Return-Path: <sentto-279987-4742-1022975960-fc=all.net@returns.groups.yahoo.com> Delivered-To: fc@all.net Received: from 204.181.12.215 [204.181.12.215] by localhost with POP3 (fetchmail-5.7.4) for fc@localhost (single-drop); Sat, 01 Jun 2002 17:03:07 -0700 (PDT) Received: (qmail 4553 invoked by uid 510); 1 Jun 2002 23:58:56 -0000 Received: from n40.grp.scd.yahoo.com (66.218.66.108) by all.net with SMTP; 1 Jun 2002 23:58:56 -0000 X-eGroups-Return: sentto-279987-4742-1022975960-fc=all.net@returns.groups.yahoo.com Received: from [66.218.66.98] by n40.grp.scd.yahoo.com with NNFMP; 01 Jun 2002 23:59:20 -0000 X-Sender: fc@red.all.net X-Apparently-To: iwar@onelist.com Received: (EGP: mail-8_0_3_2); 1 Jun 2002 23:59:19 -0000 Received: (qmail 90259 invoked from network); 1 Jun 2002 23:59:19 -0000 Received: from unknown (66.218.66.217) by m15.grp.scd.yahoo.com with QMQP; 1 Jun 2002 23:59:19 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO red.all.net) (12.232.72.152) by mta2.grp.scd.yahoo.com with SMTP; 1 Jun 2002 23:59:18 -0000 Received: (from fc@localhost) by red.all.net (8.11.2/8.11.2) id g5201v404179 for iwar@onelist.com; Sat, 1 Jun 2002 17:01:57 -0700 Message-Id: <200206020001.g5201v404179@red.all.net> To: iwar@onelist.com (Information Warfare Mailing List) Organization: I'm not allowed to say X-Mailer: don't even ask X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.5 PL3] From: Fred Cohen <fc@all.net> X-Yahoo-Profile: fcallnet Mailing-List: list iwar@yahoogroups.com; contact iwar-owner@yahoogroups.com Delivered-To: mailing list iwar@yahoogroups.com Precedence: bulk List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:iwar-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com> Date: Sat, 1 Jun 2002 17:01:57 -0700 (PDT) Subject: [iwar] [fc:India.and.Pakistan:.Crisis.Management.and.Warfighting.Styles] Reply-To: iwar@yahoogroups.com Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Spam-Status: No, hits=-0.4 required=5.0 tests=SUPERLONG_LINE,DIFFERENT_REPLY_TO version=2.20 X-Spam-Level: India and Pakistan: Crisis Management and Warfighting Styles The defense analysis field consists of two types of analysts. One gravitates to organizations like Orbat.com. He studies the nuts and bolts of defense. He is diffident in expressing his opinions: the more he learns, the harder it becomes to generalize. The other sort has no inclination, patience, or capability for real research on the subject, but loves to pontificate about Big Issues. So you have people who know what they're talking about, but don't want to talk; and people who do not know what they are talking about, but want to talk. If academics in general know little about defense issues, given the lack of importance of India and Pakistan, we are even more vulnerable to lectures by people who know little about the region. You editor is going to make a few generalizations. Anyone unhappy with any of them can write in, and he will try and explain better. In the past 55 years, we have a large base of data to draw from. India and Pakistan have engaged in open, declared war in 1947-48, 1965, and 1971. They have engaged in limited fighting in 1965 (Rann of Kutch) and 1999 (Kargil). They have been engaged in an insurgency/CI situation continuously between 1987-present; some date it as 1989-present. There have been any number of mobilization crises: there were two in the 1950s (your editor does not have his notes at hand), there was Brasstacks/Trident in 1986-87, there were two crises that could have led to war in the late 1980s, there was the Siachin War of 1984-today, there was the winter 2001-02 mobilization, and of course, the present situation. There is a discernable pattern in all these crises. 1. Extreme Caution Before Going to War Both sides are exceptionally hesitant to cross that final red line between peace and war. Pakistan because it is the weaker and has more to lose if things go wrong, India for many reasons we can discuss another day. The proof of this is that India has been under Pakistani attack for 15 years and has never retaliated. 