Re: [iwar] [fc:Research.slaps.crypto-banning.Feds]

From: Tony Bartoletti (azb@llnl.gov)
Date: 2001-09-24 11:50:07


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From: Tony Bartoletti <azb@llnl.gov>
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Date: Mon, 24 Sep 2001 11:50:07 -0700
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Subject: Re: [iwar] [fc:Research.slaps.crypto-banning.Feds]
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Although the hype about "widespread use of crypto/steganography by 
terrorists" is probably overblown, I am curious how any group could examine 
a graphic image to determine if steganography were in use.  Aside from 
thousands of possible encoding schemes that could be used to embed a 
"plain-text" message, one must consider that the text could easily be 
obscured beforehand by some combination of compression or otherwise "weak" 
encryption.  The combinations and variations are staggering, and if you 
don't hit upon the right one, you see nothing out of the ordinary.

As much as I oppose "crypto-banning" in general, I find the statement "The 
researchers discuss, and dismiss, the possibility
that strong passwords were being used" to be patently self-serving.

____tony____

At 10:54 PM 9/21/01 -0700, you wrote:
>Research slaps crypto-banning Feds
>
>By Andrew Orlowski in San Francisco
>
>Posted: 22/09/2001 at 01:03 GMT
>
>While America's own fundamentalists - led by US Attorney General John
>Ashcroft - prepare the most draconian assault on Americans' civil
>liberties since the second world war, their very own causus beli seems
>to be vanishing.
>
>The enormous increase in surveillance has been justified by claims that
>terrorists are using cryptography, and in particular steganography: the
>art of hiding information.  USA Toady has run a series of articles on
>the theme, all predictably quoting 'anonymous' security sources,
>describing how messages are passed hidden in picture innocuous picture
>files on sites such as eBay.
>
>Or maybe, not so innocuous.  The tabloid even managed to score a
>tasteless bullseye last week with an article that combined pornography,
>cryptography, terrorism and sport in the same article.  For any readers
>who doubted the message, it was illustrated with a picture of /bin/laden
>himself.
>
>But steganography isn't nearly as widespread a threat as you'd believe.
>
>A research paper published a fortnight before the attacks on US
>civilians and made public this week has discovered no examples of
>steganographic content on eBay whatsoever.
>
>Having exhaustively examined two million images on eBay, not one was
>found to contain steganographic content, according to academics Niels
>Provos and Peter Honeyman, who've published the paper at the University
>of Michigan's website.
>
>15,000 of the two million images were deemed to have some form of
>steganographically-encrypted content by the JPIIhide program.  But after
>subjecting the images to dictionary attacks, not a single hidden message
>was discovered.  The researchers discuss, and dismiss, the possibility
>that strong passwords were being used.  In short, they conclude, there
>is no significant use of steganography on the Internet.
>
>Put in context, this research could simply prove that terrorists don't
>use eBay to as a source for populating their model Ewok Villages.
>
>But more seriously it rubbishes one of the primary reasons for cracking
>down on personal privacy in the US.
>
>The paper, available in Postscript or PDF formats (and rendered in that
>spidery font that cryptographers seem to love) is a 800KB download
>
>
>------------------
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>
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Tony Bartoletti 925-422-3881 <azb@llnl.gov>
Information Operations, Warfare and Assurance Center
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Livermore, CA 94551-9900





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