[iwar] [fc:The.Afghan.Conflict.and.Regional.Security]

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The Afghan Conflict and Regional Security

P. Stobdan, Fellow, IDSA
Strategic Analysis, August 1999 Vol XXIII No. 5
Institute for Defense Analysis, New Delhi, India
<a href="http://www.idsa-india.org/an-aug9-3.html">http://www.idsa-india.org/an-aug9-3.html>

[IDSA claims to be an autonomous organization to conduct study and research
on problems of national security and the impact of defence measures on the
economic, security and social life of India.]

During the last phase of the Cold War, an influential school of thought
in the United States felt that if the Soviets' "fraternal" aggression
against Afghanistan had not happened, it would have had to be invented.1
On the other hand, Gorbachev felt in 1988, that "the untying of the
Afghan knot" would have a profound international impact on resolving
conflicts in the Middle East, in the Gulf region, in Southern Africa, in
Cambodia, and in Central America.  Gorbachev was perhaps right--the
East-West disengagement from Afghanistan paved the way for wider peace
in the post-Cold War era, either through successful UN conflict
resolution efforts or through unilateral intervention by the only
superpower, the US.  Contrarily, in Afghanistan, the collapse of the
bipolar system led to the internal collapse of the Afghan state,
plunging the country into political anarchy and civil war, thereby,
posing the question; was the Afghan conflict the cause, or a consequence
of the end of the geo-political order?

February 15, 1999, marked the tenth anniversary of the Soviet troops'
withdrawal from Afghanistan.  The Soviet Union disintegrated after that. 
The US was supposed to have disengaged from Afghanistan.  The pro-Soviet
Najibullah regime stepped down from power in 1992.  The Geneva Accords
that symbolised the hope for world peace became a point of further
discord.  The United Nations, authorised to implement the peace plan for
a "period of transition," has remained ineffective so far.  The
international community is busy elsewhere in the face of other impinging
issues arising close to the Western world.  Afghanistan today has
descended into complete anarchy, imperilling its people and scaring its
neighbours with multiple threats.  But the world is quiet, while there
is no visible sign of any form of stability returning to that country in
the near future. 

The Afghan conflict, at the same time, raises the intriguing conceptual
question pertaining to the international system, as to whether the
conflict still has any organic linkage with bipolarity or is it a part
of the symptoms of the changing international order characterised by the
rise of multipolarity.  There are no analytical frameworks available to
suggest such a pattern affecting the Afghan scene.  Nevertheless, the
absence of a bipolar system has not necessarily led to the rise of
regionalism managing regional security issues like the Afghan conflict. 
The regional actors still look to the United Nations and other world
bodies for conflict management.  In the case of Afghanistan, the
situation is further complicated by its geo-political and historical
background.  Though Afghanistan as a state existed since 1747, its
current political borders evolved only toward the end of the last
century (1880-1901) as an outcome of rivalry between British India and
Tsarist Russia.  Though there are several myths associated with the land
and people of Afghanistan being invincible for outside powers, the fact
was that the political and military compulsions demanded the creation of
a buffer state between the two giant powers in Asia.  Politically
speaking, it was the issue of security between British India and Russia
that determined Afghanistan as a state more than the factor of its
sovereignty.  Afghanistan's spatial location denied it the resources for
it to be a viable state.  Historically, various Afghan rulers sustained
their power on revenue drawn from conquests in India.  Both the
political stability and economic sophistication of the Afghan regimes
depended largely on resources generated from loot, plunder, raids and
taxes from the neighbouring regions.  The stabilisation of Afghanistan
also required careful understanding among the external powers concerned,
specially with regard to its independence, its borders, as well as
assured resources for the rulers in Kabul to maintain control over
territory and population.  In other words, Afghanistan was useful for
the great empires for sustaining the balance of power.  In return, the
rulers in Afghanistan received enough resources from the neighbouring
powers to sustain control and internal stability.  The traditional
Afghan rulers knew what is, and how to act as, a buffer state.  The
Soviet intervention may have caused damage to Afghanistan's buffer
status--the associated fall-out of that has been too severe to be
corrected soon.  Nevertheless, the internal political conflict that
erupted in Afghanistan following the Communist coup in 1978 continued
primarily due to aid and support rendered by the opposing external
powers concerned.  The Geneva Accords of April 1988 and the termination
of aid to both sides were aimed at reinstating international cooperation
for peace rather than war.  But before they could be fully implemented,
a number of other actors, including sectarian groups, quickly filled in
the vacuum in Afghanistan.  Gorbachev may have had good intentions in
withdrawing from Afghanistan, but the US and its proxy alliance
continued support in one form or the other to various armed factions. 
As the Kabul regime weakened, external powers got tempted to join
internal Afghan factions.  In the absence of a powerful central
government, peripheral forces emerged stronger, resulting in the rise of
suppressed ethnic/tribal animosities.  Notwithstanding the frequent
shifts in power relations within and outside Afghanistan, the
regional/ethnic power blocs fighting for control of Kabul since 1992
failed to agree for a unified institution to govern the country.  The
rise of a new group, the Taliban has proved not logical enough to undo
the structural collapse.  Afghanistan today, as Barnett R.  Rubin
described it, is "a legally undivided territory of fragmented power."

This paper is an attempt at summarising the study on the Afghan conflict
in the international, regional and domestic contexts, particularly in
the backdrop of the post-Soviet developments.  It is a brief analysis of
the Afghan situation impacting the regional security environment in its
immediate South and Central Asian region, specially in terms of security
policy relations among the regional actors involved in the conflict. 
The paper examines the way in which traditional security profiles of
regional countries are undergoing changes as a result of the threats
posed by the on-going conflict in Afghanistan.  It also analyses the
consequent impact of the changing regional security environment on
India's security concerns. 

International Context

Afghanistan is no longer a priority agenda on the international stage. 
International commitment for resolving almost the quarter of a
century-old conflict has slipped down amidst unfolding of new events in
Europe and elsewhere.  Even before the Kosovo developments, the world
concern for Afghanistan had slowed down.  As compared to the late 1980s,
when international donors poured in billions of dollars to help the
Afghans, the agencies dealing with Afghan repatriation programmes such
as the UN refugee agency UNHCR, the UN World Food Programme (WFP), the
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and other international
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) now complain that the goodwill
among donors for Afghanistan has dried up.  They find it increasingly
difficult to raise funds for anything to do with Afghanistan.2 Recently,
the UNHCR could get only $761,000 from Sweden, in response to an appeal
for $17 million needed for humanitarian concerns.  There are a number of
factors for this declining attention on the Afghan issue:

1.  In the first place, nobody in the Western world, especially in the
US, ever envisaged that there would be a post-Soviet Afghanistan.  The
post-mortem analysis of the US' Afghan policy suggests that Washington
had great confidence in Pakistani assessments of the developments in
Afghanistan, and little understanding and control over the tragic
developments in the aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal. 

2.  Throughout the 1990s, the Western world remained preoccupied with
the events in the Gulf and later in Europe.  Stabilisation of Central
and Eastern Europe remained the primary issue of concern and Afghanistan
attracted little notice in countries that had earlier shown commitment
to the resistance movements.

3.  The Taliban came in as a handy tool for the West to contain Iran. 
The militia's rise was also seen in the context of increasing
Indo-Iranian cooperation in Central Asia.  The Afghan politics also
seemed hostage to the new geo-politics of oil.  The USA and Saudi
Arabia, in connivance with Pakistan, took a series of steps to deny Iran
the strategic advantage it had acquired in the aftermath of the Soviet
collapse.  Iran claimed that the US Administrations had spared no effort
in using US diplomatic and financial influence to frustrate any positive
result that may derive from Iran's mediation in Afghanistan. 

4.  The Afghan conflict took a different turn in the post-Soviet era, in
terms of both its cause and nature, characterised more as a localised
conflict with few ramifications for the international community.  The US
policy goals with respect to Russia, Central Europe, Caucasus and
Central Asia dictated Washington's attitude towards Afghanistan.  In
short, the US adopted a "hands-off" policy with regards to Afghanistan,
while only pushing for the UN-sponsored peace plan. 

5.  After a brief relative disengagement, the US, much to its disbelief
and dismay, discovered in 1993 that many of its past Afghan policies had
started to boomerang against the US interests. 