2. India has Initiated Hostilities Twice Once was in 1971. Because of various reasons, the capability gap between India and Pakistan was the widest it has ever been; even then, India laid the ground by years of covert action in East Bengal, and could take advantage of Pakistan's Civil War. India still took eight months to prepare the diplomatic and military field before attacking, and still went in only for a limited war with limited aims. A more typical Indian action is Siachin 1984: whatever the original aims, India limited itself very strictly to grabbing a few hundred square kilometers of No Man's Land. 3. Pakistan has Attacked Four Times Pakistan initiated hostilities in the Rann of Kutch, Kashmir in 1947-48 and 1965, and in Kargil 1999. In two cases it kept its aims very limited. Kutch was a brigade action against a few border posts. Kargil was a grab of a few hundred square kilometers that India vacated every winter. Kashmir 1947-48 and 1965 were bold moves with big stakes. The circumstances were so unusual that we'd need much more time to discuss them; in any case, no one is talking of Pakistan starting a war at this time. 4. Demonstrated Warfighting Behavior Is Also Exceptionally Cautious Both sides have repeatedly shown on the battlefield that they operate with extreme caution and much thought. There are any number of break-points at which the situation can be deescalated without difficulty. 5. Both Sides Quickly Accept International Intervention A fundamental tenet of Indo-Pakistan strategic doctrine is that international intervention will bring hostilities to an early end: early as in days and weeks. Kashmir 1947-48 was the sole exception, for many reasons. Siachin and Kutch do not count because they were true sideshows and both sides carefully avoided escalation: India in 1965 and Pakistan in 1999. Because of the above reasons, people in India and Pakistan are perfectly calm even as the west, and the US in particular, whips itself into a frenzy about an imminent war. The US is hopelessly guilty of assuming India and Pakistan think like the US does. In fact, Washington is badly aggravating the situation even as it says it is trying to calm things. This entire situation would not have arises had Washington not jumped in - we'll discuss this day after tomorrow. United States analysts are relying on two untenable assumptions to justify their war scares. First, they assume that one side or the other will do something rash because both sides lack accurate intelligence on the other, and each fears the other may gain an advantage by striking first. Bosh, twaddle, and sewage. This is America talking, not India and Pakistan, and it's because of such talk that to this day many in the 3rd World and Europe are frightened of America than of the Soviets in years past, and Iraq today. A knowledgeable reader is sure to bring up the events of the late afternoon of December 3, 1971, but this is yet another issue we'll have to discuss later. It has no relevance to the present situation. Second, they assume that any conflict could escalate to a nuclear exchange. Incredible as it may seem to Americans, when they talk like this, the average Indian or Pakistani is not slobberingly grateful that wise America is concerned to see the bad kids don't get into trouble. The typical reaction in the subcontinent is far too rude to repeat in a family-oriented website like ours. What Americans need to see - and some in Washington do see it - is that President Musharraf's nuclear threats are not directed at India but at Washington. The Indians and Pakistanis are acting unconcerned not because they are stupid, uneducated natives who don't know what damage a nuclear warhead inflicts. They are acting unconcerned because even if the two came to blows - and we'll discuss tomorrow a likely course if that happens - they know the war will not escalate. This is because neither side has open-ended objectives. India simply wants to make Pakistan pay a price for sending terrorists - they are freedom fighters to Pakistanis - into Kashmir. It does not want to destroy Pakistan, or even to take back Kashmir. Pakistan has till now paid no price at all for the Kashmir insurgency. Quite the reverse: a casual back of the envelope calculation shows that Pakistan is spending one dollar to make India spend a thousand dollars in Kashmir. That the Indians have allowed this happens proves only what venal and corrupt leaders it has, but that's another matter. Pakistan simply wants to continue the insurgency. These are not issues of national survival that require any talk of nuclear weapons. They especially do not need to be placed in a US intellectual framework that had little merit even for the Americans. Diplomacy versus Conflict - the real Middle East War From our colleague Richard M. Bennett of AFI Research. There are a stream of uncorroborated and at times fanciful reports emanating from the Middle East that would suggest that the United States has a new found interest in rescuing Israel from an impasse over Palestine that military action alone is incapable of solving. The increasing urgency felt in Washington has led to