplomatic privileges to terrorists in the early 1980s. In cases of state sponsored terrorism, it is easier both to discern who the culprits are and to determine how to deal with them. Terrorist attacks in this category are more black and white than those in the state relevant and state irrelevant categories. If the various apparati of a state are mobilized to damage the U.S., that state will be held responsible for the acts committed. The U.S., being able to defend itself against such impending attacks, can and should act swiftly and decisively. In this instance, the idea of deterrence fits in quite well. Even Iran, one of the most radically antiU.S. states in existence, realizes the limits of its conventional capabilities when facing the U.S. Echoing this sentiment, Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah has stated, ``the oppressed nations [of the world] do not have the technology and destructive weapons [the] Americans have.'' (Kramer, Martin. "The Moral Logic of the Hizballah" in Walter Reich ed. Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, and States of Mind. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1990, pp. 144145. ) Thus, the Iranian regime would be hesitant to mobilize its state apparatus in order to inflict harm on the United States for fear of military reprisals. The bottom line is that states are concerned with selfpreservation; hence, deterrence is more likely to work with states and less likely to work with anything else. State Relevant and State Irrelevant The other two areas of terrorism (state relevant and state irrelevant) are much more nebulous in nature and, therefore, harder to combat. These types of terrorist groups are independent from state control and are able to raise money for their organizations through private donations. Consequently, these types of groups are more difficult to combat. Their ability to raise funds to fight for their cause means they have a more diversified pool from which to draw money. The source of the money is difficult to trace and even more difficult to stop. Hence, it is nearly impossible to weaken the group by trying to cut their purse strings. Many Islamic groups are of this kind. Another asset these groups possess is their ability to recruit members and maintain constant contact with large portions of their constituencies in relative safety. Most of these groups are able to maintain these connections through mosques. In Iran, before the revolution, for example, the mosques served as a podium for spreading radical ideas as well as providing a convenient and safe meeting place for radicals to congregate. Hence, communication and meeting places are already legitimately accounted for, and anyone who attempts to disturb the functions of an Islamic mosque because ``terrorists'' could potentially meet there would risk an all out confrontation with the entire Muslim world. Financial independence leads to other ``benefits.'' The ability of a particular group to finance its operations through private donations removes most obligations to act upon the wishes of a state. For instance, had the East Germans cut the purse strings of the Red Army Faction (RAF), the group's existence would have been short lived. Hence, the RAF had to be responsive to East German demands. The link between the RAF and East Germany could have been exploited by holding the East Germans responsible for the RAF's actions. The Hizballah and the HAMAS (HAMAS is arabic for the word "zeal" and it is an acronym for Harakat alMuqawama alIslamiyya (the Islamic Resistance Movement). ) do not have such states and, therefore, deterrence loses its effectiveness. State relevant terror groups are small organizations allowed to flourish within the boundaries of a state that is powerless to act against them. This type of group also possesses a desire to dominate the state in which it is fighting. Although this definition may seem odd, countries can be powerless to confront elements within their borders. Lebanon is a good example. There was, and still is, a state of Lebanon, but it has been, and still is, powerless to confront the terror organizations within its own borders. In the past, it has been unable to take effective action because of the ongoing civil war. Presently, Syria is the ``guarantor'' in Lebanon, and President Assad would not risk alienating fellow Muslims by rounding up the Islamists in Lebanon in order to weed out the violent radicals. The groups such as HAMAS and Amal fit this category well because they both fight in states they wish to rule once the fighting has stopped. Hence, the sense of mission for these groups is to rule Lebanon or Palestine and rid the Arab world of Jewish and Western influence. Another group which fits this category well is the Islamic Jihad. This group also wants to rid Palestine of the Jews and establish an Islamic theocracy in Palestine. State irrelevant terror is defined as those small groups that are independent of state sponsorship and finances and able to pursue their own agenda. These groups are the most flexible because of their freedom from state domination in financial and ``political'' realms. These groups are similar to state relevant groups in terms of their autonomy in participating in terror acts, the inability of state power to constrain them, and their ability to raise private monies to fund their operations. The difference is that the domination of individual states is simply a means to greater ends. An example of such a group is the Hizballah. It wants to dominate Lebanon and to reclaim Palestine from the Jews like the HAMAS and the Amal. However, the overall mission is to have all nations submit to Islam. 