Return-Path: <sentto-279987-4374-1011854108-fc=all.net@returns.groups.yahoo.com> Delivered-To: fc@all.net Received: from 204.181.12.215 [204.181.12.215] by localhost with POP3 (fetchmail-5.7.4) for fc@localhost (single-drop); Wed, 23 Jan 2002 22:38:10 -0800 (PST) Received: (qmail 16210 invoked by uid 510); 24 Jan 2002 06:36:36 -0000 Received: from n32.groups.yahoo.com (216.115.96.82) by all.net with SMTP; 24 Jan 2002 06:36:36 -0000 X-eGroups-Return: sentto-279987-4374-1011854108-fc=all.net@returns.groups.yahoo.com Received: from [216.115.97.163] by n32.groups.yahoo.com with NNFMP; 24 Jan 2002 06:35:08 -0000 X-Sender: fc@red.all.net X-Apparently-To: iwar@onelist.com Received: (EGP: mail-8_0_1_3); 24 Jan 2002 06:35:08 -0000 Received: (qmail 19633 invoked from network); 24 Jan 2002 06:35:07 -0000 Received: from unknown (216.115.97.167) by m9.grp.snv.yahoo.com with QMQP; 24 Jan 2002 06:35:07 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO red.all.net) (12.232.72.98) by mta1.grp.snv.yahoo.com with SMTP; 24 Jan 2002 06:35:06 -0000 Received: (from fc@localhost) by red.all.net (8.11.2/8.11.2) id g0O6Zd128600 for iwar@onelist.com; Wed, 23 Jan 2002 22:35:39 -0800 Message-Id: <200201240635.g0O6Zd128600@red.all.net> To: iwar@onelist.com (Information Warfare Mailing List) Organization: I'm not allowed to say X-Mailer: don't even ask X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.5 PL3] From: Fred Cohen <fc@all.net> X-Yahoo-Profile: fcallnet Mailing-List: list iwar@yahoogroups.com; contact iwar-owner@yahoogroups.com Delivered-To: mailing list iwar@yahoogroups.com Precedence: bulk List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:iwar-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com> Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2002 22:35:39 -0800 (PST) Subject: [iwar] [fc:Electronic.Attack.-.With.Static.And.Sword] Reply-To: iwar@yahoogroups.com Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Electronic Attack - With Static And Sword Ref: Journal of Electronic Defense, Dec 2001 <a href="http://www.jedonline.com/default.asp?journalid=4&func=articles&page=0112j13&year=2001&month=12&doct=cover%20story">http://www.jedonline.com/default.asp?journalid=4&func=articles&page=0112j13&year=2001&month=12&doct=cover%20story> Part I: The Offensive EW Concept Tactical Aircraft Must Take The Offensive Against Future Threats by Lt. Colonel Omer Regev (ret.) Air-search and fire control radars are widely available, mobile, and effective. The aspects availability, mobility (or transportability), and effectiveness combine with modern communications and networking to enable many armed forces to construct first-rate air-defense systems. This fact of life means that the electronic warfare self-protection system - or suite of systems - is an essential feature of every modern or upgraded fighter. The EW systems for self-protection were developed to counter radar threats as they became lethal to the aircraft. This traditional self-protection concept deals with the threat as one might approach peeling an onion, with priorities forming a series of layers. Unlike an onion, the aspects of the task most likely to bring tears to the eyes are widely regarded as the easiest to deal with. The first priority is to counter the approaching missile by increasing the missile's miss distance. The second priority is to deceive or to "break" the lock of the threat's target acquisition sensor or fire control radar before launch, or even after launch, if the missile is semi-active homing. The third priority is to counter the acquisition phase of the threat's fire-control radar trying to deny successful lock on. Taken as a whole, comparatively low priority is dedicated to deal with the threat's search phases. This is because it is extremely difficult to deal with air-search radars on a technical basis. Only a few of the world's nations have the ability to avoid detection by the air-search radars of a modern air-defense network through some combination of low-observable technology (stealth), signature damping, and jamming. More commonly, countermeasures to air search radars are found in tactics, such as terrain following or striking from unexpected quarters. Self-protection concepts have evolved through few generations, the oldest of which are systems destined for aircraft survivability over the battlefield. These concepts employ the inner protection layer of the onion. Unfortunately, countering a threat in the terminal phase calls for "panic" (emergency weapon release) and mission abort. Thus, it is possible for an air defense unit to win an engagement with a combat aircraft even if the aircraft lives to fight another day. It could be argued that a mission aborted is a battle won by the defending side. Rather than thinking about protection in terms of platforms, it is time to start thinking about it in terms of missions. Mission protection implies the survival of the platform and crew while at the same time encompassing the survival of the purpose that put them in harms way to begin