[iwar] [fc:Association.of.Former.Intelligence.Officers.(AFIO).Bulletin]

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From http://www.afio.com

S P E C I A L  N O T E S
NOTE 1) This WIN is still overshadowed by the tragedy of September 11th. A
torrent of information is being released by the media and commentators.
President Bush, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and Attorney General Ashcroft
are providing continuing mature counsel and leadership, while the
Government's intelligence operations are taking place in secret, as they
should. The ubiquitous intelligence leaking in Washington appears to have
abated a bit.

NOTE 2) We have posted a statement on the terrorist attack on our Homeland
on our Website (www.afio.com). It includes a reference to what AFIO can do
for members with relevant expertise. Also, a proposed AFIO "Letter to the
President" has been submitted to the Board for approval. It will be provided
to you soon. In addition, the AFIO Executive will, through the WINs, the
Website and special communications, address issues that may be of use in
members' discussions with the public.

NOTE 3) We have been inundated with hundreds of emails, letters and phone
calls. They are appreciated. Please excuse a delay in responses!

NOTE 4) As to the AFIO Symposium and Convention on 2/3 November, White House
Intelligence Director Mary Sturtevant has confirmed her participation as a
speaker, as has DCI Intelligence Community Management Staff Director Joan
Dempsey. Honorary Board Member Shirley Temple Black regrets that she has
another engagement. We are honored that former DCI James Woolsey has
graciously consented to be the keynote speaker at the AFIO Awards Banquet.
All speakers will be authoritative on the attack on the US Homeland on
September 11th and the continuing battle against terrorism.

NOTE 5) SPONSOR A NEW MEMBER TODAY!!

____________________________________________________________________________

SECTION I - CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

IRA TERRORISTS TRAINING COLOMBIAN REBELS -- The arrest of three
suspected Irish Republican Army members in Colombia, on charges of
training local rebels, indicates the country's largest guerrilla group
is laying the strategic and tactical groundwork to expand Colombia's
civil war into densely populated urban areas such as Bogotá, Medellin
and Cali.  An urban strategy spells a bloody sea change in guerrilla war
tactics. 

The incident exposed links between the FARC, Colombia's largest
guerrilla group, and the IRA that extend to still-unidentified groups or
individuals in Cuba, Venezuela, Panama, Nicaragua and El Salvador.  The
widening ripple of violence could affect foreign commercial concerns
still active in Colombia, such as U.S.-based Occidental Petroleum Corp. 
and Canada's Alberta Energy Co.  And there are signs that the FARC may
be considering attacks on U.S.  military and civilian contractors
elsewhere -- a possible 'asymmetric' response to the massive US military
and special forces intervention in the country. 

The arrested IRA operatives are skilled in the use of mercury-tilt
switches designed to blow up people in cars and radio-controlled
"command" bombs for use against armored vehicles, technologies that
would significantly enhance the FARC's explosives-handling capabilities. 
They are also believed to be experts in the design and manufacture of
increasingly effective homemade mortars for use against military and
political targets in Northern Ireland and England.  British security
sources reportedly believe that the IRA members were schooling FARC
rebels in mixing high-powered synthetic explosives to extend the range
of homemade gas cylinder mortars.  The FARC needs to extend the roughly
400-meter range of its homemade mortars because of better defenses at
military compounds built with American aid.  This implies the guerrillas
are considering attacks on the compounds, which typically house U.S. 
military and civilian defense personnel assigned to Plan Colombia, an
anti-drug initiative. 

Colombian officials have described the FARC-IRA link as a "business
relationship" in which the IRA trades advanced explosives-handling
techniques for drugs, cash or illegal weapons.  Colombian security
experts believe the IRA members were part of a much larger Cuban-led
undercover operation training the rebels.  No matter the cause and
effect, the US-drug war or the indigenous guerilla war, the chicken or
the egg, this region promises to become the source of increased
intelligence priorities and expanded military involvement.  (Jonkers)
(Boston Herald, 2 September 01) (courtesy L.  Sulc)

IRAQI TERRORISM -- Aman, the Israeli military intelligence service, is
giving publicity to intelligence reports pointing to Iraq as a sponsor
of terrorist activity.  They state that Iraq has established ties with
Al-Qaeda.  They identify two the Lebanese Imad Mughniyeh, head of the
special overseas operations for Hizbullah, and the Egyptian Dr Ayman Al
Zawahiri, senior member of Al-Qaeda and possible successor of the ailing
Osama Bin Laden, as terrorist masterminds being used by Iraqi
intelligence.  The Israeli sources claim that for the past two years
Iraqi intelligence officers were shuttling between Baghdad and
Afghanistan, meeting with Ayman Al Zawahiri. 