3. Dynamics It is necessary to establish this typology of terror organizations because the latter two groups (state relevant and irrelevant) do not have state imposed constraints. Therefore, these groups do not behave like state sponsored groups. This difference in behavior is critical when addressing the problems these types of groups pose. State sponsored terrorists have constraints placed upon them, not least because of the ability of the state to discipline dissident members within the organization: if certain members within the group jeopardize state missions by being ``too radical'' they will be dealt with immediately. Such a mechanism does not exist in groups that are not state sponsored. Groups that are political in nature, such as the PLO, would rather disassociate themselves from radical actors than discipline the troublesome members. This is largely because these political entities can not gain legitimacy from states if they employ violent measures to change the existing order. When examining the dynamics of radical organizations like terrorist groups, it is possible to discern a recurring pattern. It seems these organizations eventually undergo a transition in which the group splits into factions. For simplicity's sake, the factions will be named ``radical'' and ``moderate.'' There are probably exceptions to this statement, but, by and large, this is an established pattern. Examples range from the Irish Republican Army splitting into the Official and Provisional IRA to the Japanese Red Army Faction splitting from the Japanese Communist League. Perhaps the most striking examples are in the Middle East. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) started as the premier organization for the Palestinian cause. With the evolution of radicalism within the PLO, small bands, such as Force 17, the Black September Organization, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) emerged. However, as time went on, radical factions began to break away from the PLO, claiming that Yasir Arafat was concentrating too much on political settlements. For these groups, liberation would never happen unless they used violence to overthrow the Israelis. Such sentiment gave rise to the creation of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine General Command (PFLPGC). This group broke with the PFLP in 1968 claiming that it desired to use the sword rather than the spoken word. It was violently opposed to the moderate factions of the Palestinian movement because of Arafat's ``acceptance'' of a political solution. However, the dynamic did not stop with the PFLPGC. A splinter group called the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) broke from the PFLPGC and this group split even further into proLibyan, proSyrian, and ProPLO factions. Another off shoot of the PFLP was the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). Again, this group claimed that the only way to free Palestine was through violent action. Within this group, another split occurred between a proArafat segment and another hardline faction headed by Nayif Hawatmah 4 The same dynamic has occurred with another group known as the Muslim Brotherhood Society. The Brotherhood is an Islamist movement which wants to create a Muslim society in Palestine as was intended by the Prophet Muhammad. Although this group was originally moderate, it grew more radical in response to the criticism by the Islamic Jihad. These two factions had two entirely different views on how to reclaim Palestine. As noted Palestinian scholar Ziad Abu Amr has stated: Where the Islamic groups differ is on the centrality of the Palestine issue and the proper timing for liberating the country. For the Muslim Brotherhood, the first priority is the Islamic transformation of society, which it sees as a prerequisite to the liberation of Palestine. According to the Brotherhood, armed struggle (jihad) cannot be undertaken until the society is reformed, until secular ideas are abandoned and Islam is adopted. The Islamic Jihad, on the other hand, considers Palestine its central issue, and advocates armed struggle as its strategy for political action without waiting for the Islamization of society. The Islamic Jihad was all the more critical of the Brotherhood's failure to engage in armed struggle in that jihad is one of the five pillars of Islamic doctrine. (United States Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, (U.S. Government Publication), April 1993, pp. 32, 4547. 