Return-Path: <sentto-279987-4203-1010197486-fc=all.net@returns.groups.yahoo.com> Delivered-To: fc@all.net Received: from 204.181.12.215 [204.181.12.215] by localhost with POP3 (fetchmail-5.7.4) for fc@localhost (single-drop); Fri, 04 Jan 2002 18:26:08 -0800 (PST) Received: (qmail 30386 invoked by uid 510); 5 Jan 2002 02:25:04 -0000 Received: from n26.groups.yahoo.com (216.115.96.76) by all.net with SMTP; 5 Jan 2002 02:25:04 -0000 X-eGroups-Return: sentto-279987-4203-1010197486-fc=all.net@returns.groups.yahoo.com Received: from [216.115.97.190] by n26.groups.yahoo.com with NNFMP; 05 Jan 2002 02:15:49 -0000 X-Sender: fc@red.all.net X-Apparently-To: iwar@onelist.com Received: (EGP: mail-8_0_1_3); 5 Jan 2002 02:24:46 -0000 Received: (qmail 51528 invoked from network); 5 Jan 2002 02:24:45 -0000 Received: from unknown (216.115.97.171) by m4.grp.snv.yahoo.com with QMQP; 5 Jan 2002 02:24:45 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO red.all.net) (12.232.125.69) by mta3.grp.snv.yahoo.com with SMTP; 5 Jan 2002 02:24:45 -0000 Received: (from fc@localhost) by red.all.net (8.11.2/8.11.2) id g052P2130226 for iwar@onelist.com; Fri, 4 Jan 2002 18:25:02 -0800 Message-Id: <200201050225.g052P2130226@red.all.net> To: iwar@onelist.com (Information Warfare Mailing List) Organization: I'm not allowed to say X-Mailer: don't even ask X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.5 PL3] From: Fred Cohen <fc@all.net> X-Yahoo-Profile: fcallnet Mailing-List: list iwar@yahoogroups.com; contact iwar-owner@yahoogroups.com Delivered-To: mailing list iwar@yahoogroups.com Precedence: bulk List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:iwar-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com> Date: Fri, 4 Jan 2002 18:25:02 -0800 (PST) Subject: [iwar] [fc:Report.Finds.Shortcomings.In.Energy.Dept..Arms.Testing] Reply-To: iwar@yahoogroups.com Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Washington Post January 3, 2002 Report Finds Shortcomings In Energy Dept. Arms Testing Ability to Ensure Weapons' Reliability at Issue, IG Says By Walter Pincus, Washington Post Staff Writer The Energy Department's inspector general has determined that the growing problems associated with the safety and reliability of the nation's nuclear weapons, without nuclear testing, have become a "most serious challenge area" for the newly established National Nuclear Security Agency that runs the weapons complex. In a report sent to Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham on Dec. 21 and made public yesterday, Inspector General Gregory H. Friedman said one review his office conducted last year turned up backlogs in flight and laboratory test schedules for five of nine nuclear missile warheads and bombs in the operational stockpile. Another review, completed last month, showed backlogs of more than 18 months in correcting defects or malfunctions that were discovered in testing of older weapons systems. "Without a robust and complete surveillance testing program, the department's ability to assess the reliability of some nuclear weapons is at risk," Friedman wrote. Each year, the Pentagon and the Energy Department must certify to the president that the nuclear weapons stockpile is safe and reliable and that there is no need to resume tests involving the detonation of nuclear warheads and bombs in underground caverns, as was done until 1992. At a time when the Bush administration is contemplating sharp reductions in offensive strategic nuclear missiles and bombs, some lawmakers and senior officials inside the nuclear weapons complex and the Pentagon have been talking about the need to resume underground testing, said Sen. John W. Warner (Va.), ranking Republican on the Senate Armed Services Committee. "If the surveillance program can't do the job, we will have to resume testing to make sure our [nuclear] weapons work," Warner said recently. The government's process of certifying "high confidence" in the nuclear stockpile involves randomly selecting for testing about 11 units from each of the nine deployed nuclear warheads on land- and submarine-based intercontinental missiles and bombs on aircraft. Nuclear warheads, missiles and bombs are flight-tested by being launched or dropped to see if the propellants and guidance systems work. The IG's report showed that, over the past four years, there were delays in five of 16 tests scheduled for the W-80 warhead used on cruise missiles and in three of 12 tests scheduled for the W-88, which is carried by the sub-launched Trident II missiles. Laboratory tests to see whether handling, aging or manufacturing problems have developed in components such as radars showed delays in eight of 30 tests related to the B-61 nuclear bombs and in eight of 31 tests planned for the W-76 warhead used on sub-launched Trident I missiles. Component tests -- which include looking at "pits," or nuclear triggers and detonators -- are also running behind, with four pit tests delayed out of 13 that were scheduled for the four-year period. When successful testing over four years falls below 75 percent of planned tests, "there is significant concern that anomalies or defects in the stockpile might have been missed," the IG's report said. Part of the problem, according to the IG, is that the facilities of the nuclear weapons complex have been aging and need increased spending for maintenance and replacement. Congress recently approved an extra $200 million for such work, but more is needed, Energy Department officials say. When testing shows a defect or malfunction, department procedures require immediate notification of the nuclear weapons lab that developed the weapon. Five days after notification, the lab is supposed to determine whether the problem is significant. If so, the lab has 45 days to determine through tests whether a major investigation should be initiated since the reliability and performance of the weapon could be involved. About 10 percent of significant findings have resulted in "retrofits or major design changes to the nuclear weapons stockpile," the IG reported. Nevertheless, the IG recently found that the 45-day period for determining the significance of problems had grown, in some instances, to 300 days. After the determination had been made, "over two-thirds of the 64 active investigations remained unresolved beyond the department's one-year benchmark for completion," according to the IG's report. Only a small cadre of engineers and experts carry out these investigations and they often are involved in other projects, a former top Pentagon official said. The IG noted that, as of March 2001, 18 of 24 such investigations remained unresolved after 18 or more months at Los Alamos National Laboratory, which spent the past two years adapting to tighter security rules in the wake of allegations of Chinese espionage. "If these delays continue, the department may not be in a position to unconditionally certify the aging nuclear weapons stockpile," Friedman wrote. ------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor ---------------------~--> Tiny Wireless Camera under $80! Order Now! FREE VCR Commander! Click Here - Only 1 Day Left! http://us.click.yahoo.com/WoOlbB/7.PDAA/ySSFAA/kgFolB/TM ---------------------------------------------------------------------~-> ------------------ http://all.net/ Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.2 : 2002-12-31 02:15:02 PST