Return-Path: <sentto-279987-2268-1001266283-fc=all.net@returns.onelist.com> Delivered-To: fc@all.net Received: from 204.181.12.215 by localhost with POP3 (fetchmail-5.1.0) for fc@localhost (single-drop); Sun, 23 Sep 2001 10:33:10 -0700 (PDT) Received: (qmail 24949 invoked by uid 510); 23 Sep 2001 17:32:12 -0000 Received: from n26.groups.yahoo.com (216.115.96.76) by 204.181.12.215 with SMTP; 23 Sep 2001 17:32:12 -0000 X-eGroups-Return: sentto-279987-2268-1001266283-fc=all.net@returns.onelist.com Received: from [10.1.1.223] by fg.egroups.com with NNFMP; 23 Sep 2001 17:31:49 -0000 X-Sender: fc@big.all.net X-Apparently-To: iwar@onelist.com Received: (EGP: mail-7_3_2_2); 23 Sep 2001 17:31:22 -0000 Received: (qmail 42700 invoked from network); 23 Sep 2001 17:31:22 -0000 Received: from unknown (10.1.10.26) by 10.1.1.223 with QMQP; 23 Sep 2001 17:31:22 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO big.all.net) (65.0.156.78) by mta1 with SMTP; 23 Sep 2001 17:31:48 -0000 Received: (from fc@localhost) by big.all.net (8.9.3/8.7.3) id KAA10265 for iwar@onelist.com; Sun, 23 Sep 2001 10:31:48 -0700 Message-Id: <200109231731.KAA10265@big.all.net> To: iwar@onelist.com (Information Warfare Mailing List) Organization: I'm not allowed to say X-Mailer: don't even ask X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.5 PL1] From: Fred Cohen <fc@all.net> Mailing-List: list iwar@yahoogroups.com; contact iwar-owner@yahoogroups.com Delivered-To: mailing list iwar@yahoogroups.com Precedence: bulk List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:iwar-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com> Date: Sun, 23 Sep 2001 10:31:47 -0700 (PDT) Reply-To: iwar@yahoogroups.com Subject: [iwar] [fc:America's.second.greatest.enemy] Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit by Ralph Peters Sunday, September 23, 2001; Page B01 After the terrorists themselves, America's greatest enemy in its new war may be traditional wisdom. In the military and diplomatic spheres, the rules we have struggled to honor have failed us. Yet in the wake of the atrocities of Sept. 11, the media have been crowded with armchair strategists prescribing the same discredited 20th-century solutions and warning that any bold response will lead to frightful repercussions. In his address to the nation last Thursday, President Bush rejected the counsels of the timid and defeatist. Yet dangerous myths remain. The president made it clear that we are at war, that the war will not be short, and that it cannot be waged on the cheap. Certainly, our enemies regard it as war. But this is a new variety of war, without an illuminating precedent, and we will have to learn much as we go. We face enemies whose fundamental beliefs and chosen behaviors cannot coexist with our own, no matter how we attempt to explain away their cruelty. After sleepwalking through the past decade, as we did in the 1930s, we have awakened in our own blood. We can, and will, prevail. But before we can fight well, we must think clearly. All eyes are focused upon Afghanistan as our likely target, although our initial strikes may range far afield, simultaneously punishing other states known to sponsor terrorism or host terrorists. Already, we have been subjected to solemn warnings that the British could not conquer Afghanistan in the 19th century, the Russians could not subdue it in the 20th, and therefore America will fail in the 21st. We have heard these warnings before. During the buildup to Desert Storm, the pundits warned us that the Iraqi military was "battle-hardened," and that tens of thousands of American soldiers would come home in body bags. When our success disarmed them, the deep thinkers next warned that the Serbs were born guerrillas (although most were overweight bullies) for whom young Americans were no match. Now we are told that the Taliban warriors are 10 feet tall. But I have stood in the Khyber Pass, unlike so many experts, and, if necessary, I would pit our soldiers and Marines against the best fightersthe Talibanhas to offer. Their rank and file are often brave, but they are war-weary and under assault by their own countrymen, who, although religiously conservative themselves, do not share the extreme views of these "warriors of god." Despite their defiant rhetoric, we would do well not to underestimate the underlying fear our enemies have of our power. Nor do we want to conquer or occupy Afghanistan, as earlier armies sought to do. We are hunting specific men and groups of their supporters, whom we must kill before they strike us again. Certainly, geography and logistical issues complicate operations against targets in Afghanistan, but all military operations involve risk. We have armed forces of immense skill, capable of raiding a darkened room or destroying entire armies. We also have been warned that we dare not kill terrorists, thus making martyrs of them. This is absolutely wrong. The surest way to make an effective martyr of a terrorist is to put him in prison, inspiring his followers to commit hijackings, kidnappings and other acts of terror in an attempt to set him free. We have seen