5 AbuAmr, Ziad, "HAMAS: A Historical and Political Background," Journal of Palestinian Studies (Summer 1993), p. 9. ) The Brotherhood allowed coexistence with secular Arab states. These differences, in combination with the eruption of the intifada, led to the Brotherhood sanctioning the use of violence in order to free Palestine from Israeli occupation. This led to the creation of what is known today as the HAMAS. The HAMAS' willingness to use terror in order to ``liberate'' Palestine is undoubted and has managed to overshadow the ``moderate'' Muslim Brotherhood. Finally, we will examine the Hizballah. This seems to be the group that many in the U.S. fear because of the ``Iranian connection.'' 6 This group was initially very radical and, although there has really been no visible split within the group itself, there are indicators in the state of Iran which suggest that a schism has occurred. After all Iran is, first and foremost, a religious community of Shi'ite Muslims and the Hizballah is a terrorist groups that is dominated by Shi'ites. Disorganization within the Iranian state is reflective of its religious community. Moreover, the revolution in Iran has lost considerable steam, largely because the Mullahs have been unable to deliver many of the promises they had made to the people. During Iran's eightyear war with Iraq, the enormous amounts of money spent on military procurements, and its inability to rebuild all of its oil fields devastated the economy, and the shattered economy has left many in Iran feeling disillusioned about the ability of their religiously run government. This, in conjunction with a leadership crisis, has broken the ``Khomeiniite'' hold on Iran. Another movement away from the radicals was the ascendance of Hashemi Rafsanjani to the Presidency of Iran and the redefinition of the role of the Velayat eFaqih. (For more on these subjects read: Sarabi, Farzin, "The PostKhomeini Era in Iran: The Elections of the Fourth Islamic Majlis," Middle East Journal, vol. 48 no. 1 (1994). 8 See: "Iran Broke CIA Spy Ring, U.S. Says," New York Times 8 August 1989. ) These are signs that the moderates in Iran are reemerging. A sign of Rafsanjani's moderation was his lack of action after a major CIA ring was broken up in Iran in April 1989. 8 Rafsanjani did not come out and attack the U.S. as was expected. One could hardly imagine 6 This "connection" has led many to believe that the Hizballah takes it marching orders form Tehran. This is simply another attempt to simplistically name groups "state sponsored." The Hizballah was never a tool of Iran, it was a tool of Khomeini. He used the group in order to internationalize his revolution. To assure that no one would moderate this group and hence, compromise his revolution, he kept it separate from the ruling establishment. what would have happened had Khomeini been in power. A subsequent example of its moderation was the assistance in the freeing of U.S. hostages in Lebanon. In short, Iran's religious community is fractionalized at best and without solid leadership. The internal situation in Iran may have a significant impact on terrorist groups such as the Hizballah. 4. U.S. Policy The ``get tough'' stance on terrorism was started in the United States after the massacre at Lod Airport in Israel and the killing of the Israeli olympic athletes in Munich in 1972. The media brought terrorism to the forefront of world attention, and the U.S. was compelled to formulate policy on this unpredictable form of violence. This ``get tough'' attitude was both a blessing and a curse. The benefit was that the United States realized that terror organizations were capable units, willing and able to take their fight to the international stage. This realization forced President Nixon to gather all the agencies that would play a role in the fight against terrorism and form a committee that would handle future terror incidents. (The committee was called the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism. It was comprised of the Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of Defense, Attorney General, Secretary of Transportation, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs, the Director of the F.B.I., and whoever else the President might deem necessary.) This action, at the very least, set parameters for the jurisdictions of these agencies. It also gave U.S. government agencies a mandate to prevent terrorism from affecting the United States. However, the formation of this committee occurred more for show than substance. This lack of motivation was reflected in the performance of the group when it became operational. The committee continued to meet for about five years and achieved very little. A staff report issued by the Sub committee on Civil and Constitutional Rights noted ``[i]n the five years of existence the Committee accomplished little towards fulfilling its mandate.'' 