with. A mission aborted is a mission that will have to be undertaken again, perhaps with a loss of operational surprise or other less than ideal conditions in play. Furthermore, there are few air forces that have the resources or leisure to stage sortie after sortie and above all there are particular missions where there is no substitute for success. Modern self protection concepts for mission survivability employ the outer protection layers of the onion; countering the threats with sophisticated techniques that allow the aircraft successful ingress to attack the target within SAM protected zones and then egress to safety when the job is done. Be offensive A fundamental weakness of the platform self-protection concept is that supporting technologies are reaching the limits of cost effectiveness. Modern threats incorporate phased array radar technology, low probability of intercept capabilities, and effective ECCM. Maintaining and improving EW systems capabilities to counter improved and modern threats grows asymptotically expensive while the outcome merit of "total EW effectiveness" is almost unchanged. EW systems for platform protection are growing as expensive as the threats, which enjoy the distinct advantage of being procured in greater quantity than platform EW systems (perhaps excepting expendables rounds). Moreover, the problem of protecting a platform is generally more difficult than deterring or destroying it. Intimate intelligence database for each threat and for each threat-mode is required in order to generate effective techniques. Gathering this data and maintaining this database updated requires large budgets and massive effort. There is only one short window of opportunity to counter the threat, and false data might cause fatalities. On the other hand, the threat has the advantage of surprise and superior start position. Operational requirements and budget constrains should require more cost-effectiveness out of modern EW suites and systems. Analyzing the reasons for the weakness and limitations of the self-protection concepts finds the basic "protection-limited" operational requirement and a defensive mindset. Modern air forces would benefit from considering what might be called the Offensive EW Concept (OEWC). "Best defense is offense" is the philosophy of this concept. The fighter (with its EW system) is able to turn the tables on the air-defense system. This is a dramatic change in the combat relationship between the SAM and the fighter. The first step of "going offensive" is upgrading the operational requirements list for the EW systems. EW systems and suites are usually the most sophisticated electronic asset of the fighter. The system usually incorporates a long-range detection function, fast and capable processing functions, and an ultra wide band transmitting function. The EW system is tuned to serve self-protection purposes but leaves its fine potential as a sensor for electronic attack unexploited. The detection function of the radar-warning receiver is very sensitive and able to detect numerous threats at beyond visual range in numerous radar modes. However, for self-protection purposes, the sensitivity is usually "tuned down" and filtered so that only a few threats and threats modes will reach the attention of the aircrew. The processing units gather data from the detection function and from the fighter's avionics. Fusing this data can generate new and vital information. However, most of this data is filtered and only a small portion of it is used by the self-protection system. The OEWC concept is a SEAD doctrine based upon EW means. The EW system capabilities enable the fighter to be first to engage the threat. The EW system will detect, locate and identify the threat at beyond visual range and before it start its hostile engagement procedure. The fighter will then be able to fully exploit its natural advantages of maneuverability and mobility against the threat. Detection capability at beyond visual range provides the pilot with all the required information and will give him the time to prepare and plan his attack. The EW suite generates combat situational picture 360 degrees around the platform. The EW combat picture has depth of many layers: target location, target dynamics, target mode of operation, target intentions, weapons launch, etc. All of this is vital offensive information to the pilot. Threat information will provide accurate geo-location of the threat by implementing state-of-the-art location finding technologies. Threat information will also provide detailed identification of threat type, threat "tail-number," and threat mode of operation. In approaching to attack the threat, the jammer function will play a major role. Using the EW "onion shell" comparison, the jammer will have to deal with the outer shells of the threat (search and detection). The jammer will have to provide the best electronic environment to help the attack mission. At the long range, the jammer's task is to saturate the threat or to deceive it (or both). The