"We've only got scraps of information, not the full picture," admits one
intelligence source, "but it was good enough for us to send a warning
six weeks ago to our allies that an unprecedented massive terror attack
was expected.  We believe that the operational brains behind the
New-York attack were Mughniyeh and Zawahiri, who were probably financed
and got some logistical support from the Iraqi Intelligence Service
(SSO)."

According to the Aman sources of this publicity, experts on Iraq and
Saddam Hussein also believe that Iraq was the state behind the two
terror masterminds.  "In recent months, there was a change, and Iraq
decided to get into the terror business.  On July 7th, they tried for
the first time to send a suicide bomber, trained in Baghdad, to blow up
Tel Aviv airport (Foreign Report No.  2651)." Clearly, among the
potential targets of the US anti-terrorist war it appears that Iraq will
probably soon loom large, for a number of reasons.  The Aman publicity
given to sensitive terrorist intelligence may be to prepare the ground
for this event.  (Jonkers) (JANES TERRORISM AND SECURITY MONITOR)
(courtesy Tony Newcomb)



----------------------------------------------------------------------------

SECTION II - CONTEXT AND PRECEDENCE

AL-QAEDA -- During the 1980s, resistance fighters in Afghanistan
developed a world-wide recruitment and support network with the aid of
the USA, Saudi Arabia and other states.  After the 1989 Soviet
withdrawal, this network, which equipped, trained and funded thousands
of Muslim fighters, came under the control of Osama bin Laden.  Al-Qaeda
('The Base') is a conglomerate of groups spread throughout the world
operating as a network.  It has a global reach, with a presence in
Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Turkey, Jordan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Syria,
Xinjiang in China, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Myanmar, Indonesia,
Mindanao in the Philippines, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
Bahrain, Yemen, Libya, Tunisia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya, Dagestan,
Kashmir, Sudan, Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, Azerbaijan, Eritrea, Uganda,
Ethiopia, and in the West Bank and Gaza.  Since its creation in 1988,
Osama bin Laden has controlled Al-Qaeda.  As such, he is both the
backbone and the principal driving force behind the network. 

THE LEADER - Osama bin Laden, alias Osama Mohammad al Wahad, alias Abu
Abdallah, alias Al Qaqa, born in 1957, is the son of Mohammad bin Awdah
bin Laden of Southern Yemen.  When he moved to Saudi Arabia, Osama's
father became a construction magnate and renovated the holy cities of
Mecca and Medina, making the Bin Ladens a highly respected family both
within the Saudi royal household and with the public.  At Jeddah
University, Osama bin Laden's worldview was shaped by Dr Abdullah Azzam,
a Palestinian of Jordanian origin.  An influential figure in the Muslim
Brotherhood, Azzam is regarded as the historical leader of Hamas.  After
graduation, Bin Laden became deeply religious. 

At the height of the foreign Arab and Muslim influx into
Pakistan-Afghanistan from 1984- 1986, Bin Laden spent time traveling
widely and raising funds in the Arab world.  He recruited several
thousand Arab and Muslim youths to fight the Soviet Union, and helped to
channel several billion dollars' worth of Western governmental,
financial and material resources for the Afghan jihad.  He worked
closely with Pakistan, especially the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI),
the Saudi government and Egyptian governments, and the vast Muslim
Brotherhood network. 

When the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, Bin Laden decided to form a
group that could unite the whole Muslim world into a single entity. 
Although Soviet troops withdrew that year, they installed the
pro-communist leader Najibullah in Kabul.  Al-Qaeda drew from the vast
financial resources and technical expertise mobilized during the
decade-long anti-Soviet campaign to fight and defeat the Najibullah
regime.  After Iraq's 2001 invasion of Kuwait, the failure of Saudi
rulers to honor their pledge to expel foreign (US) troops when the Iraqi
threat diminished led Bin Laden to start a campaign against the Saudi
royal house.  He claimed the Saudi rulers were false Muslims and it was
necessary to install a true Islamic state in Saudi Arabia.  The Saudi
regime deported him in 1992 and revoked his citizenship in 1994. 