10 The lack of accomplishment seems to indicate that since the United States had not suffered a direct blow from a terrorist organization, it lacked sufficient motivation to contemplate fully the reality of terrorism. After the Nixon/Ford administration left office the Committee was essentially dead. However, there was continued debate in the Carter administration on how to formulate counterterror policy. Deterrence was brought to the forefront of the discussion. The antiterrorist program under the Carter administration broke down into the following categories: 11 1. Prevention. International initiatives and diplomacy to discourage state support of terrorism and to build a broad consensus that terrorist acts are inadmissible under international law irrespective of the cause in which they are used. 2. Deterrence. Protection and security efforts of the public and private sectors to discourage terrorist acts---essentially target hardening. 3. Reaction. Antiterrorism operations in response to specific major acts of terrorism. 4. Prediction. Intelligence and counterintelligence efforts in continuous support of the other three program components. The Carter administration's definition of deterrence was essentially based on passive techniques like target hardening. Carter's intention with this policy was to make it harder for terrorists to get to their desired targets, rather than crippling the organization before it could reach the U.S. Although many criticize Carter for not taking a more active stance with terrorists, he 10 For more on this, see U.S. Congress, House, Federal Capabilities in Crises Management and Terrorism. Staff Report, Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, 95th Congress, 2nd session, December 1978, p. 6. 11 Executive Committee on Terrorism, The United States Government Antiterrorist Program (Washington: National Security Council, June 1979), p. 2. at least was able to formulate a policy. That was more than Nixon's Cabinet Committee had accomplished. The administration's idea of deterrence reveals much about Carter's thoughts on what terrorists would most likely target, and is very narrow in focus. The assumption seems to be that only state and private facilities will be targeted. For example, it is plausible to build the White House and virtually all U.S. Embassies into veritable fortresses, but this technique is completely useless when it comes to protecting the most vulnerable portion of the state: its civilian population. Hence, this passive approach to deterrence has limited effectiveness. Site hardening may be used in conjunction with other policies, but, as a definitive objective, it has many holes. As Reagan and Bush ascended to power in the 1980s, they maintained the idea of getting tougher with terrorists. Although the definition of deterrence changed, there were still shortcomings in their version of deterrence. National Security Decision Directive 138 symbolized the change in definition. Defense Department official Noel Koch reported that it was ``a quantum leap in countering terrorism, from a reactive mode to recognition that proactive steps are needed.'' ("Preemptive AntiTerrorist raids Allowed." Washington Post, April 16, 1984, p. 19. 13 Motley, James B. "Target America: The Undeclared War" in Neil Livingstone and Terrell Arnold edt. Winning the War against Terrorism. (Lexington, D.C. Heath and Company, 1986), p. 67.) Although much of NSDD 138 is still classified, there is one idea that is pervasive throughout the document. All countries have a right to defend themselves and states that use or support terrorism cannot be allowed to do so without consequences. 13 The following quote by Admiral James D. Watkins encapsulated the Reagan Administration's thinking about terrorism: Our goal is to deter aggressors from taking terrorist actions against us. We should work to make terrorist acts so counterproductive and costly, that potential perpetrators will think twice before carrying out, or threatening to carry out, terrorist acts. In that context, even preemptive and retaliatory acts carried out for their deterrent effect may, under carefully controlled circumstances, be moral. 14 This quote symbolized the change from passive deterrence of the Carter Administration to the active deterrence emphasized by Reagan. Operation El Dorado Canyon was a perfect example of the Reagan Administration's counter terror policy. Although it can be argued this operation was successful in deterring state sponsored terrorism, such strikes will not deter all terrorists, especially those that do not depend on states for their livelihood. In fact, similar strikes run a better chance of making more enemies than deterring the ones that already exist. Martha Crenshaw states: Terrorism may also be intended to provoke a counteraction from the government, to increase publicity for the terrorists' cause, and to demonstrate that criticism of the regime is well founded. Terrorists mean to force the state to show its true repressive face, thereby driving the people into the arms of the challengers. 15 The U.S must avoid overt shows of repressive force because that force can be used to legitimize the criticisms of the terrorist groups. Therefore, a new approach must be taken in order to combat terrorist organizations that are not state sponsored. Many do not see the lethal potential in these groups because of their relatively limited financial and military support. However, these are the groups that are most dangerous to the U.S. and its allies. It is precisely their diminutive stature which makes them such a threat. Groups such as the HAMAS and the Hizballah feel, since they have no state of their own, they have very little to lose and much to gain by employing terror tactics. 