bringing Egypt back into the negotiations as a major player and promoting certain Palestinian leaders considered largely untainted by close involvement in the Intifada or Islamic terrorism as either potential replacements for Yasser Arafat or as a balance to his remaining power base. Egypt is a natural partner for Israel in any attempt to defuse the Palestinian uprising, particularly as Cairo is in a position to control events in the Gaza Strip and restrict the activities of Hamas, while it also has a long-term interest in the demilitarization of the Sinai--Negev region with an eye to tourism and other economic development. The position of Saudi Arabia remains less clear as although the recent Saudi peace plan was heavily touted by both Riyadh and Washington and may indeed have opened certain minds to a dialogue, the Saudi Governments long term aims may conflict with the present US-Egyptian-Israeli round of talks. Saudi Arabia and particularly its intelligence service are openly competing with Iran for influence and have gained considerable control over certain operational aspects of Hamas, based predominately in the Gaza Strip. It has also become clear that large numbers of Chechen fighters have been relocated to the Middle East and will operate effectively as a Saudi asset in the ongoing conflict in the region. Secret negotiations between the US Government and other Middle Eastern states such as Syria and Iran have been under way for some time and intermediaries are reported to be working on a face-saving plan to defuse the situation in southern Lebanon to allow for the withdrawal of Iranian and Syrian forces and thereby avoid a major confrontation between Hizbollah, its main supporters and an increasingly restive Israel.Washington quite rightly recognizes that a major Israeli assault on the Beka'a Valley could well lead to a regional war that would probably fatally derail any US plans for the invasion of Iraq. Washington may rethink war on Iraq Those plans are already firmly on the back burner for now as Intelligence reports suggest that Saddam Hussein will strongly resist any attempt to overthrow his regime and may indeed now have the weapons at his disposal to cause unacceptable levels of destruction to the invading forces and Iraqs nearest neighbours, including the vital oil producing areas of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. The United States Defence Department has also signalled that a major rethink of the over-optimistic claims originally being made about the size of force needed for a successful invasion and indeed the timescale is long overdue. A more realistic view of the military options in the region may now allow Washington to ease Russia back into the area as an important influence. Moscow needs hard currency from massive arms deals with Syria, Iraq and Iran and in return for Washington's acceptance of Russia's newly restored and potentially dominating position in the area it would be expected that President Putin would exercise his new found influence to persuade those countries to abandon or at least greatly scale down their support for terrorism and open hostility to Israel. Such a scenario would indeed allow Washington to claim that democracy had won a major victory over international terrorism by means of cleaver diplomacy without risking the political embarrassment of large numbers of bodybags arriving at Andrews Air Force Base. Perhaps it is too much to hope that Washington will be adept enough to grasp the opportunity to win the War on Terrorism by statesmanship and exerting its economic and diplomatic influence, rather than by outright bullying and military action alone. It is true that both methods must run in parallel and that ultimately the military sanction may be the only one that works, but there are many potentially effective paths open to victory before President Bush need rely on the use of armed force as the only possible solution. ------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor ---------------------~--> Which security solution is right for your Web site? Before you decide, request your FREE guide, "Securing Your Web Site For Business," to learn the facts. In the guide, find solutions for: * Encrypting online transactions * Securing corporate intranets * Authenticating your Web site Get your FREE guide today at: http://us.click.yahoo.com/U02TTC/OyKEAA/sXBHAA/kgFolB/TM ---------------------------------------------------------------------~-> ------------------ http://all.net/ Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
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