Meanwhile, the National Islamic Front, led by Hasan al Turabi, came to
power in Sudan and sent a delegation to Pakistan.  Bin Laden had moved
his infrastructure of well-trained and experienced fighters from
Pakistan to Sudan beginning in 1989 and remained there until
international pressure forced him to return to Afghanistan. 

THE ORGANIZATION - Al-Qaeda is organized with Bin Laden, the
emir-general, at the top, followed by other Al-Qaeda leaders and leaders
of the constituent groups.  Horizontally, it is integrated with 24
constituent groups.  The vertical integration is formal, the horizontal
integration, informal.  Immediately below Bin Laden is the Shura majlis,
a consultative council.  Four committees - military, religio-legal,
finance, and media - report to the majlis.  Handpicked members of these
committees - especially the military committee - conduct special
assignments for Bin Laden and his operational commanders.  To preserve
operational effectiveness at all levels, compartmentalization and
secrecy are paramount. 

Al-Qaeda membership is estimated at between 3,000-5,000 men, most of
whom fight alongside the Taliban against the Northern Alliance and are
designated the 055 Brigade.  It has camps in Khost, Mahavia, Kabul,
Jalalabad, Kunar, Kandahar, and depots in Tora Bora and Liza.  There are
no female members.  In terms of recruitment of experienced fighters, Bin
Laden has benefited from his vast Mujahideen database, created during
the anti-Soviet campaign. 

Bin Laden's cadres are drawn from a 50,000 strong pool of two
generations of Afghan veterans.  The first generation fought in the
multinational Afghan campaign in 1979-89, the second generation in
campaigns in Tajikistan, Bosnia- Herzegovina, Kashmir, Mindanao,
Chechnya, Lebanon, Nagorno-Karabakh, Algeria and Egypt.  These fighters
are devout Muslims inspired by Islamic scholars and are willing to
sacrifice their lives for Islam. 

Al-Qaeda support and operational cells have been detected and
neutralized in Italy, Germany, UK, Canada, USA, Tanzania, Kenya, Yemen
and Albania, but they have since been replaced.  Cells have also been
identified in about 50 countries including Somalia, Eritrea, Sudan, and
the Philippines. 

THE IDEOLOGY -- Al-Qaeda owes its extensive support and operational
infrastructure to its broad ideological disposition.  Bin Laden's
ideology appeals to both Middle Eastern and non-Middle Eastern groups
that are Islamic in character.  Although an Arab, Bin Laden advocates
pan- Islam, not pan-Arabism.  His thinking in this direction was greatly
influenced both by Azzam, his Palestinian mentor, and to a lesser extent
by Hasan Turabi, the spiritual leader of Sudan. 

Bin Laden supports three types of groups.  First, groups fighting
regimes led by Muslim rulers which they believe are compromising Islamic
ideals and interests (as in Egypt, Algeria and Saudi Arabia).  Second,
groups that are fighting regimes perceived as oppressing and repressing
their Muslim populace (as in Kosovo, India and Indonesia).  Third,
groups fighting regimes to establish their own Islamic state (as in
Palestine, Chechnya, Dagestan and Mindanao).  Bin Laden has also
directed his efforts and resources to fight the USA, a country he sees
as a direct threat to Islam, closely followed by Europe, Israel, Russia
and India in importance as targets. 

Al-Qaeda's broad ideology has enabled it to infiltrate many Islam-
driven groups.  Most of Al-Qaeda's membership is drawn from the two
Egyptian groups: Islamic Group of Egypt (Gamaya al Islamiya) and
Egyptian Islamic Jihad (Al Gamaya Al Islamiya).  Two Algerian groups,
the GIA of Antar Zouabri and the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat
(Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat - GSPC) of Hassan
Hattab developed ties with Al-Qaeda early on, but large-scale
penetration of Algerian groups came in 1997-8. 

Bin Laden also cemented ties with Jaish Aden Abin al Islami of Yemen,
and members of several small Islamist parties from Tunisia, Libya,
Morocco and elsewhere also joined.  With the exception of the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Abu Sayaaf Group (ASG), Al-Qaeda
links with Asian Islamist groups, notably those fighting in Kashmir,
developed in the second half of the 1990s. 