Many of the good old Mujahideen, including the Americans' own favourites
and proteges like Gulbuddin.  Hekmatyar, had turned Afghanistan into a
breeding ground for terrorists. 

The Afghan War veterans, also known as "Afghanis" numbering in
thousands, had got involved in anti-Western terrorist acts.3

The increasing menace of terrorist threat to the West, originating from
Afghanistan since 1993, led to intense debate in the US, in both
official circles and outside, that questioned Washington's policy,
ignoring the tragic aftermath, and sought suggestions for rectifying the
past policies that had begun to backfire on American interests. 

The concern began after the pipebomb explosions at the Olympic Games in
Atlanta, the loss of 230 lives on board TWA Flight 800 in 1996, the bomb
explosion at the Egyptian embassy in Islamabad, the killing of CIA
officials in Karachi, and the abduction of six Europeans by the Al-Faran
in Kashmir that sent shock waves in the Western world. 

The Group of Seven Anti-Terrorism Conference was held in July 1996, in
Paris, to initiate a global, coordinated effort to identify and locate
thousands of veterans of the US-backed 1979-89 Afghan War against the
Soviets. 

It was in this backdrop of the American commitment to combat the
terrorist network, based in Afghanistan, that Washington provided a
clear-cut incentive for the introduction of the Taliban movement that
emerged on the Afghan political scene in October 1994. 

The US also saw a strategic interest in the Taliban, as the latter
promised to work towards,

(i) disarming of armed guerillas;
(ii) driving out international terrorists from Afghanistan;
(iii) fighting against Islamic fundamentalism, putting an end to drug-trafficking; 
(iv) doing away with the unexploded landmines;
(v) reuniting Afghanistan under a single stable government.

The Taliban victory over Kabul, therefore, was welcomed by the US. 
Washington talked about plans to dispatch diplomats to Kabul to confer
with the Taliban, and expressed interest in reopening its embassy. 

The State Department spokesman expressed the hope that the Taliban "will
act quickly to restore order and security and to form a representative
interim government that can begin the process of reconciliation
nation-wide.  "Washington only expressed "regret" at the execution of
Najibullah.  The State Department spokesman, Nicholas Burns,
acknowledged that the US had had contacts with the Taliban "regularly in
the years past but also this year."4 In general, the Americans welcomed
the militia as a moderate force for peace and stability.  The editorial
comment of the New York Times said, "The Islamic fundamentalist movement
that gained control over much of Afghanistan with a recent string of
military victories has brought a measure of stability to the country for
the first time in years." Similarly, a former State Department official
who dealt with the US Afghan policy, Zalmay Khalilzad, said that "the US
should actively assist the Taliban because even though it is
fundamentalist, it does not practise the anti-US style fundamentalism of
Iran."5 The Americans described the Taliban as "anti-modernism" rather
than "anti-Western", and also noted that they are keen on restoring a
"traditional society" rather than "exporting Islam."

Within less than a month of the Taliban's take-over of Kabul, the US
made a U-turn in its position, when it abandoned the plan to send an
envoy to Kabul. 

The US policy shift came amidst mounting international criticism against
the Taliban's appalling policies.  The savagery and arbitrary medieval
rule, while imposing a strict Islamic social code, banning women from
working and shutting down girls schools, turned off the international
community, drawing condemnation even from the orthodox Iranian clergy. 

Washington's denouncement of the Taliban action also came in the
backdrop of the presidential election in the US, as supporting a regime
that had no respect for human rights would have negatively affected
Clinton's position.  Robin Raphel said that the "US had little influence
in Afghanistan, and supports none of the warring factions, and has no
plan for bringing the conflict to an end."

Another senior official of the US Administration denied that the US had
assisted the Taliban in capturing Kabul.  The official asserted that "as
far as US policy is concerned, we have always maintained that peace and
security in Afghanistan can only be achieved through the establishment
of a broad coalition government."6

Washington got rattled not only with the Inter-Services Intelligence's
(ISIs) ill conceived plan but also horrified and ashamed at the
Taliban's defiance. 

The US' Taliban policy evoked mounting criticism for being too dependent
on Pakistani inputs and analyses. 

One US official was reported to have noted: "The US' initial embrace of
the Taliban, which proved to be an embarrassment, was prompted by
Pakistan, which had misled Washington into thinking that the Taliban
could stem narcotics trafficking from Afghanistan and close down all the
exports-oriented terrorist camps in that country.  We soon realised the
Taliban could do neither, and more so, we found that they were to a
large extent funding their own operations with the profits from
drug-trafficking." Since then, the US followed only a policy of
engagement with the Taliban and called for the formation of a
broad-based government in Afghanistan. 

Gradually, the international focus on Afghanistan has changed
qualitatively from that of internally stabilising the country to the
problems concerning only international terrorism, narco-trafficking,
human rights, etc. 

Afghanistan today receives a "cartoon type image of goodies and
baddies." The focus on the Taliban's barbaric treatment of women and
children, championed by no less a person that Hillary Clinton, supported
by the American Feminist Majority (AFM) and the National Organisation
for Women has completely overshadowed the other problems in Afghanistan. 
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and other officials deplored the
Taliban's "despicable" treatment of women and children and their lack of
respect for human dignity.7 Similarly, the sheltering by the Taliban of
the world's most sought-after terrorist, Osama bin Laden, in
Afghanistan, has given it a negative image among the world community. 

If Afghanistan captured the centre-stage of international affairs
through the 1980s, the issues today are shaped more by other events. 
The global security concerns of non-proliferation, the emergence of
nuclear power states in South Asia, the Saddam Hussein phenomenon in
West Asia, the democratisation and human rights issues in Central Asia,
the fear of religious and ethnic uprising in the region, and above all,
the need to tap the vast natural resources in Central Asia, etc, have
emerged as important issues of concern in the region of Central and
South Asia. 

The Afghan issue has also receded from the primary agenda of concerns of
other world organisations like the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the
Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC), the Economic Cooperation
Organisation (ECO) and others.  In fact, the NAM in its recent meetings
has shown concern about the need to curb the menace of international
terrorism in all forms.  The OIC initiatives on Afghanistan are also
becoming less effective due to divergence of interest about the issue
among member countries. 

Regional Security Concerns

Interests in Central Asia

If the Afghan conflict has got marginalised on the international stage,
it has become the most alarming issue of security concern for regional
countries in South and Central Asia.  In fact, in the post-Cold War era,
both the reasons and nature of the conflict in Afghanistan have assumed
a regional character.  What appears now in Afghanistan is the East-West
confrontation being replaced by sectarian conflict among powerful
Islamic states.  The Afghan conflict posed a challenge to the regional
countries at two broad levels. 

First, the geo-strategic importance of Afghanistan following the Soviet
disintegration has become more critical for the regional countries.  The
emergence of new ethnic based states in Central Asia has fundamentally
altered the security environment.  The politics in terms of religion,
ethnicity, regionalism has made Afghanistan most explosive for the
entire region. 

Secondly, the Cold War had left a legacy in strategic thinking and
security policy perception among the major regional countries that
resulted in a clash of interest and formation of loose regional
alignments around Afghanistan. 

If we elaborate further, the Afghan conflict has posed a challenge to
the three Central Asian countries--Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and
Turkmenistan--to deal with the practical aspect of coping with possible
spillover of turbulence into the region.8

The Afghan conflict negatively impinging on their security includes:

(i) the threat of religious ideology affecting the domestic political cleavages; 
(ii) the relative backwardness of the Afghan society and economy affecting
the future developmental programmes of Central Asian states;
(iii) the Afghan conflict as a major constraint for developing communication
and energy pipelines towards the southern direction;
(iv) the threat of Central Asian states getting drawn into the
"narco-corridor" originating from Afghanistan;
(v) the threat of trans-border terrorism, especially in the wake of Wahhabi
activists' presence in Afghanistan;
(vi) the threat of refugee influx.

After the Soviet distengration, both Uzbekistan and Tajikistan became
"frontline" states which had to deal with the major hotbed of
instability in Afghanistan.  They have found themselves being encircled
by an arc of crises in the immediate neighbourhood torn apart by
internal conflicts--encouraged by ethnic intolerance, religious
extremism, sectarian violence, regional and tribal conflicts, drug
trafficking and external pressures of different kinds. 