14 Admiral James D. Watkins, "Countering Terrorism: A New Challenge to our National Conscience, "Sea Power, November, 1984, p. 37. 15 Crenshaw, Martha, "Causes of Terrorism," in Charles W. Kegley, ed., International Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls (New York: St. Martins Press, 1990), p. 118. 5. Problems with U.S. Policy In the United States, policies that surround the issue of terrorism have traditionally been more rhetorical than substantial. An even more significant shortcoming has been the assumption that terrorism can be deterred. This is a pervasive thought in combatting terrorism but, in reality, is flawed. Under some circumstances, efforts at punitive deterrence has been counterproductive. For example, after the bombing of the Marine barracks and the U.S. Embassy in Lebanon, the U.S.S. New Jersey lobbed shells into the AlShouf mountains hoping to deter future actions of the fledgling Hizballah. This action, however, legitimized the Hizballah's version of U.S. intervention in the region, and neither impeded nor deterred the group from committing future acts. Another prime example was the attempted assassination of Hizballah ``leader'' Muhammad Fadlallah. While this operation failed, it also managed further to convince the Shi'ites in the region that the U.S. was out to destroy the Muslim world and its leaders. Neither Reagan's nor Carter's version of deterrence should be pursued as a primary objective when considering counterterror policies. Many in the Arab world still consider the United States the ``Great Satan'' and, therefore, the greatest evil on earth. Devout Islamists are not concerned with their own lives or resources. Their mission is simple: to have all submit to Islam and those who will not submit must be eradicated. Threats of violence against these groups are useless. In the Islamists' mindset, it is the highest duty for a Muslim to fight and, if need be, to die for his faith. For an outsider to threaten death accomplishes nothing but assists them in their martyrdom. Deterrence assumes that the adversary is concerned about selfpreservation. If members of groups such as the Hizballah are willing to accept death, deterrence is not an option. Consequently, a new approach to this problem is essential. Policy Prescription This policy prescription relies heavily on the intelligence community and is based on the ``schism'' dynamic discussed above. The first stage involves collecting and collating information about various terrorist organizations. The second stage of this policy consists of making contact with the moderate faction of the organization's constituency. The third phase deals with gaining access to the moderate faction's intelligence network, and establishing a closer relationship with the moderate elements. Although terrorism will continue from the radical group even after most of its backing has been stripped away, in the final phase, the use of counterintelligence (CI) can be used to disarm the rump of the radical faction. When these groups split into radical and moderate factions, the U.S. must have hard evidence as to why the schism occurred and what type of support the factions have. Intelligence services must ascertain, with the highest degree of accuracy possible, who are leading the factions, what support they have, and who are their major enemies (both within the group and outside it). The primary target of such ``surveillance'' would be mosques that were known to have radical followers and preachers. Detailed information on moderate groups is necessary for the next stage of the policy. In the second stage, after the moderates and the radicals have been identified, it is necessary to initiate contact with the moderate faction. Such contact can be achieved by either overt or covert methods, depending on the situation. For example, an overt approach with the PLO served U.S. interests by enhancing Arafat's position and the factions that support him. It was viewed as the U.S. actually listening to the voice of the Palestinian nation, and was followed by tangible efforts to resolve Palestinian problems. Efforts ranged from increased financial aid to moderating future negotiations for the establishment of a Palestinian state. This access and subsequent successes should, in turn, make Arafat a viable alternative for voicing grievances. In essence, these actions gave the moderates the political initiative. However, such an approach would not work with a state like Iran. If the U.S. were to make overt governmental overtures to Tehran, Rafsanjani would be forced to refuse. If he accepted U.S. advances, he would unnecessarily run the risk of being seen as collaborating with the ``Great Satan,'' which could cost him his political future as well as unite the hardliners against the U.S. This would, in turn, give the initiative to the radicals and probably trigger renewed attacks by fundamentalist terror groups. Therefore, covert diplomacy should be the tool here. Approaches