Other Al-Qaeda constituent or affiliated organizations include Jamaa
essalafya lid Daawa wal Q it al, en Nahda, Sipah e Sahaba Kashmir,
Hizb-al-Islami in Kashmir, Harakat ul Mujahjideen and Harakat-ul Jihad
in Kashmir, Hizbullah in Lebanon, Hamas in the Occupied Territories and
the Islamic Party of Turkistan. 

Due to fears of penetration, especially since the embassy bombings,
Al-Qaeda is becoming more discreet in its decision making process, with
fewer operatives knowing the next target.  Target selection, preparation
and acquisition remains confined to Bin Laden and a handful of leaders
in the military committee. 

SUPPORT SOURCES -- Bin Laden's state sponsors have included Sudan, Iran
and Afghanistan.  Pakistan has not supported Bin Laden's terrorist
campaigns but it does assist several hundred Afghan veterans currently
serving directly under Al-Qaeda, notably Harakat ul Mujahidin which is
engaged in fighting Indian troops in Kashmir. 

Bin Laden's funding sources vary.  His personal inherited fortune is in
the region of US$280 to $300 million according to the estimates of
Western intelligence agencies.  Wealthy Arab well-wishers in the Middle
East, especially in the Gulf states, continue to support Bin Laden and
sympathetic organizations.  Bin Laden is also known to siphon funds from
overt Muslim charities.  A wide variety of banks in the Gulf are used,
with Bin Laden front organizations transacting businesses.  The
transfers of funds occur via international banks in the Gulf where his
brother-in-law Mohammad Jamal Khalifa is based. 

He is responsible for managing a part of the financial network and
manages significant investments, notably in Mauritius, Singapore,
Malaysia and the Philippines.  His businesses range from trade in
diamonds to fish.  Despite some sources saying he has been disowned, Bin
Laden has received significant funds from wealthy donors including his
family.  Funds are transferred through a number of banks in the United
Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.  US authorities were able to
trace $5,000 transferred by Bin Laden to the operational group in Yemen
that attacked the USS Cole. 

However, overall evidence suggests the extent of Al-Qaeda funding is
limited, a result perhaps of successful US attempts to block finance to
and from Al-Qaeda or of limits on communication placed on it by the
Taliban. 

MODUS OPERANDI -- Bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman, direct a number of
support and strike operations using their own support activists and
attack teams.  Al-Qaeda's elite consists of experienced Egyptian,
Algerian and Yemeni cadres.  Al-Qaeda has a high capacity for
infiltrating any Muslim community irrespective of size and geographic
location.  Individually, Al-Qaeda members have joined Muslim communities
from New Zealand to India, and the organization has infiltrated both
authoritarian and democratic states.  In the authoritarian states of the
Middle East, especially in the oil-rich Gulf, Al-Qaeda enjoys the
support of Islamic philanthropists and foundations.  In emergent
democracies, it infiltrates by providing goods and services to Muslims
in need.  In democracies, it operates by forging links with influential
Muslim communities with the aim of soliciting and channeling their
support to Muslim communities in need elsewhere. 

As the 1998 bombings and September 2001 plane missions demonstrated,
several Al-Qaeda infiltrators were sleepers for several years.  In some
cases, members who have left have been re-approached by Al-Qaeda leaders
for assistance, and have returned to the fold.  The Western intelligence
community believes there are sleepers in Europe and North America
waiting to be activated State response The fight against Al-Qaeda poses
several challenges.  Bin Laden has built an organization difficult to
disrupt, degrade and destroy.  The intelligence community is unfamiliar
with the network's fluid and dynamic structure and the past offers
little guidance.  The time- tested strategy to destroy a politically
motivated armed group is to target the core and penultimate leadership,
but in Bin Laden's case, this is a difficult proposition. 