The Central Asian fear in this regard is compounded by the fact that the
Uzbek and Tajik Diasporas are the largest among others in Afghanistan. 
In fact, there are more Tajiks in Afghanistan than in Tajikistan itself. 
Uzbekistan's approach to the Afghan issue is shaped mainly by the fear
of an Afghanistan type situation getting repeated in Tajikistan, which
in turn would have direct implications for Uzbekistan's security.  The
fear is that any solution of the Afghan problem on the basis of Pushtun
ethnic affinity will lead to greater Tajik nationalism that will
inadvertently undermine Uzbekistan's national unity. 

The Afghan conflict has in many ways redefined the contours of post-Cold
War regional alignments and power relationships around the South,
Central and West Asian regions.  At one level, the strategic axis
between Pakistan and the US, as well as between Pakistan and China has
not undergone changes.  On the other hand, the traditional perceptions
of security interests between Russia and India, as well as Russia and
the Central Asian states are being fractured or getting diluted.  Many
of the agreements concerning security envisaged in the Tashkent
Collective Security Treaty of May 1992 are becoming redundant or are
deliberately being floundered.  Although the threat from the Taliban
continues to activate consultations among the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) members, many problems have cropped up on
account of the inability of the organisation to do more than defending
the CIS borders against the Taliban's advance towards the north. 

The Afghan conflict is encouraging a trend among the Central Asian
states to diversify their security policy ties and orientations with
countries other than their traditional security guarantor, Russia.  A
greater degree of ambiguity with respect to security is emerging in
Central Asia today.  For example, Russia is perceived as the guarantor
of Central Asian security, but, at the same time, also a threat to their
national independence and sovereignty.  This paradox is widening as
Russia is neither able to regain its control over its former territories
nor able to completely retreat from the region because of its own
national interests.  Kazakhstan, for example, considers its ties with
Russia as geo-strategically unavoidable but, at the same, time, it
sought to develop a substantive strategic partnership with the United
States under the 1994 Charter on Democratic Partnership between the US
and Kazakhstan. 

Uzbekistan, too, in the initial years, had a strong bilateral defence
cooperation with Russia, but since 1995, there has been increasing shift
in Uzbekistan's security planning away from Russia.  Tashkent refers to
Russia as "imperialistic," refuses to support Russian views on North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO's) eastward expansion, and instead
has become an ardent advocate of the Partnership of Peace (PfP)
programme.  It supports transport and pipeline routes that bypass
Russian territory.  Recently, Uzbekistan opted out of the CIS Collective
Security Treaty of 1992, and promotes military integration within
Central Asia through the Central Asian Union (CAU).  Ambiguity also
exists in the Uzbek security policy.  Tashkent tends to reject Russian'
troops presence in Tajikistan because it could undermine Uzbekistan's
interest, but it seeks strong Russian support against the rising Islamic
threat from Afghanistan.  Similarly, Uzbekistan objects to Iranian
involvement in the Tajik conflict, but goes along with the Iranian
position of supporting the anti-Taliban forces in northern Afghanistan. 

A similar orientation of military security interests is being displayed
by Turkmenistan, which tends to pursue a posture of "positive
neutrality" and advocate close ties with Russia but does not approve of
the collective security and the CIS.  It remains close to Turkey but
understands the importance of Iran.  It has forged close relations with
Pakistan but remains sensitive to India's concerns.  Turkmenistan's
close ties with the Taliban have caused unease among other Central Asian
states, whereas, Kyrgyzstan has diversified its security policy goals
and adopted a more balanced orientation.  Both Turkmenistan and
Kyrgyzstan have become active participants in the PfP. 

The differing views on national security interests among the CIS states
have created opportunities for the US and other international
organisations to enter the region with greater intensity of security
policy engagement.  Already, the US has signed bilateral defence
treaties with Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Georgia.  The 1998 treaty with
Georgia covers American air and marine defence.  The US Sixth Fleet
flagship visited the Georgian port of Poti in September 1998.  Turkey
and the US conducted naval exercise "Sea Breaze-97" in the Black Sea. 
It is expected that the Sixth Fleet would soon penetrate the Caspian
Sea.  Azerbaijan has offered the US a military base on its territory. 
Baku has proposed that the US should include a platoon of Azerbaijan's
armed forces to the Balkans as part of the Turkish military contingent. 
Georgia and Azerbaijan are also seeking NATO peace-keeping operations in
Abkhazia, Karabakh, and the Dnestr Republic.9

The US has already brought in the Central Asian states into its Central
Command (Centcom) responsibility.  The military exercise by Centcom that
airlifted units of the 82nd Air Mobile Division direct from the US to
Central Asia for the conduct of the Centrabat-97 exercise in September
1997, clearly demonstrated the US' intention to build new structures for
regional security in Central Asia.  The Russian sources consider that
the US has already defined the areas of Central Asia and the Caucasus as
"zones of American responsibility" and these are already subject to
intelligence monitoring and tactical planning.  Except for Tajikistan,
the others have joined the NATO affiliates, the North American
Cooperation Council (NACC) and PfP, which provide mechanisms for
individually tailored programmes of security cooperation, like training
and joint exercises.  The new military-security profile of each Central
Asian state, which is currently evolving in response to the Afghan
conflict, may influence decisively the future security policy
environment of Russia and even India. 

On the other hand, the mutual defence treaty signed under the CIS
framework shaped in the form of the Tashkent Collective Security Treaty
of May 15, 1992, by Russia, the Central Asian states, except
Turkmenistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus and others, is weakening due
to the following reasons:

-- The vision of the CIS theatre commands has failed to take off.

-- Russia feels the treaty could drag Moscow into the conflicts between
member states.

-- Agreements signed bilaterally by each member with Russia are stronger
than the collective ones.

-- Severe financial pressure for enforcing the agreements.

-- Different view-points on regional security issues.

-- Varying threat perceptions of each member.

-- Failure to sort out the bilateral conflicts.

However, despite all the weaknesses and constraints, the Collective
Security Treaty remains operational in response to the threat from
Afghanistan and geo-political pressures from China.  In response, to
counter the threat from the Taliban, a joint exercise was conducted in
July 1997, in the Trans-Volga Military District as a test for a "Pamir
coalition army group." The treaty nevertheless failed to take a decision
to get directly involved in the Afghan conflict except to reinforce its
border troop contingent in Tajikistan to 20,000 men to confirm the
demilitarised zones along the Tajik-Afghan border.  There is, however,
talk about expanding the CIS Treaty beyond the confines of the former
USSR to include Iran in the activities. 

The new Central Asian security profile, such as the CAU, actively
associated with NATO's PfP, does not, however, indicate the region
acquiring any pan-Turkic identity or pan-Islamic orientation.  Instead,
the new profile is being projected as a mechanism to counter the threat
of Islamic fundamentalism that the CIS Collective Security Treaty has
failed to provide.  The CAU's objectives do not appear to be against
Russia, but Moscow may lose influence in Central Asia by default. 
Nevertheless, an anti-Russian realignment is taking a shape in the
Transcaucasus region after the formation of a grouping of Georgia,
Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova (GAUM) in October 1997.  Initially
started as an economic grouping, the GAUM is now getting a security
dimension as the member states are talking about forming a joint
battalion.  Uzbekistan has also lately shown interest in sending its
troops to be a part of the GAUM contingent. 

With both Afghan and Tajik conflicts at the back of their minds and
considering that each has its own Kosovos, NATO's recent bombing in
Yugoslavia has put the Central Asian states in a dilemma.  On the one
hand, they reject NATO's style of military actions in resolving ethnic
problems, but they are not sure who will help them in case such ethnic
problems occur in Central Asia. 

There are other initiatives like Kazakhstan's Conference on Interaction
and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) modelled on the
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).  But the
objective of the CICA is too amorphous and covers too many diverse
conflicting interests to emerge as a functional security organisation. 
It is also highly unlikely that the ECO will develop a security profile,
despite efforts by Pakistan and Iran to use it as a vehicle for
political rhetoric.  On the other hand, China is keen to give a security
dimension to the "Shangai Dialogue", a confidence-building measure (CBM)
among three Central Asian countries, Russia and China to resolve the
CIS-China frontiers.  This dynamic at the moment appears tactical rather
than strategic.  In the regional security complex of Central Asia,
Uzbekistan is appearing to be the key and most decisive factor in the
events to come.  First, Uzbekistan has become a "frontline" state after
the Soviet collapse, dealing with multiple threats emanating from the
south.  Second, notwithstanding Uzbekistan being the biggest state in
terms of demography, it is the hub of the Central Asian civilisation
and, therefore, has the potential to become the dominant regional power. 
The population of Uzbekistan is projected to grow from 23 million at
present to 50 million by the year 2010.  Third, like India in the case
of South Asia, Uzbekistan shares borders with all other Central Asian
states, including Afghanistan.  Fourth, the Uzbek Diaspora is the
largest among the ethnic minorities in Tajikistan and Afghanistan. 
Fifth, Uzbekistan has the potentials to diversify its economic resources
and may become an economically powerful state.  Sixth, it has no border
with Russia and China, which makes it easy to formulate independent
foreign and domestic policy postures. 