that scenario played out by Germany's Red Army Faction and Colombian narco-terrorists, by Palestinian, Indonesian, Filipino, Peruvian and even Russian czarist-era terrorists. Osama bin Laden himself has suggested that the United States must be punished for imprisoning his comrades. Nor is it a matter of jailing a handful of these men. There are thousands of terrorists now, and we may face tens of thousands across the years and decades. In which jails shall we keep them? They are our enemies, in a war. And they are fanatical in the extreme sense of the word. Only by killing them and striking the governments that succor them may we deter their weaker supporters and deny them a place of refuge. The humanitarianism we cherish is regarded as a sign of impotence by such opponents. Theirs is the mentality of the schoolyard bully writ very large, and you cannot appease them anymore than you could a Hitler. Deadly bullies must be beaten down, and those who cheer them on must be chastened as well. If we are unwilling to instill fear in our enemies, we must be content to live in fear ourselves. The use of special operations forces is much discussed. But they are only one tool in our strategic box, if a superb one. The myth of the surgical strike is as dangerous as it is seductive. We will not be able to reach all of the necessary targets cleanly, nor should we try to economize on the use of our power, which is our great strength. The military is a killing instrument; if we want finesse we should hire a ballet company. Above all, we must seize the initiative, wherever we can, and never ease the pressure in any sphere, military or otherwise. Crisis drives innovation, and military or security techniques barely imaginable today will seem timid and clumsy in 10 years. Our military, though strong and well-trained, is far from perfectly structured for the task before us, but we are in far better shape than we were in 1941. We have large, well-trained and well-equipped standing forces, and we will not have to expand hastily from a small, resource-starved military to the 10 million man establishment we required for World War II. But we will have to change many of our practices and priorities. In the near- to mid-term, we should cancel expensive, irrelevant systems such as the F-22 fighter and buy more transport. Except for the Marines, with their expeditionary tradition, our forces are in the early phases of a transition to less ponderous structures that can reach distant trouble spots more swiftly with sufficient power. The pace of change will have to be accelerated, and it is only lamentable that it took a catastrophe to make the need for more responsive forces seem urgent. Much remains unknown, as it always does at the beginning of a war. We do not even know where we will fight with certainty. Though Afghanistan has our attention at the moment, there appear to be more terrorist-related targets on the territory of our provisional ally Pakistan than there are in the Afghan mountains and valleys. Iraq supports terrorism, despite pronouncements from specialists that Saddam Hussein fears fundamentalist extremists. In reality, Saddam appears to have tried to use terrorists to his own ends, while placating them with support. There is already compelling evidence that our pursuit of terrorists and their supporters will lead deep into Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states, and that their networks are embedded from Algeria to Canada. Nor do we know who our ultimate allies will be. In future years, we may again align with Iran, ournatural strategic ally in the region. At least in geographic scope, this unsettling new struggle truly is a world war. A last, well-meant, but pernicious warning has been that, if we adopt ferocious means of fighting back against our enemies, we will become just like them. This is nonsense. In World War II, we responded to Japanese and German savagery with indescribablebrutality of our own. We firebombed the cities of our enemies and ended the war by dropping atomic bombs. On the bitterly contested islands of the Pacific, our GIs did not read Japanese soldiers their rights before burning them to death with flamethrowers. Yet the men and women of the "Greatest Generation" did not come home to stage a military coup. They came back, gladly, to peace, liberal democracy and the GI Bill. We must recognize that this is a new age, with new rules and new requirements. We cannot prevail with the failed wisdom of a failed century. Ralph Peters, a retired Army lieutenant colonel, is the author of "Fighting for the Future: Will America Triumph?" (Stackpole Books). © 2001 The Washington Post Company ------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor ---------------------~--> Get your FREE VeriSign guide to security solutions for your web site: encrypting transactions, securing intranets, and more! http://us.click.yahoo.com/XrFcOC/m5_CAA/yigFAA/kgFolB/TM ---------------------------------------------------------------------~-> ------------------ http://all.net/ Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.2 : 2001-09-29 21:08:48 PDT