Al-Qaeda is resilient for four principal reasons:

  (1) It is the symbol of resistance against Western domination. 
Although Bin Laden is a veritable icon of terrorism to the West, in
parts of the Islamic world he is seen as the only leader that can stand
up to the big Satan (the USA) and the little Satan (Israel).  To draw
maximum support, Al-Qaeda created the 'World Islamic Jihad Against the
Jews and Crusaders'.  As such, Al-Qaeda has a ready base of recruits,
supporters and sympathizers.  To deepen and widen Al- Qaeda's reach, Bin
Laden departs from tradition and embraces a pan- Islamic view.  As a
result, Al-Qaeda draws the support of both Arab and non-Arab Muslims. 
With time, Al-Qaeda's vast active and potential support base will grow
and mature;

  (2) Al-Qaeda has built strategic depth by maintaining leadership and
operational links with some of the largest and deadliest Middle Eastern
and Asian terrorist groups.  As an experienced practitioner, Bin Laden's
stature and personal relationships with the leaders of these groups
facilitated Al-Qaeda links.  Bin Laden's generosity with funds and, more
importantly, words of praise, has enabled him to cement strong working
relationships at both leadership and operational levels.  Although
conceptualized, planned and even financed by Al-Qaeda, the targeting end
of terrorist operations will be by constituent groups such as GIA, MILF,
and ASG.  Attributing individual attacks and finding the perpetrators
will be a long process;

  (3) Landlocked Afghanistan provides Al-Qaeda with a political,
security and geographic shield, which, by imposing sanctions, the
international community has only strengthened.  Afghanistan's isolation
has major implications for intelligence collection, especially for the
generation of high-grade intelligence, which usually comes through human
sources.  Without people-to-people contact it is difficult to influence
their thinking;

  (4) Al-Qaeda physically and/or ideologically penetrates international
and domestic Islamic NGOs throughout the world.  Thus the Al-Qaeda
infrastructure is inseparably enmeshed with the religious,-social and
economic fabric of Muslim communities worldwide.  Host countries such as
the UK, Canada, Australia, and even the USA, are hesitant to investigate
Islamic charities, including foreign charities. 

Nonetheless, Al-Qaeda is not invulnerable.  Thanks mainly to US
intelligence agencies, Al-Qaeda suffered gravely since the embassy
bombings in '98, and will suffer more after the September 2001 missions. 
There remains a high capacity to replenish losses and wastage. 
Nevertheless, Al-Qaeda can be destroyed with the allocation and
sustained application of resources, political courage, legal and
diplomatic tools.  The key to disrupting, degrading and destroying
Al-Qaeda lies in developing a multipronged, multidimensional and
multinational strategy that targets the core and the penultimate
leadership and the network's sources of finance and supplies.  That is
what is being done.  (Slightly edited version of excellent report in
Jane's Intelligence Review, 1 August 2001, Special Report /// written by
Phil Hirschkorn, Rohan Gunaratna, Ed Blanche, and Stefan Leader)
(courtesy PJK)


----------------------------------------------------------------------------


SECTION II - CONTEXT AND PRECEDENT

INTELLIGENCE LEGISLATION AND INTELLIGENCE FAILURES -- Congressional
sources indicate that proposed intelligence legislation will include
provisions designed to remove impediments imposed on CIA, FBI and
Defense Department intelligence agents over the past quarter century. 

For those who are searching for a reason for the so-called "intelligence
failure" so horribly on display last week one answer proposes that it
was the result of political and legal attacks on our Intelligence
establishment and operations going back to the 1970s witch hunts of the
Church committee. 

A key reason that we don't have the intelligence we need to thwart
terrorism is that we have spent many years actively discouraging good
agents from getting it.  If one had to single out the moment that our
nation moved from an intelligence to anti-intelligence footing, it came
26 years ago this week, when front pages across America featured a
photograph of Senator Frank Church, the Idaho liberal, brandishing a
special dart gun that ex-CIA director William Colby had brought to the
committee hearings.  In Senator Church's view, the CIA was a "rogue
elephant on the rampage," and the image of the dart gun underscored the
accusation that our agents were goon squads. 

That was the same year that CounterSpy magazine published the names of
CIA agents around the world. 

Human source intelligence particularly has been reeling ever since. 
Under President Jimmy Carter human intelligence (espionage) was slashed
and dozens of CIA's most experienced operations officers were sacked. 
Similar actions were taken in the Department of Defense.  The leadership
at the time clearly chose intelligence technology over human
intelligence ( which was most likely to involve them in trouble on the
Hill) to satisfy their primary intelligence collection needs.  A second
wave of pressures from Congressional and human rights advocates during
President Clinton's administration further restricted the types of
agents that could be used -- they had to be scrubbed for their human
rights credentials.  A host of other Congressionally mandated
restrictions came in, including those preventing the CIA from using
cover as journalists, clergy or aid workers. 