The above mentioned factors of Uzbekistan are bound to generate
suspicion between it and other regional countries.  Already there is
strong competition between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in a variety of
areas in the region.  The fear of Uzbekistan becoming a bully is making
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan look internally towards Kazakhstan.  Whereas
Turkmenistan wants be neutral for the same reason.  Externally,
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are looking towards Russia and China to
counter-balance Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan and Turkmenistan are taking
an orientation towards Iran for the same reason.  No state in Central
Asia is willing as yet to approve of Uzbekistan's dominant position in
the region.  But Uzbekistan's regional ambitions may have implications
for China, Iran and Russia getting more entrenched role in Central Asia
in the medium term.  Already Uzbekistan-Israel relations, Uzbekistan-US
relations, and Uzbekistan-Turkey relations have evoked suspicion in
Iran, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, further complicating the Afghan
conflict. 

In short, as the open-ended Russian military engagement may not continue
for a long time, the states in Central Asia may go closer to the
European security structure or look elsewhere, in order to seek a
guarantee for their national security.  This may generate new
circumstances and implications for resolving conflicts like those in
Afghanistan and other hot spots in Asia. 

Interests in South Asia

Pakistan/Iran

Pakistan's role in Afghanistan, especially in the post-war period has
been most crucial; however, it has not been able to settle the issue on
the lines it desires. 

It was expected in influential Pakistani circles that an indebted Afghan
nation would become a satellite of Pakistan. 

Some even hoped that Afghanistan would eventually federate with
Pakistan.  The concept of strategic depth for Pakistan was not just
acquiring military space, but a wider political canvass of diluting and
undermining of "Afghan nationalism" that threatened to exacerbate the
demand for Pushtunistan.  To that extent, Pakistan seems to have
achieved its purpose, as the concerns about Afghan irredentism around
the issue of Pushtunistan seem to have virtually disappeared, especially
after the rise of the Taliban. 

Although, at the official level, the strategic depth concept as
propounded by Zia is no longer propagated, the idea remains attractive
among religious groups and political parties in Pakistan.  They see a
greater possibility of expanding Islamic solidarity beyond Afghanistan
into Central Asia to strengthen its rivalry against India. 

Again, to that extent, Pakistan has achieved success in completely
cutting off the traditional Kabul-Delhi axis, which historically acted
as a strong counterweight against Pakistan. 

However, on other accounts, the Afghan conflict has a strong negative
bearing on Pakistan's domestic stability.  The fighting in Afghanistan
and the continued presence of more than a million Afghan refugees are
having a corrosive effect on the Pakistani domestic order.  There are
concerns expressed openly in Pakistan that any deeper involvement with
Afghanistan will distract Pakistan from the Kashmir issue. 

Among other thing, the critics in Pakistan argue that Islamabad is in a
situation of over-stretch, resulting in failure on both
fronts-Afghanistan and Kashmir. 

The other fear is that in a situation of Afghanistan getting fragmented
along ethnic and regional lines, the issue of Pushtunistan may be
revived.10 The emergence of the Pushtun dominated Taliban may further
increase the possibility of revival of the Pushtunistan issue. 

The Durand Line Agreement expired in 1993, and the Afghans have every
right to reclaim areas up to Attock, on the lines of Hong Kong's merger
with China. 

One school of thought even suggests that Pakistan raised the Taliban
militia in anticipation of interested parties like India and Britain
bringing up the Durand Line issue after the treaty expired in 1993. 

From Pakistan's point of view, the Taliban's creation has helped put the
universal goal of Islam ahead of any Afghan nationalist aims.11

Although, at present, Pakistan appears to have firm control over the
Taliban leadership, its ability to orchestrate the militia's activities
in the long term may be limited.  Both internationally and among the
regional countries, Pakistan stands isolated on the Afghan issue. 
Islamabad is too deeply involved in the conflict to be seen by other
regional actors as a dispassionate negotiator to end the conflict. 
[Iran]

Pakistan's traditional intimacy on the Afghan issue with Iran has also
disappeared, especially after the emergence of the Taliban.  The
bewildering sequence of developments in November 1998, after the
deplorable murder of Iranian diplomats at Mazar-i-Sharif, had brought
the Iranian forces and the Taliban to a near military confrontation. 
Iran amassed troops along the sensitive border with Afghanistan--an
action that sent out enough signals to the Taliban about Tehran's
concerns.  Iran achieved a number of objectives out of its military
manoeuvre along the Afghan border. 

First, the Taliban well understood the role of Iran in Afghanistan,
particularly its concern about the Shia population in Afghanistan. 
Second, the Iranian uproar compelled the UN to deplore the genocide by
the Taliban against the Shia minority population in northern
Afghanistan.  Third, the Iranian image in the eyes of Central Asian
countries improved considerably. 

Fourth, and most important, the Iranian action forced Unocol to withdraw
its pipeline project, to be built via Afghanistan.  Iran displayed
wisdom in opting out of a direct military action in Afghanistan, as that
could have helped Pakistan in getting out of its isolation on the Afghan
front.  It is more than clear that Iran will keep up its pressure if the
Pakistani backed Taliban undermines its interests. 

India

Afghanistan has traditionally engaged different sets of Indian security
policy concerns.  For reasons dictated by history and geography, India's
strategic concerns are tied up with the regions bordering our north and
north-west.  For a variety of reasons, India's abiding strategic
interests demanded a cordial and friendly relationship with the regimes
in Kabul.  The close historical and emotional proximity of Afghan
nationalism with Indian nationalism had brought the interests of the two
countries together.  India's benign presence in Afghanistan during the
Soviet period had been enduring.  However, the developments in
Afghanistan after the fall of Najibullah, have confronted India's
security policy with tough challenges.  The recent events have proved
that instability in Afghanistan has an adverse influence on India. 

The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan gave a pretext to Pakistan to
pursue its own interests based on General Zia's concept of "strategic
depth" vis-a-vis India. 

Pakistan took it as an opportune time, and in fact, saw to it that the
Soviet forces remained bogged down in Afghanistan for a longer period,
the ultimate objective being to draw the spectre of the Cold War closer
to the South Asian situation, which in turn could internationalise, if
not help solve, the Kashmir issue. 

The Mujahideen's victory against the Soviets had also inadvertently
given rise to a belief in Pakistan that it can replicate a similar
strategy vis-a-vis India.  In fact, there has been a corresponding
relationship between the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan
and heightening of Pakistani inspired terrorist acts in the Kashmir
Valley.12

A significant portion of Western supplied weapons for the Afghan
Mujahideen were later transferred to the Kashmiri separatist forces in
India, sustaining a low-intensity conflict since July 1988. 

India's overriding interests in Afghanistan emerge from its security
concerns. 

First, India's vital security interests are linked to the territorial
integrity of Afghanistan.  Any prospect of Afghanistan's disintegration
or the creation of Pushtunistan or its integration into Pakistan would
severely undermine the principle on which India's political and social
stability is built.  Even during the British Raj, upholding of Afghan
independence was considered vital to the Indian state. 

Second, with the Soviet strategic retreat, it became crucial for India,
much more than before, to moderate the changing security relationship
across its north-west frontiers.  Afghanistan assumed importance for
India's Central Asia policy as well as for the purpose of tempering the
Pakistani aggressiveness towards India. 

Third, India has been the worst victim of the post-Soviet Afghan
imbroglio, which manifested in the form of trans-national terrorism. 
The Pakistanis and Saudis continued to provide funds for Afghan War
veterans to recruit and train Muslim volunteers from other Islamic
countries in various terrorist training camps opened in several towns on
the Pakistan-Afghanistan frontier.  These came to be known as the
"Afghanis" (estimated at some 30,000 according to the US sources) and
were implicated in terrorist attacks in India and the Western world. 
Since the summer of 1992, the infiltration of "Afghanis" into Kashmir
increased, numbering about 2,000--from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Algeria,
Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia--at the peak of the militancy in the Kashmir
Valley. 