jammer will deny any relevant information of fighter's location and intentions from the threat. At later attack phases, in close range, the jammer will also provide self-protection functions. Data fusion of EW data with avionics data is another important layer of the OEWC. Fusing the detection function data with the data of other weapon systems and avionic systems, such as radar, targeting systems and pods, Link-16, IFF interrogator etc., will generate a comprehensive situational awareness for the aircrew. Fusing all the data will generate new targets that might otherwise go unnoticed. These targets are fused out of partial detections of each system that might otherwise be rejected due to lack of information. However, combining the partial data from all the systems will generate a legitimate fused target. Every threat or target will be analyzed and displayed to its last relevant detail. Threats and targets data fusion will also increase the accuracies of the data parameters (direction, location, angles, state of operational mode etc.) allowing improved operational effectiveness. The OEWC is capable of high accuracies of direction and sometimes range. These capabilities are part of the cooperation with avionics and the data fusion. Combined with all the complementary ESM, data the OEWC is capable of generating targeting, weapon cueing and offensive recommendations to the pilot. By using network such as the Link-16, all of its capabilities and accuracies are increased while gathering the information from what has become a multi-source system. Networking sensors will increase the chances of mission success. The targeting function will be comprehensive and accurate, while the jamming function will be coordinated between all the attackers to gain best saturation and deception results. The OEWC will enable operational requirement organizations and platform designers to design an EW system that will be an inherent function of the fighter's avionics and fighter's missions. In the next few years we will witness the EW suite becoming one of the most important systems in the fighter due to its advanced offensive capabilities. The OEWC concept exploits the EW system resources and capabilities to its maximum. Using the offensive concept as part of the avionics or as a weapon will result in expanded and improved operational capabilities even when using the same basic EW system. The future fighter generation -- F-22, JSF, F-16 Block 60, etc. -- are already employing some major parts of the offensive concept. Lt. Colonel Omer Regev (ret.) served 22 years of operational service. He is an expert in operational requirements for EW & electronic systems, as well as in flight-testing electronic systems, avionics, and weapons. Currently he is president of OMERTEC Ltd., a consulting and marketing firm based in Israel. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Part II: Offensive EW In Action The Shooters Can Also Be The Sensors by Maj. Mike "Starbaby" Pietrucha, USAF <image Low-power signals are particularly difficult for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance sensors to pick out at range. The shooter is in an excellent position to locate a SAM system and then make the decision to employ weapons or electronic attack. USAF photo 0300 Zulu, 26 June, 2006, the Persian Gulf. Four F-15E Strike Eagles fly through the Zagros mountain range in southern Iran, their terrain-following radars guiding the aircraft safely at 300 feet in pitch-black conditions. In addition to their normal self-defense AMRAAM/ Sidewinder loadout, the aircraft carry a variety of munitions intended for use against a specific SAM array - the S-300 (SA-10 Grumble) batteries guarding the naval base at Bandar Abbas - and incidentally covering much of Oman, the UAE, and all of the Straits of Hormuz. The Strike Eagles are running under emissions control (EMCON) with only low power modes of the terrain-following radar and the radar altimeter to betray them. Given the terrain, detection by active or passive means is extremely unlikely. But the crews are not blind - a low-bandwidth datalink, relayed by satellite, is providing them with a partial picture from offboard sensors far from the area. An onboard precision radar-warning receiver (RWR) is silently listening for nearby threats. As the F-15Es run in, the #1 and #3 aircraft pop above a ridgeline in a preplanned target acquisition maneuver. The electronic surveillance (ES) sensors on board the aircraft detect the S-300's "Clam Shell" radar, but the F-15Es are lurking in the shadows of high mountains and remain undetected. (Pity the defenders for not springing for the "Big Bird" early warning radar tower.) While the Strike Eagles' individual RWRs locate the threat, the two aircraft communicate via a low-power intra-flight datalink, improving their passive solution. Within seconds, all four aircraft now have a location for the Clam Shell: not good enough for weapons employment, but enough to confirm that the previous coordinates are out of date and