Over at the FBI, meanwhile, Congressional and media inquisitions led to
similar administrative changes.  Dedicated field agents who had spent
their careers investigating groups such as the Weather Underground--with
the tacit approval of several Presidents--suddenly faced the prospect of
criminal indictments.  The prosecutions were nixed, but President Ford's
Attorney General, Benjamin Levi, handed down similar restrictions. 
Under the Levi guidelines, agents could not begin investigating suspect
groups until after a crime had been committed.  Agents tell us that such
were the restrictions that they were not even allowed to collect
newspaper clippings. 

The street agents got the message, and though restrictions were eased
during the Reagan years, counter-intelligence has never fully recovered. 
The best and the brightest left the Bureau for criminal work, where it
was still possible to catch bad guys.  As Attorney General John Ashcroft
notes, it's easier today to get a wiretap on a suspected drug dealer
than on a terrorist.  And other requests by Mr.  Ashcroft--such as his
plea to allow wiretapping authority to be directed at a person (who may
use several phones) rather than one specified line, or to monitor
financial dealings of suspected terrorists--suggest just how out of
touch the legal framework is.  It speaks of the perverse incentives
today that among the Bremer Commission's recommended reforms is having
intelligence agents know they are insured against personal liability
lawsuits. 

Many years ago, after the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut,
President Reagan said such attacks were harder to spot because of an
attitude that "spying is somehow dishonest and let's get rid of our
intelligence agents.  " And that was done.  Our message must be that
there are greater evils in this world than U.S.  intelligence agencies,
and that espionage and related clandestine operations are an essential
part of our national defense.  (Jonkers) ( adapted from Wall Street
Journal editorial - -"How America Dismantled its Intelligence
Capabilities", Sept 18, 2001)


----------------------------------------------------------------------------

SECTION III CYBER INTELLIGENCE

NIPC WARNS OF DISTRIBUTED DENIAL-OF-SERVICE [DDoS] ATTACKS -- The
National Infrastructure Protection Center, the FBI's cyber security
agency, issued an advisory Tuesday warning against the possibility of
increased distributed denial-of-service attacks coming as a result of
the last week's terrorist attacks against targets in New York and near
Washington, D.C.(Levine 19 Sep 01) <a
href="http://www.cnn.com/2001/TECH/internet/09/19/nipc.warning.idg/index.html">http://www.cnn.com/2001/TECH/internet/09/19/nipc.warning.idg/index.html>

TERRORISTS USED INTERNET -- There is new evidence suggesting the
terrorists who carried out last week's attacks in New York and
Washington used the World Wide Web to help coordinate their deadly
efforts.  "They used the Internet and they used it well," an FBI
official said of the 19 men who hijacked four passenger airliners last
Tuesday, steering three of them into the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon.(Levine) &lt;<a
href="http://www.techtv.com/news/story/0,24195,3348572,00.html">http://www.techtv.com/news/story/0,24195,3348572,00.html>

ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE LEGISLATION TO BE REVISED -- The Bush
administration will ask for more power to eavesdrop on phone calls, the
Internet and voicemail messages, according to an outline of a bill
obtained by Wired News.  In response to last week's catastrophic
terrorist attacks, President Bush plans to ask Congress to approve
far-reaching legislation that rewrites U.S.  laws dealing with
electronic surveillance, immigration and support for terrorists.(Levine)
<a
href="http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,46953,00.html">http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,46953,00.html>

HACKER DECEPTION ALTERS NEWS STORIES ON PRESIDENT BUSH -- A computer
security researcher was able to edit and alter wire stories posted on
Yahoo.com's SecurityFocus.com.  The researcher rewrote a story, subtly
changing some facts and attributing faked comments to President George
W.  Bush.(Levine) <a
href="http://www.msnbc.com/news/631231.asp">http://www.msnbc.com/news/631231.asp>