The fall-out of religious fundamentalism pursued by Pakistan as an
instrument of regional policy and the subsequent post-Najibullah events
in Afghanistan also saw the infusion of several negative patterns with
deeper ramifications for India's security. 

The large scale weaponisation of the population in Afghanistan,
Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and the
intertwining relationship of weapon production and narcotics trade,
lumped together as the "Kalashnikov culture" has set off fundamentalist
drives into Kashmir, Tajikistan, Chechnya, Bosnia and elsewhere. 
India's vulnerability increased from the growing narcotics trade across
the border, bringing with it a host of other social and political
problems. 

There is no doubt that India's traditional security response in dealing
with Afghanistan at the strategic level has progressively eroded after
the Soviet disintegration.  The unsettled conflict in Afghanistan,
especially after the rise of the Taliban, supported by Pakistan, seemed
to have put India in geo-political defensiveness, thereby limiting its
concerns to defending its own borders in Jammu and Kashmir, similar to
the Central Asian situation.  If the Afghan conflict has so far
negatively affected India's security concerns in Kashmir, the scenario
of the Taliban not being able to hold onto power in the near future
would generate yet another threat from Afghanistan to India.  The
chances of India's security interests getting affected directly by the
Taliban are at the moment countered on three accounts.  First, the
Taliban is too deeply engaged in Afghanistan to pose a threat to others. 
It would take at least 10 years for it to consolidate internally. 
Second, India's interests will be secure as long as Iran continues to
checkmate the Taliban on the western front of Afghanistan.  Third, there
will be no direct threat from the Taliban as long as Ahmed Shah Masood
controls the Badakhshan areas in the north-east.  [Note: Masood was
assasinated just before 9-11 Atrocity]

However, in the longer term, India's security concern will be shaped
less by the intra-Afghan conflict and more by externally induced
developments in that country, similar to the scenario that unfolded
after the Soviet occupation and the subsequent war.  India will need to
regain political influence, if not direct leverage, in Afghanistan, not
only because of increasingly Western as well as Pakistani presence but
also due to the growing Chinese nexus with the Afghan militia.  India's
strategic interests would be further threatened if the Chinese influence
increases in the south of the Pamirs, apart from in Pakistan.  There
have been alarming reports about the Taliban's increasing economic and
security ties with China.  The agreements between the two signed in
February 1999 included training of the Taliban forces in Chinese
training centre.  The Chinese announced that they had agreed to start
direct flights between Kabul and Urumchi.13 It is possible that China is
developing its relations with the Taliban on the model it had had
applied in the case of Myanmar's military junta.  The drug money
available in Afghanistan provides the ideal condition for China to
replicate its earlier Myanmar policy of exporting arms to its
neighbours, bordering India.  Although it may take some time for such a
situation to develop, the implications of China's growing interest in
Afghanistan even in the areas of commerce would be serious for India. 

The Afghanistan Conflict and Energy Security Afghanistan figures
importantly in the context of American energy security politics. 
Unocal's project to build oil and gas pipelines from Turkmenistan
through Afghanistan for the export of oil and gas to the Indian
subcontinent, viewed as the most audacious gambit of the 1990s' Central
Asian oil rush had generated great euphoria.  The US government fully
backed the route as a useful option to free the Central Asian states
from Russian clutches and prevent them getting close to Iran.  The
project was also perceived as the quickest and cheapest way to bring out
Turkmen gas to the fast growing energy market in South Asia.  To help it
canvass for the project, Unocol hired the prominent former diplomat and
secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, and a former US ambassador to
Pakistan, Robert Oakley, as well as an expert on the Caucasus, John
Maresca. 

Even though the wisdom of planning the project to go across war-ravaged
Afghanistan was challenged by many, Unocol remained highly optimistic
and opened its offices in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Pakistan
and even in India.  Like the US government, the Unocol officials, too
initially welcomed the taking over of Kabul by the Taliban in September
1996.  The president of Unocol even speculated that the cost of the
construction would be reduced by half with the success of the Taliban
movement and formation of a single government.  It was reported by the
media that the US oil company had even provided covert material support
to help push the militia northward against Rabbani's forces.  Since
1996, officials from Unocol and Saudi Delta have been involved in
behind-the-scenes diplomatic efforts to bring peace in Afghanistan. 
Marty Miller, a top executive of Unocol, said that the projects are an
important part of the conflict resolution process.  Unocol officials
travelled all over Afghanistan trying to convince all the warring
factions to endorse the pipeline project14 Unocol also offered the
Afghans assistance in clearing the landmines along the proposed pipeline
route, engaging Afghan labourers, while also promising free gas supply
to Afghan towns such as Herat and Kandahar from where the pipeline would
pass.  Besides, Unocol proposed to set up a "Pipeline Council"
representing all the Afghan factions to supervise the project. 
Interestingly, for a long time, prior to Unocol, a Latin American oil
company, Bridas, had been trying to win the same oil and gas pipeline
projects.  Initially, it got support from the Turkmen government, as
well as from Pakistan, when Benazir Bhutto was the prime minister.  For
a long time, both Bridas and Unocol had been competing for the project,
with both sides getting powerful political backing.  Turkmenistan
strongly supported Unocol, while the Taliban preferred to give the
contract to Bridas.  It is believed that almost all the Afghan factions,
including Ahmad Shah Masood, preferred the Argentinian company.  In
1997, he had even hoped that "the US would not be duped by Pakistan and
that US plans to build a pipeline with Unocol were unhelpful."15 Similar
sentiments were expressed by the Taliban in favour of the Argentinian
company, Bridas, the reason being Unocol's association with Russian
Gazprom, to which the Taliban had serious objections.  Whereas Bridas
has an equity share with the Saudi company, Ningharco--which in turn, is
close to Prince Turki al-Faisal Saud, the head of the Saudi General
Intelligence, which has been backing the Taliban.16 In October 1997, an
international consortium was set up, known as the Central Asian Gas
Pipeline Ltd (CENTGAS), which included Unocol the Turkmen government,
Saudi Arabia's Delta Oil Company, Japan's Itochu Corp and Inpex, South
Korea's Hyundai Engineering and Construction Co Ltd, Pakistan's Crescent
Group, and Russia's Gazprom (10 per cent).  However, Gazprom withdrew
from the consortium in January 1998.  According to their plan, the
1,250-km-long pipeline project at the cost of $2 billion, was to be
started in December 1998, and completed by 2001.  An additional cost of
$600 million was envisaged for an additional 640-km-long pipeline to be
extended to India.  Unocol promised the Taliban $50 to 100 million a
year as transit fees should the pipeline be built.  Unocol even invited
a Taliban delegation to Texas for detailed discussions with the oil
company officials.  Among other things, the Taliban delegation, headed
by Mullah Mohammad Gaus, was shown the latest deep-water drilling
technology.  In fact, much effort had gone into getting the Taliban
delegation to Texas, including an operation by the Pakistani ISI of
holding up five Taliban officials who were going to Buenos Aires to
finalise the agreement with Bridas.  The ISI insisted that the
delegation first go to Texas instead of Buenos Aires.  Earlier, in
November 1997, Unocol provided $900,000 to the Afghan Studies Centre at
the University of Nebraska at Omaha to start a programme to train 400
Afghan teachers, electricians, carpenters and others in
pipeline-building skills.17 Besides, Unocol had also sponsored young
Afghans getting technical training in southern Afghanistan. 