provide a cue for other sensors. The Strike Eagles are 90 seconds from the IP when the trailing element launches a total of 24 miniature air-launched decoys (MALDs). The decoys fly up and proceed toward the target area - providing a rather rude awakening to the crew at the "Flap Lid" acquisition radar who have been presented with a convincing imitation of a large strike package headed toward the naval base. The automatic features of the SAMs come into play against the decoys, and the first S-300 missiles clear the canisters before the MALDs are a third of the way toward the target. Within seconds, every target engagement radar is radiating. Four miles from the IP, the F-15Es enter a valley and obtain direct line of sight to the very active radar array that is engaging the MALDs. The F-15Es are immediately detected, but it is already too late. The F-15E radars are fully active now, mapping the target array that has been located by onboard sensors. Target location data is passed from the F-15Es via datalink back to the satellite for use by other assets in theater. Within 10 seconds of unmasking, the trailing element launches a pair of anti-radiation missiles at the enemy target engagement radars. The crews identify target coordinates from the SAR maps and the jets mask behind a ridgeline. Total exposure time: 20 seconds. The scenario above is entirely notional. The F-15E does not have the RWR to make this vision a reality. In fact, no US combat aircraft has the sensor array described above, and the MALD is not yet fielded. Having said that, neither are beyond the technical or financial reach of a combat air force, especially given the high stakes involved. Radar defenses are very difficult targets. The addition of mobility to their arsenal has greatly complicated the problem of finding and killing the radars that serve as the backbone of both the surveillance and "shooter" portions of an Integrated Air Defense System (IADS). The US is highly reliant on its standoff sensors to find radar targets. Unfortunately, the picture provided by these sensors is incomplete and lags the event significantly behind. It is long past time to take advantage of our other, underutilized sensor array - the gear on board the strike aircraft. If we want to detect and target the threat in single-digit minutes, the shooters must also be the sensors. The use of offboard sensors and datalink to provide data to the fighters is an established concept, and is often used as a model for passing high-fidelity data to strike aircraft. The idea is valuable when considered as an adjunct to the striker's own sensor array - but is dangerous as a substitute. An example can be drawn with the F-15C in its air-to-air role. The aircraft is capable of independent detection, target identification, and weapons employment; datalink merely enhances the process. Any suggestion that an F-15 would rely on datalinked information from AWACS, to the exclusion of its own radar, would be both impractical and unwelcome. Implicit in the idea of networked sensors in general, and offboard sensors in particular, is the assumption that the participants in the network will have functional datalink. Disregarding the considerable effects of equipment failure and operator error, datalink cannot be guaranteed. An adversary can be expected to make considerable effort to deny us the use of our own datalinks and we cannot design an architecture that is reliant on datalink to function. Any architecture that requires datalink to function is subject to enemy attack directed at a single point of failure. If, for example, a scheme requires a number of sensors on various aircraft to coordinate their actions over long distances, then this structure can be neutralized if datalink is denied. If, instead, datalink is used to enhance and refine a single-ship solution, then datalink is not essential to the process. While datalink makes the cooperative solution more precise, the individual aircraft can still locate threats without it, allowing graceful degradation of the network. Datalinks need not reach across the battlefield. A flight of four aircraft could communicate via a low power link that need not even be a radio frequency link. It can be designed for jam resistance and low probability of intercept, and can provide information exchange between nearby strike aircraft. Back to reality Putting aside the current fact that US strike aircraft RWR were not designed with the modern threat in mind, a hypothetical electronic surveillance sensor suite (think advanced RWR) in the target area has a much greater chance of detecting a radar signal in its vicinity. After all, the strike aircraft is nearby, and if it is being targeted it can be assumed that the sensor is both in the main beam and has a direct line of sight to the radar. Thus, the sensor detects the concentrated energy from a radar pointed directly at it rather than the much weaker sidelobes scattered in other directions. Against a modern threat, the ability of a RWR to locate a SAM system is