HACKERS STRIKE MIDDLE EASTERN SITES -- Saying the U.S.  government
hasn't sufficiently responded to last week's terrorist attacks, a group
of vigilante hackers has taken matters into its own hands and defaced
some 200 to 300 Middle Eastern government Web sites and those of
Palestinian Internet service providers.  The group says it plans to
destroy Web servers and Internet access in Afghanistan.  "This is the
21st century, the world of technology belongs to us," says a 21-year old
computer security worker from Ohio who uses the name "Hackah Jak." He is
the founder of the group of 60 computer professionals from around the
world who call themselves the Dispatchers.(Levine) <a
href="http://www.usatoday.com/life/cyber/tech/2001/09/19/hack-attack-launched.htm">http://www.usatoday.com/life/cyber/tech/2001/09/19/hack-attack-launched.htm>

NIMDA WORM MAY BE PEAKING -- The outbreak of the Nimda computer worm,
which has spread rapidly across the Internet, appeared to have peaked
Wednesday for the powerful server machines that drive the Web, but the
number of infected PCs may never be known, computer security experts
said.  (Levine) <a
href="http://www.siliconvalley.com/docs/news/tech/025805.htm">http://www.siliconvalley.com/docs/news/tech/025805.htm>

A "TARPIT" THAT TRAPS WORMS -- Network administrators now have a hacking
tool that can help them strike back at malicious attackers.  "LaBrea" is
a free, open-source tool that deters worms and other hack attacks by
transforming unused network resources into decoy-computers that appear
and act just like normal machines on a network.  But when malicious
hackers or mindless worms such as Nimda or Code Red attempt to connect
with a LaBrea-equipped system, they get sucked into a virtual tarpit
that grabs their computer's connection -- and doesn't release
it.(Levine) <a
href="http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,1282,46964,00.html">http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,1282,46964,00.html>

TECH FIRMS JOIN FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM -- The use of existing and
emerging technologies is essential to the fight against terrorism,
analysts say.  Counter-terrorism is now one of the nation's top
priorities, President Bush said last week.  The government has already
allocated billions of dollars to the cause, and US agencies such as the
CIA and the FBI are expected to bulk up their staffs and resources in
the near future.(Levine) <a
href="http://www.techtv.com/news/culture/story/0,24195,3348383,00.html">http://www.techtv.com/news/culture/story/0,24195,3348383,00.html>

TECHNOLOGIES TO PROTECT PASSENGERS -- Governments and airlines seeking
to reduce the threat of airplane hijackings by terrorists have a wide
range of security technologies to choose from.  Much of the spotlight
will be on biometrics systems, which identify travelers by fingerprints,
the patterns in their retinas, their voices or other individual
characteristics.  (Levine) <a
href="http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/19/nyregion/19TECH.html">http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/19/nyregion/19TECH.html>
<a
href="mailto:rlevine@ix.netcom.com?Subject=Re:%20[LEANALYST]%20FW:%20WIN%20#37-01%20dtd%2017%20Sep%202001%2526In-Reply-To=%2526lt;LGECKGMGNEANMEOFDAKNMEDLDBAA.k7va@email.msn.com">rlevine@ix.netcom.com</a>
www.newsbits.net <a
href="http://www.newsbits.net/search.html">http://www.newsbits.net/search.html>



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SECTION IV - BOOKS AND SOURCES

PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 2000, U.S.  Department of State
(Publication 10822), April 2001.  US policy is described succinctly: (1)
Make no concession to terrorists and strike no deals; (2) bring
terrorists to justice for their crimes, (3) isolate and apply pressure
on states that sponsor terrorism to force them to change their behavior,
and (4) bolster the counter-terrorist capabilities of those countries
that work with the US and require assistance.  Last year's policy stands
today, except that it is now enforced by the US military and
unrestricted clandestine operations.  The scope of terrorism in the year
2000 - (seemingly a long, long time ago): 19 US citizens were killed,
seventeen of whom were part of the crew of the USS Cole.  The other two
died in conflicts in East Timor and in Sierra Leone.  The number of
anti-US attacks increased from 169 in 1999 to 200 in 2000 -- but this
was mostly because there were 152 attacks against a pipeline in
Colombia, considered a US target.  Terrorist attacks on the US or US
citizens in the year 2000 were either suppressed or suspended. 
International incidents exceeded the US totals greatly, with 423
incidents killing 405 persons, mostly in Africa and Asia (354).  This
publication, published recently, is an excellent historic document on
the topic, with a country-by-country rundown and useful appendices
listing incidents chronologically, describing terrorist groups
throughout the world, and providing statistics as far back as 1981 as
well as geographic displays.  (Jonkers)


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