Suddenly, on August 20, 1998, Unocol had to indefinitely suspend all its
work on the pipeline in the wake of US bombing of terrorist camps
belonging to Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan.  Although Unocol has pulled
out of the consortium, efforts are on to complete the project.  In a
meeting held in Islamabad on April 29, 1999, energy ministers of
Turkmenistan, Pakistan and Afghanistan confirmed their adherence to the
tripartite gas pipeline project.18 However, the pipeline from
Afghanistan may remain a non-starter even in the longer term, for the
simple reason that there exists a strong contradiction between the oil
pipeline and drug-trafficking in the region of the Golden Crescent. 
According to Western estimates, the region generates revenue worth $45
billion (some give the figure of $90 billion) from drug related
activities.19 There are so many stakes involved in the region, which
actually become the cause for perpetuating conflict in Afghanistan.  In
such a situation, it would be highly difficult for anyone to replace
drugs with oil, specially when Afghanistan being only a transit state
would generate not more $100 million per year as transit fee.  There is
also the question of the security of the pipeline, as the Taliban
officials themselves had not guaranteed its safety against attacks by
non-Taliban factions.  In any case, the Taliban's control over the whole
of Afghan territory is not going to bring peace in that country. 
Historically, too, trade caravans originating from India to the
Mediterranean region and passing through Afghan territory were often
looted and plundered by various Afghan tribes on the way.  Both
politically, and from the operational point of view, the implementation
of the proposed pipeline project from Turkmenistan to Pakistan through
Afghanistan may not be easy.  Although Islamabad believes that it can
obtain Western support to complete the transit route to Central Asia,
the involvement of both Russian firms and the US may be disliked by some
faction or the other in Afghanistan--thereby increasing the risk of
sabotage. 

On several occasions, the proposed pipeline from Turkmenistan to India
had been pushed as a good non-military confidence-building measure (CBM)
between India and Pakistan.  Several international think-tanks including
the Washington based Henry Stimson Centre, in their study reports,
suggested the viability of a possible trans-national pipeline. 
Technically, this the most feasible project, as there are no
topographical constraints along the route up to India and even beyond,
but the strategic and security apprehensions have discouraged both
Pakistan and India from being too enthusiastic about the proposal.  The
argument in support of the pipeline enhancing the CBMs is undermined by
the fact that even the Indus Waters Treaty, signed in 1960 for the
sharing of Indus waters, failed to prevent conflict between the two
countries.  The pipeline under consideration is not going to be
acceptable to Pakistan for political and national security reasons. 
Several such proposals made in the past to get a gas pipeline from Iran
and other Gulf countries to India via the overland route of Pakistan
have no made headway.  India's fear is not just the security of the
pipeline, but also includes possible blockade of the supply line by
Pakistan at its will, which will cause serious economic disruption in
India.  However, of late, Pakistani officials have assured that Pakistan
will not disrupt the supplies if the pipeline is built, stressing that
the economics do not work out in favour of stopping gas supplies.20 The
Indian apprehensions, according to a study, can be allayed, if the
project is merged with a larger multilateral arrangement to extend the
pipeline to Bangladesh and Myanmar, and finally to the Association of
South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) market.  In such a situation, Pakistan
will hesitate to take the unilateral step of blocking supplies. 
Besides, Iran or Turkmenistan are likely to stop the supplies from the
source, before Pakistan can take such a step of denial.  Since
Bangladesh and Myanmar have their own gas reserves, it is difficult to
identify as to what degree they would be in favour of a trans-national
pipeline, specially when both Bangladesh and Myanmar have similar fears
about India having the option of blocking the supplies, if New Delhi
chooses to stifle its neighbours in the east. 

The optimists, such as India's former Prime Minister I.K.  Gujral, on
the one hand, believe that an eventual cooperation in energy would be
the "precursor" for regional cooperation in South Asia, while, on the
other hand, fears have been expressed by many that the issue of energy,
like any other good proposal, will ultimately be stalled because of the
"political differences" between the two countries.  Neither is the
pipeline via Pakistan going to be feasible for India's own security
reasons as it would be highly vulnerable to attack and sabotage by
Pakistan.  The pipeline across the Thar Desert will also entail many
obstacles for military operations in a war-like scenario, especially
when Pakistan will concentrate its military installations along the
pipeline running towards India. 

The issue again is not whether the oil and gas pipelines should come via
Pakistan or not, or that they will bring prosperity to Pakistan and its
people.  The mute point here is, primarily owing to the Pakistan's own
insecurity and its inability to reconcile with India, the revenue
generated from such projects will be diverted to large scale arms
procurement, resulting in furthering the arms race in South Asia, as
well as promoting destabilising implications for the entire region of
Central, West and South Asia.  The negative aspects of this pipeline are
many as it involves not only the regional stability factor, arising out
of war-torn Afghanistan, but will also have to confront the ever
increasing sectarian strife and growing lawlessness in Pakistan's own
Sind province.  In the recent months, Iran had demonstrated its military
muscle along the Iran-Afghan frontier, indicating the political
vulnerability of the areas which the pipeline will have to pass through. 
In the absence of a legitimate government in Afghanistan, recognised by
the international community, it would be difficult for the investors to
get support from international financial institutions.  Yet another
factor would be that Pakistan may not require gas from either
Turkmenistan or Iran, after the recent discoveries of vast quantities of
offshore reserves at Qadirpur and Zamzana in Sind province.21 Although,
several Western companies including Monument Oil and Gas, Premier Oil,
and Lasmo are already exploring the Zamzana field in Pakistan, the
complex business and political environment will make it difficult.  The
Afghanistan Conflict: Domestic Situation The emergence of the Taliban
has once again raised the question of the role of the clergy in
Afghanistan politics.  Traditionally, the ulema, the most qualified
clergy in the Sunni Islamic hierarchy, played a most important role in
Afghan history.  The ulema's role became important especially in the
absence of a central government in Afghanistan.  They displayed an
extraordinary role during times of dynastic conflict, wars of
succession, and invasion by an external enemy.  They legitimised
political authority and endorsed power succession.  The ulema invoked
jehad as the main concept of resistance in Afghanistan against foreign
invaders.  Not only did they instigate and mobilise the masses for
jehad, but also provided leadership for the war effort.  There have been
many instances when the Afghan clergy declared jehad.  For example, the
battle of Panipat (1761) was deemed a jehad against the Maharata Hindu. 
In 1837, jehad-i-akbar the "great jihad" was declared against the Shia
invadors from Persia.  Jehad was launched against Russian and British
invaders and lately against the Soviets. 

The upper echelons of the ulema hierarchy belong to four Sufi-Islamic
orders: the Qadiriyya, Naqshbandiyya, Chistiyya, and Suhrawardiyya. 
Belonging to a noble religious lineage, the ulema adhering to the
Qadiriyya order displayed significant control over the Pushtun
population in southern and eastern Afghanistan. 

The mullahs, on the other hand, formed the lower ranking clergy,
restricted to mosque functionaries, who performed daily prayers,
conducted marriages and funerals, and taught in the madrassas.  The
mullahs excercised greater power through the network of madrassas and
mosques; and thereby had more influence on the people at the grassroots
level.  There is no doubt that the ulema and mullahs had an effective
catalyst role to play in the Afghan polity and society.  In fact, during
the resistance against the Soviets, the party Harakat-e-Inqalab was
built on the same madarassa networks.  But the lack of an established
structure, and limited military skills severely restrained the earlier
effort for a political mobilisation along the mullah networks. 

The Taliban's genesis can be linked to the old inclusive Afghan
resistance Harakat-e-Inqalab party, led by Mohammed Nabi Mohammadi. 
But, unlike the traditional mullahs, the Taliban outfit, composed
primarily of the fanatic illiterate mullahs, belonged to the disbanded
forces of other Mujahideen groups who had fought the Soviets. 
Predominantly a Pushtun group, the Taliban's strength was drawn from
Jamaat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) in Baluchistan and the Frontier province. 
The students were mobilised by Maulana Fazlur Rahman and trained by the
Frontier Constabulary Corps and the Sibi Scouts near the Baluch border
with Afghanistan.  Gradually, new recruitments were made from other
madrassas in Pakistan, especially from the Karachi based
Jamait-il-Uloom-il Islamiyah.  Run by Maulana Mohammed Yusuf Binnori in
New Town area of Karachi, the Binnori chain of madrassas has acquired a
name in Pakistan for producing the best Taliban.  Several members of the
Taliban's Shura Council, including Mulla Omar are supposed to be
products of the Binnori School.  Subsequently, reinforcements for the
Taliban militia also came from Afghanistan's south-eastern provinces of
Ghazni, Kandahar and Helmand.  These students belong to the landless and
weakest sections of Afghan society and are generally orphans, who
preferred to live in madrassas for free meals and shelter.22 They were
mostly convicts and mercenaries, identified particularly with the
smuggler gangs operating from the Pak-Afghan frontier.  Devoid of any
social obligation, as they represented only the peripheral section of
Pushtun society, the Taliban were easy to provoke and lure into the new
movement, either through money or religious indoctrination.  Trained by
Deobandi ideologues, these students generally lacked the sense of Afghan
nationalism, as compared to the Islamists (Mujahideen) who were
ferociously nationalist.  The economic and ideological underpinning of
the Taliban as a deprived group had motivated the movement against the
traditional Afghan leadership, including the resourceful tribal
chieftains and warlords.  The Taliban denounced the Mujahideen as
"corrupt, power-hungry and un-Islamic".  They promised to put an end to
the ongoing factional fighting among the different Mujahideen guerillas
and to replace them with a purist regime for the country. 