critical to the survival of the aircraft. Against pulse-Doppler (PD) radars, aircraft try to maneuver to the zero-Doppler region to interrupt track, enhance the effectiveness of chaff and decoys, and hide in the ground clutter. Against a system with a +/- 30-knot Doppler filter, a strike aircraft at 540 knots must hold a tangential heading to the radar +/- 3 degrees to stay "in the notch." The ability to locate the threat is critical to survival and critical to targeting. If the strike aircraft can locate the emitter to within a 2000-ft radius circle, it can cue other sensors. The F-15E, F-18, B-1 and B-2 can use high-resolution synthetic aperture radar (SAR) maps to precisely locate the target cues by onboard ES, thus bridging the gap from the circle provided by ES to GPS-quality coordinates provided by the SAR. Most importantly, this precise location is done rapidly, entirely within the cockpit of a strike aircraft capable of conducting an immediate attack. Rather than simply being a user of the ISR data collected by larger, standoff systems, the strike aircraft become a provider of critical sensor data to other assets. Their positioning in the battlespace makes them an ideal collector. They stimulate the air defenses, becoming the reason that the radars turn on in the first place. They are the closest to an air threat. An array of onboard sensors, from IR to radar to electro-optics can be used to gather information, record it, and download it after the mission, reserving datalink bandwidth for only the most time-critical data. ELINT information, for example, can be used to update threat databases, characterize enemy radars, and analyze enemy tactics. The ability to bring back recorded data and conduct a post-flight download could provide essential intelligence - not everything of value is needed in real or near-real time. The shortening of the timeline to engage targets like mobile SAMs is also an immediate benefit of using strike aircraft sensors. Rather than passing targeting data through a sensor, a targeting cell, and the Air Operations Center, the information starts and ends where it can do the most good - in the cockpit. Against a threat array that can commonly pack up and drive away in less than 10 minutes, strike aircraft have a critically short time to engage a threat that has just revealed itself by its radar emissions. Our sensors should also take advantage of the human-in-the-loop benefits of manned combat aircraft. We can make much better use of the crew than we currently do. These individuals are well trained in target recognition, threat knowledge, tactics, and weapons employment. The combat aircrew is accustomed to making rapid decisions on complex problems for high stakes. Major Mike "Starbaby" Pietrucha is a former F-4G/F-15E IEWO assigned to HQ USAF/XOXS "The Skunk Works." He has 156 combat missions over Iraq and the Yugoslavia, mostly hunting SAMs, sometimes successfully. The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the official opinion of any portion of the US Air Force. Silent Partners: Unattended Sensors Any sensor net can have its collection capabilities improved by the inclusion of remote, unattended sensors. In Vietnam, IGLOO WHITE sensors were dropped by aircraft along the Ho Chi Minh trail to provide target detection data to listening aircraft. While there are serious technical limitations on the sensing and communications capability of small sensors of this type, even relatively limited sensors can provide important information. Strike aircraft will often be the delivery platforms, although cruise missiles and rocket artillery could also be used to seed an area with sensors. Unattended sensors could be seeded into preplanned areas to pick up specified types of data. But they may also be deployed on an ad hoc basis by strike aircraft. For example, a strike aircraft that detected a radar threat but could not precisely locate it could deploy sensors in the area and wait for the target to move. A beer-can sized submunition similar to the BLU-97/B could be loaded in CBU-87 canisters or AGM-154A JSOW bodies for easy, predictable dispensing. There are other uses for cheap, expendable remote sensors. Small and micro-UAVs are often considered as part of an airborne net, but their usefulness need not be as limited as their airborne endurance. If the sensors aboard these tiny aircraft survived the inevitable crash (as they could be designed to do) after the UAV ran out of fuel, they could provide an additional enhancement to a distributed sensor net. If one of the MALDs used in the illustrated scenario had a datalink and an ELINT sensor, it could have popped up above the mountains and sampled the electronic environment for the F-15Es. A cheap, expendable MALD will not have the ability to locate the threat, but it could see which signals are "on the air." Then, the Strike Eagles could have unmasked their ES sensors knowing which threats to look for. ------------------------ Yahoo! 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