should be made to Rafsanjani and other moderates, covertly suggesting that the U.S. wishes to ``bury the hatchet'' and pursue a more peaceful policy towards Tehran. In order to convince the moderates in Tehran that these peaceful overtures are legitimate, the U.S. would have to make concessions to Rafsanjani without alerting either the U.S. public or the radicals in Tehran. This could be accomplished by using nonstate actors. For example, Washington could quietly encourage American oil companies to aid the Iranian government to rebuild the oil rigs damaged in the IranIraq war. Unfreezing Iranian assets that have been held since 1979 would be another signal that the U.S. was serious about rapprochement. If the U.S. discontinues its confrontation with Tehran, it would remove much of the steam that drives the engine of the radicals. This would, in turn, enable the moderates in the country to regain the political initiative. The third stage in the development of this counter terror policy is contingent upon the success of attaining positive dialogue with the moderate factions. The attempt to achieve a running dialogue with the moderate factions is crucial to the success of this policy plan and can reasonably be expected to be effective so long as the moderate faction wants to remain a viable political force. Constituencies want tangible results that their problems are being solved. In the absence of such results, radical solutions can appear attractive. Therefore, if moderate leaders can produce tangible results for their constituency, it enhances their legitimacy while simultaneously reducing the legitimacy of radical solutions. The United States can aid in this process through monetary or trade incentives. Once the dialogue with the moderate faction is established, the U.S. must strive to gain access to the intelligence assets of the moderates. This access can be achieved by granting further monetary and/or political concessions. The extensive human intelligence (humint) network that is already in place would be an invaluable asset to the U.S. because of the time needed and extreme difficulty in building such a network of its own. Arafat and his Lieutenants, for example, already have a network capable of reporting on groups in the area that have hostile intentions towards the U.S. Subsequently, penetration into the radical groups would be much easier. Arafat personnel would be much more able to penetrate those radical organizations than U.S. personnel because those radical groups will be competing with Arafat factions for members. One or many men or women loyal to Arafat could pose as dissidents and infiltrate the organization and feed intelligence on radical organizations. Once the U.S. gained access to this network, the nature of the relationship would essentially turn into a quid pro quo. The U.S. would then support the Arafat camp by supplementing U.S. humint with Arafat's own intelligence sources and/or increasing foreign aid in return for the latest intelligence on the radicals. Arafat could be Washington's biggest ally in the fight against Islamic terrorism. Many of the terror organizations claim to act on behalf of the Palestinian cause. Hence, most of these groups need the support of the Palestinians to maintain their struggle. If the U.S. could gain access into the Arab world through Arafat and then eventually establish its own intelligence network, the rewards would be considerable. Once solid intelligence is received on a consistent basis, dealing with terror groups becomes easier. The fourth stage is based on the fact that increased legitimacy of the moderate faction will not stop the radical faction from using violence. It is unlikely terrorism will be eradicated. Most terror groups are formed because the viable avenues of political, social, and economic change are perceived to be blocked. A small group of ``militants'' are empowered to champion the cause of justice. This ``empowerment'' can elevate certain individuals to a higher plane (socially, politically, etc.) as well as give them tremendous political authority within their community and/or nation. To assume that one would be completely willing to forgo such power is not realistic. Thus, it is not foolish to speculate that these leaders would try to ``prolong'' the movement in order to gain more concessions from the government and maintain their heightened status. A quote from Jerrold M. Post encapsulates this thought well. He states, ``Terrorists whose only significance comes from being terrorists cannot be forced to give up terrorism, for to do so would be to lose their very reason for being. `` (Post, Jerrold W. "Terrorist PsychoLogic" in Walter Reich ed. Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1990, p. 38.) This is a strong barrier to overcome and thus, it is virtually impossible to completely remove this form of violence from the international arena. It is not the purpose of this paper to eliminate terrorism. Rather, it is to reduce and control the damage terrorist groups can exact on the U.S. Given that some members of an organization feel that participation in terrorist actions will elevate them to a noble plane, it is logical that terrorism will occur even if all of a constituency backs the actions of the moderates in a society. When this happens, counterintelligence (CI) assets, in particular, should be brought to bear in order to fight these groups. A terrorist organization's most powerful asset is secrecy. If it cannot maintain its covert status, state officials would seek out and destroy the unit after one act was committed. Not surprisingly, these groups are extremely suspicious (if not paranoid) when attempting to maintain their secrecy. This asset is a two way street, however, and can be manipulated through the use of counterintelligence, as has been noted by Angelo Codevilla and Roy Godson: Effective deception can be viewed as a kind of mental judo---a set of techniques for handling an opponent by lending just a little extra strength to his own tendencies. Hence the most fundamental operational requirement for deception is knowledge of the target's prejudice---What does he want to believe? What is he disposed to accept? And who in the target's camp is disposed to accept what. (Godson, Roy et. al. Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s Vol. 7. (Lexington: Lexington Books), 1986, p. 102. ) Terrorist groups actively seek out informers in their ranks. Therefore, counterintelligence should create the illusion that one of the members (preferably one of high rank in the organization) is an informant. If this operation targets more than one person within the group, it will cause suspicion and, perhaps, create a witch hunt. Since these groups are small to begin with, as suspicion grows within the ranks it could effectively paralyze the unit. This paralysis will result, at least, in a temporary cessation of activity by the group. At best, it could cause a complete breakup. Conclusion The intelligence option is one that can result in very tangible benefits while minimizing risks to U.S. interests and personnel. Everyone pays lip service to the fact that intelligence is the ``front line'' of defense against terrorist groups. However, when debate is raised about countering such activity, the discussion bypasses intelligence options in favor of legal, diplomatic, and military solutions. Yet, the use of the CIA and its intelligence capabilities may be the most effective tool against terror organizations. As such, intelligence agencies should be the primary instrument in fighting the war against terrorism. However, if intelligence assets are still not adequate to neutralize the danger of terrorist groups, other actions should be considered. When this occurs, the U.S. must be willing and able to ``up the ante'' if need be. Military options provoke many ethical as well as practical objections. Many do not view the military option as a viable solution because of the possibility of hurting civilians as well as placing U.S. military personnel in harm's way. (By "military option" it is meant sending U.S. Special Forces groups into hostile territory and neutralizing camps or individuals.) Another problem which should be taken very seriously is the fact that the U.S. has not been effective at military operations which require a person or group to be neutralized (e.g. Aidid in Somalia, Noriega in Panama, and Qadaffi in Libya). These operations may be feasible, but they are also highly prone to failure. Even though this option appears weak, however, it is still a necessary possibility. If groups realize that the U.S. will not resort to force, this perception may send the wrong message to terror groups and allow them to feel they can act with impunity. In conclusion, the fight against terrorist organizations with no state support is difficult for the U.S. because Washington has not dealt with such actors in the past. With the end of the Cold War, the U.S. will have to deal more often with terrorist groups in the future. If the U.S. fails to understand that these groups do not behave like states, the chances for ineffective policy increase exponentially. The problem with formulating comprehensive policy is that it takes time. Meanwhile, policy makers may be tempted to use the military as a ``quick fix'' to the terrorist problem. The danger in succumbing to this temptation is twofold. First, the U.S. has not been entirely successful in such low intensity missions, and the probability of failure remains high. Second, such actions may anger, not deter, the terror groups and undermine, rather than enhance, the efforts to have the moderates as part of an attempt to divide and rule. Skillful diplomacy and effective intelligence and counterintelligence are likely to be more effective than the use of force. ------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor ---------------------~--> Secure your servers with 128-bit SSL encryption! Grab your copy of VeriSign's FREE Guide, "Securing Your Web site for Business" and learn all about serious security. Get it Now! http://us.click.yahoo.com/r0k.gC/oT7CAA/yigFAA/kgFolB/TM ---------------------------------------------------------------------~-> ------------------ http://all.net/ Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.2 : 2001-09-29 21:08:44 PDT