Considered as a successful force, the credit for the Taliban's creation
goes to General Nasserullah Babar for his brilliance in assessing the
then prevailing sense of despondency amongst ordinary Afghans who were
tired of the Mujahideen's intra-factional fighting.  General Babar chose
Mulla Mohammad Omar, formerly an ustad at the Miram Sha town, to head
this motivated group of talibs.  After rescuing a Pakistani truck
convoy, the first batch of Taliban entered Afghan territory, capturing
the small town of Doorahi near Kandahar.  From there, some 30 students
of madarassas, headed by Mulla Omar, laid the foundation of the Taliban
movement in the Mewand district of Kandahar in south-western Afghanistan
in early October 1994.  With the supervision of General Babar, the JUI
chief, Maulana Fazlur Rahman, conferred on Mulla Omar the title of
Amir-ul-Momineen, through an Ulema Shura in Kandahar.  The public
display of the cloak worn by the Prophet, after a gap of 61 years on
that occasion, was a part of the design to shore up international
legitimacy for Omar and his organisation, the Taliban.  Maulana Fazlur
Rahman, who also headed the Committee for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan's
National Assembly, was believed to have been instrumental in writing the
Taliban's Constitution and the day-to-day code of conduct of the
militia's regime in Kabul.  Maulana Fazhur Rahman, along with Pakistan's
Interior Minister General Babar, was the first to reach the Afghan
capital the day the Taliban captured Kabul and supervised the execution
of Najibullah from a square of Kabul. 

In ideological terms, the Taliban is a carefully designed conceptual
body to pursue the political and military goals of Pakistan.  This
guerilla force tends to be different from the old Mujahideen groups in a
number of ways.  First, the Taliban is set on the Islam of the village
level, illiterate mullahs (those who give), rather than ulema who
represent the upper hierarchy in Islam.  Second, unlike the Islamists
(Mujahideen) groups, well known for their independent thinking and wide
exposure to the world outside, the Taliban enjoyed no external contacts,
particularly with foreign agencies.  Third, unlike in the case of
Mujahideen, who were divided into seven major groups among many others,
the Taliban are commanded and controlled by one single leadership, under
the patronage of the ISI.  Fourth, unlike the Mujahideen who were too
pan-Islamic and anti-Western in their rhetoric, the Taliban militia is
sought to be based on the purist fervour of the Wahhabi variant, the one
practised in the Arab world, which is tolerated by the West.  Generally
belonging to the Deobandi donomination, the movement to establish a
purist form of trans-national Islamic ideology was aimed at providing an
antidote to Afghan nationalism.  The sustained support and funding by
Saudi Arabia to the Afghan militia indicated the link between the
Taliban and the Wahhabi movement. 

The initial ideological motivation displayed by the Taliban was to get
rid of the corrupt and so-called un-Islamic Mujahideen, and establish a
purist regime in Afghanistan.  The movement gained a certain legitimacy,
specially since large segments of the Afghan population were fed up with
the disorder under the rule of local Mujahideen commanders.  Among other
things, the Taliban had promised to disarm the Afghan population, as
well as open a trans-Afghan highway to Central Asia.  However, the
Taliban actually spelled out its ideology only after capturing Kandahar,
when an effort was made to impose a very narrow interpretation of the
Sharia.  The banning of photography and films, imposition of strict
rules on women and children and capital punishment for men without a
beard, all generated the image of an "obscurantist force" for the
Taliban.  The Taliban also spelled out its intention to curb poppy
cultivation as it considered it to be un-Islamic.  Besides, it also
talked about doing away with the terrorist camps within the Afghan
territory.  Some assurance was also given about demining the thousands
of landmines in Afghanistan.  Will the Taliban gain legitimacy within
Afghan society and the outside the world permanently? First, the clergy
in Afghan society has played an important political role but only during
the transitional period.  They have been the kingmakers but not the
rulers in Afghanistan.  Second, the ulema in Afghanistan had a noble
ancestry and followed religious lineages, legitimised by society, but
the Taliban mullahs enjoy no such status and were created in exile in
Pakistan.  The answer to the above question may be in the negative if we
apply the tribalist thesis to Afghan politics.  Most academic and
political analyses and policy-formulations with regards to Afghanistan
tend be based on the dynamics of tribal society, dominated by the
Pushtuns.  However, the current academic analyses of the current
political developments in Afghanistan suggest that the Taliban movement
is fast assuming a revolutionary character.  The new breeds of Afghan
mullahs have introduced an altogether a new phenomenon of political
Islam, and if successful, it will became a model for Sunni Muslims
elsewhere, in the next century.  In revolutionary terms, the Taliban is
perceived to be more threatening than any Iranian Islamic ideology. 

The pre-war paradigm may not provide adequate analyses of the current
realities that have been brought about by the processes of war-induced
changes.  Even the demographic strength of the Pushtuns has been reduced
to less than half of Afghanistan's population.  More than anything else,
for the Taliban, the Islamic revolution in Iran has a demonstrative
effect, as a model for revolutionary change, breaking the traditional
power-based structures.  Not only does the Iranian case become a model,
but also a rival model for the Afghan Sunnis to emulate.  In fact, it
has been pointed out by many analysts of Afghan affairs that much before
the Sunni Pushtuns, the Shias of Afghanistan, under the banner of the
sheiks, organised a similar movement to establish a shura in central
Afghanistan, during the period of resistance against the Soviets. 
Possibly modelled on the Iranian revolution of 1979, the Shia movement
became the most successful resistance force, providing significant
strength to the minority Hazara Shias in Afghanistan.  The Shia movement
became more established when it got reorganised as the Hezb-e-Wahdat in
1989, putting up tough resistance against all the other warring factions
in Afghanistan, including the Taliban.  Just as the Taliban was created
in exile in Pakistan, the Shia movement too was built up outside
Afghanistan. 

The current status of the Taliban movement tends to suggest that its
display of ruthlessness and negative sanctions were tactical exercises
for an early mobilisation and consolidation of compliance.  As it moves
ahead, the Taliban is likely to show greater maturity, broader policy
posture.  Most importantly, the social profiles of the Taliban mullahs
are undergoing massive transformation.  They are no longer the fighters,
but holding important administrative positions, earlier held by feudal
chieftains and warlords.  The increase in the mullahs' political
influence is accompanied by their increased economic power.  Earlier,
they were riding bicycles but today they drive cars.  They lived in
refugee camps in the past; today they live in big houses.  Most
influential mullahs have acquired large tracts of land.  The revenues
generated from drug-cultivation have made them affluent.  These changes
have transformed the image and the profile of the Taliban at the level
of the villages.  The current trends in Afghanistan show that the
Taliban would gradually gain legitimacy both within and outside
Afghanistan, in the way the Iranian mullahs did in the post-revolution
period.  However, the only difference here is that Afghan society is
still dominated by tribal traits and values.  The regional, ethnic,
topographic and other factors that strongly determine the Afghan scene
will never allow the Taliban to entirely pacify the country. 

Conclusion

The Afghan conflict no longer looms large on the international stage. 
The West is only worried about the international terrorist threat
emanating from Afghanistan.  The international activism has made no
significant headway in resolving the post-Soviet Afghan crisis.  Since
1991, one after another, four chiefs of the UN Special Mission on
Afghanistan (UNSMA) have concluded that their mission is "impossible". 
Dr.  Norbert Heinrich Holl, the last one to quit, admitted that his two
years efforts had yielded precious little.  The UN peace-making formula
included "shuttle diplomacy," forming of "technical groups", and
"intra-Afghan dialogue" to evolve a common denominator of peace.  The
UNSMA's new chief, Lakhdar Brahimi, advocated a "six-plus-two" approach
as the only route to peace.  The UN peace broker now feels that the
"decisive factor" for peace lies not among the warring Afghan factions,
but among the meddling neighbours.  To this effect, Brahimi toured the
regional countries, including India, in September 1997, to assess
opinion and shore up support. 

Brahimi's "group of eight" initiative, which has already met several
times, is based on the concept of involving Afghanistan's immediate
"bordering neighbours" and "meddling neighbours" supporting the Afghan
factions.  The six bordering neighbours include Tajikistan, Uzbekistan,
Turkmenistan, Pakistan, Iran and China, the other two being the US and
Russia, as observers.  India has been excluded from the international
initiative on the Afghan conflict, even though it has been the most
affected victim of civil disorder in Afghanistan.  It is incorrect to
say that India shares no contiguous border with Afghanistan (except that
Pakistan's continued military occupation of J&amp;K comes in the way). 
Secondly, while it is justified that India is not a "meddling neighbour"
and a party to the endless Afghan tragedy, the same can be said about
Turkmenistan and China as well, which are members of the group.  India's
exclusion in the Afghan peace process needs to be seen in the light of
Pakistan's sinister campaign to isolate India from Afghanistan and also
Central Asia historically, politically, and on the grounds of religion
and physical access.  Understandably though, the UNSMA's limitations,
depending largely on Pakistan's good-offices, compel it to avoid the
process becoming hostage to Indo-Pak animosity.  India, for its own
reasons, has failed to be more assertive on the Afghan front.  In the
recent years, India's foreign policy postures had their own implications
in the receding of India's influence beyond South Asia. 

The "six-plus-two" meeting sponsored by the UN, held in Ashkabad in
February 1999, has made no headway mainly due to the Taliban's tough
stand on the issue of power-sharing.  The regional powers are unlikely
to be able to impose solutions in Afghanistan, as they themselves are
deeply involved in supporting their favoured warring factions.  The
initiatives made by individual states have also shown limitations. 
Pakistan's heavy-handed efforts, at times through "parallel initiatives"
have severely undermined the UN efforts.  Pakistan's behind-the-scene
manoeuvres have seriously come in the way of resolving the conflict. 
Amidst criticism, Islamabad had to abandon its much-publicised plan to
hold a "five nation" conference on Afghanistan.  The UN secretary
general's November report noted that "the Taliban's backers professed
support for UN resolutions...their actions, regrettably spoke the
opposite".  Given the Afghan complexity, whether any solution can be
found on Pakistani terms of reference is doubtful.  By making
Afghanistan an adjunct to its rivalry with India, Pakistan has obscured
the reality of the crisis.  Pakistan not only reduced the 5,000-year-old
Afghan history to an Islamic issue but also exploited the simple Afghan
people, subjecting them to bigotry and fanaticism, which has no
precedent in Afghan history and culture.  Many even suspect that
Pakistan is using the Afghan conflict as a pretext for its own
geo-political actions in the region. 

The conflict has alarmed the neighbourhood.  There are strong signs of
the Taliban's influence spilling into adjoining countries, including
India.  There can be only two scenarios for the short and medium-term:
(a) in a scenario of the Taliban successfully taking control of the
whole of Afghanistan, the first possible fall-out will be the entire
region getting exposed to the threat of similar ideology.  The Taliban's
success would only mean a boost for the Pakistani military to gain
access to the borders of Central Asia.  The possibility of the Taliban
further eliminating the ethnic Uzbeks and Tajiks will alter the nature
of the civil war there.  In such a situation, the risk of refugee influx
into Central Asia will increase.  (b) If the Taliban fail to control the
whole of Afghanistan, the consequences for regional security would also
be negative.  More so, for Pakistan that will face all the risk of
internal ethnic explosion.  The military consequences in terms of
weapons stockpiles reaching across the border, particularly in Central
Asia, will be high.  Once the Taliban militia is dislodged from
Afghanistan, thousands of these battle-hardened guerillas, like the
Mujahideen, would take up international missions, threatening regional
and international peace and security.  Already the regional countries
are faced with the dilemma of whether to confront the militia or to
engage it in a regional political process.  The experiences in the
recent period have shown that the approach of confrontation leads to
escalating rather than resolving of tension.  It is high time that
regional powers find a regional solution to incorporate the various
Afghanistan warring factions and also Pakistan into a wider peace
process.  It will not be possible for the Central Asian states to shy
away from such conflicts in our region.  An integration with Europe may
ensure security for Central Asia but not peace.  Here, a lesson needs to
be learnt from the ASEAN's constructive engagement policy with regards
to resolving the internal conflicts in Cambodia and Myanmar.  India has
consistently supported the idea of a regional approach to conflict
resolution in Afghanistan.  India should continue to support all UN
initiatives that will fulfill the fundamental interests of the Afghan
people.  Many of the problems in Afghanistan seem directly related to
the breakdown of the agriculture and irrigation system, tribal and
social laws, and unless and until those areas are effectively addressed,
the return of peace and stability in that country would remain elusive. 
India's opposition to the Taliban regime should not be seen as an
anti-Afghan or anti-Pushtun stand.  Matters of principle primarily guide
India's objections.  The Taliban have blatantly ignored all the
international norms subscribed to by the United Nation's Charter. 
India's traditional bonds of friendship and trust among the vast
majority of the Afghan people are its biggest strength.  In fact, the
silent majority of the Afghan people still appreciate India's position
of non-interference in their country.  While, efforts at undermining
India's legitimate interest may have had an unsettling impact on the
Afghan peace process, it is evident that the world community has not
endorsed the Pakistani and Saudi recognition of the Taliban.  India
needs to take more autonomous action on the Afghan front. 

NOTES

1.  Dimitri Simes, "The Death of Detente," International Security, no. 
5, 1980, pp.  111-139. 

2.  "UN Says no Cash to Get Afghans Home," Reuters, March 21, 1999,
"Afghan Refugees Feel Kosovo Impact," Reuters, April 30, 1999. 

3.  Marvin G.  Weinbaum, "Pakistan and Afghanistan: The Strategic
Relationship," Asian Survey, June 1991, p.  507. 

4.  Hindustan Times, October 10, 1996. 

5.  As quoted in Times of India, October 12, 1996. 

6.  "US Claims it Was Misled on Taliban," as reported by IANS, Pioneer,
November 23, 1996. 

7.  In the recently held meeting of the Physicians for Human Rights,
Hillary Clinton echoed the 1998-99 Annual Report of Freedom House that
said, "The Taliban's violent, arbitrary rule has imposed order through
terror.  Its de-humanisation of women and girls has turned educated
women into beggars; left widows, mothers and daughters to die of
illnesses that have been treatable for decades; and denied a generation
of girls access to basic education," Voice of America, April 30, 1999. 

8.  P.  Stobdan, "The Afghan Conflict and India," Delhi Paper No.  6,
IDSA, New Delhi, 1998. 

9.  Times of Central Asia, April 8, 1999. 

10.  Abid Ullah Jan, "The Way Out for Taliban," The Frontier Post, March
9, 1999. 

11.  The Frontier Post, March 9, 1999. 

12.  P.  Stobdan, "Kashmir: The Key Issue," Strategic Analysis, April
1996, pp.  111-139. 

13.  Far Eastern Economic Review, March 11, 1999. 

14.  Ahmed Rashid, "Pipe Dreams," The Herald, October 1997, p.  50. 

15.  Ibid. 

16.  Ahmed Rashid, "Unocol and Bridas Battle to Build Pipeline in
Afghanistan," Far Eastern Economic Review, June 19, 1997. 

17.  "Taliban's Treatment of Women Leaks Into Pipeline Deal,"
International Herald Tribune, January 12, 1998. 

18.  Itar Tass, April 30, 1999. 

19.  Stobdan, n.  8, p.  39.  Also see "Opium Poppy Production in
Afghanistan: High But Stabilised, New UN Survey Finds," UN Information
Service, (Vienna), September 1996. 

20.  This was said by the secretary of the Pakistan Petroleum Ministry,
Dr.  Gulfaraz Ahmed.  See "Pak Promises Not To Disrupt Gas Pipeline,"
The Hindu, December 8, 1996. 

21.  "Shell, Premier Plan $390m Pak Venture," Khaleej Times, June 18,
1998.  Also see, "Explorers Report Big Pakistan Gas Find," Financial
Times, June 1, 1998, and "Major Gasfield Discovered in Pakistan,"
Business Standard, April 29, 1998. 

22.  Rahimullah Yusufzai, "Who Are the Talibans," Newsline, Islamabad,
October 1996, p.  55. 


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