[iwar] [fc:Why.Bush's.Middle.East.propaganda.campaign.won't.work]

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Subject: [iwar] [fc:Why.Bush's.Middle.East.propaganda.campaign.won't.work]
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Why Bush's Middle East propaganda campaign won't work
The U.S. is spending millions crafting messages to win the hearts and minds
of the Arab world. There's just one problem: We have no credibility.

- - - - - - - - - - - -
By Samer Shehata

printe-mail

July 12, 2002  |  The U.S. State Department has launched a series of
multimillion-dollar programs designed to improve America's image and win the
hearts and minds of the Arab and Muslim world. But despite the enormous
ambitions and cost, troubling questions have emerged over whether an
elaborate marketing campaign can be effective in a region where mistrust of
the United States is nearly universal.

The public diplomacy plan to influence grass-roots opinion in the Arab and
Muslim world includes not just new cultural and academic exchanges, but also
a Web site focused on Sept. 11 and terrorism, a pamphlet called the Network
of Terrorism, television commercials aimed at a Muslim audience, an
Arabic-language FM radio station and even, perhaps, a satellite television
station for the Arab world.

New York Times columnist William Safire recently joined the debate about
public diplomacy in the Islamic world, complaining that the U.S. voice is
"faint" and its efforts thus far are a "flop." In his July 1 column, Safire
argued that the State Department has not been making America's case loudly
enough and criticized the Voice of America newsroom -- which he said "tilts
pro-Arafat and anti-Sharon" -- for broadcasting interviews "with Muslim
supporters of terror." His sharply worded recommendation was that America
should be "knocking heads" to get "our wartime message out -- to persuade
Islamic people that freedom is in their political interest, and that the
path of democracy offers their best hope for a good life."

Safire's recommendations -- as well as many of the State Department's new
initiatives -- reflect a profound misunderstanding of the basic problem. The
overwhelming majority of Arabs and Muslims love freedom and democracy as
much as we do. The problem is that from their perspective, U.S. Middle East
policy is guided by neither of these two noble principles.

While some have claimed that anti-Americanism stems primarily from
misinformation from local media and distorted Hollywood images of American
values, the core problem results from specific U.S. foreign policies. Arabs
and Muslims are profoundly angered by three policies in particular: a bias
toward Israel in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict; the U.S.-led sanctions
against Iraq, which harms innocent Iraqi civilians but does nothing to
topple Saddam Hussein's brutal dictatorship; and Washington's consistent
support for authoritarian regimes friendly to U.S. interests.

While public diplomacy can be effective, no amount of marketing, slick
packaging or explaining our message loudly can solve this problem. Yet
advertising is precisely what the Office of Public Diplomacy has been doing.

At a recent lecture at Georgetown University, for example, a high-ranking
State Department official spoke with delight about the success of a new Web
site designed to explain the tragic events of 9/11 to the Arab and Muslim
World. The official, a former Yale University professor, bragged that the
site had received millions of hits and had therefore been successful.

A Web site for the Arab and Muslim world? Only a small fraction of residents
in these countries have telephones, let alone computers. And an even smaller
fraction has access to the Internet. A snazzy Web site does nothing to reach
99 percent of Arabs and Muslims. In fact, the only region that is less
connected to the Internet is sub-Saharan Africa.

The Office of Public Diplomacy has also produced 1.3 million copies of a
pamphlet entitled the Network of Terrorism. The publication has been
translated into 36 languages and is now the most widely disseminated
document ever produced by the State Department. Staggering illiteracy rates
in the Arab and Muslim world, however, doom this massive undertaking to
failure. According to the CIA World Factbook, for example, illiteracy in
Morocco is about 43 percent for men and 68 percent for women. The figures
for Egypt are 36 percent for men and 61 percent for women; 44 percent and 71
percent in Pakistan; and 52 percent and 85 percent for Afghanistan. If
people cannot read, even the best of documents is sure to be ineffective.

Another new initiative already underway is an FM Arabic language radio
station. The new station, the Middle East Radio Network (MERN), is a
24-hour, seven-day-a-week service that began broadcasting in late March and
is to be fully functional by late summer. Named "sawa" -- meaning "together"
in Arabic -- the station is aimed at Arab listeners under 30 years old and
is supposed to be more effective than the Voice of America because it will
broadcast on AM and FM rather than shortwave, insuring a larger audience.
Congress has already provided $35 million for MERN, and future
appropriations are expected.

The most costly new initiative is a proposed satellite television station
directed at the Arab world. The idea for the station, rumored to be named
Al-Haqeeqa -- Arabic for "truth" -- was supported last fall by Sen. Joseph
Biden, D-Del., and others. It is projected to cost close to $500 million.
Biden reportedly discussed the idea with President Bush and received the
president's approval, but it is still unclear where the money will come from
­- whether Al-Haqeeqa will be a public undertaking, private or a joint
venture.

Wherever the money comes from, the new $500 million station would be an
incredible waste of resources. The idea behind an American station directed
at the Arab world reflects an obsession with Al-Jazeera, the highly
successful Qatari-based satellite television station that gained notoriety
in the U.S. for its broadcast of the Osama bin Laden videotapes.

Many in the U.S. have claimed that Al-Jazeera is anti-American and that its
biased news reporting intentionally inflames passions against the United
States. But Al-Jazeera has become an easy scapegoat, its power overestimated
and its content grossly misrepresented. The station is not inherently
anti-American. In the fall of 2001, I conducted an informal study of
Al-Jazeera for WBUR, the Boston Public Radio station. I compared coverage of
the war in Afghanistan on Al-Jazeera and "NBC Nightly News" and concluded
that Al-Jazeera was neither pro-Taliban nor anti-American and just as
professional as the American news coverage. In fact, the station has often
been critical of Arab regimes and has gotten into trouble as a result.

Arabs and Muslims will undoubtedly view the new U.S.-funded radio and
television stations with extreme suspicion and skepticism, as they view all
government-owned media. Many already have access to Western radio channels,
including the BBC and the VOA, making the new station simply redundant.

No matter what channel delivers the U.S. message, evidence suggests that the
audience might not believe it. The widely reported results of the Gallup
poll conducted in nine predominantly Muslim countries and released last
February clearly demonstrate that Arabs and Muslims simply do not trust the
U.S. government. Asked whether they found the U.S. trustworthy, the
overwhelming majority of respondents said no.

Only 17 percent of Turks answered favorably. Only 7 percent in Kuwait, 5
percent in Jordan, 3 percent in Saudi Arabia and 1 percent in Pakistan said
they found the U.S. trustworthy. If you don't trust the messenger, you will
not trust the message.

Poorly conceived, quick-fix solutions are bound to fail. Yet while the
primary problems are policy-related, public diplomacy ­- if done properly --
can be effective in influencing public opinion among Arabs and Muslims. In
fairness, the Office of Public Diplomacy has done some excellent work,
including increasing funding for cultural and academic exchanges and
traditional diplomatic outreach efforts. Some of the most successful efforts
to build bridges between the United States and the Middle East have been
through the Fulbright program and the U.S. universities ­- the American
University in Cairo and the American University in Beirut ­- which are now
among the best academic institutions in the region.

Traditional public-diplomacy efforts work and need to be funded more
generously. But in addition to increased funding for institutions and
programs like these, the State Department should consider at least two new
measures, which will be both highly effective and cost-efficient.

First, the U.S. should increase funding for basic and primary education in
the Arab and Muslim world through literacy programs and English-language
training. Education in the region is a major problem and literacy rates are
abysmal in many of these countries. If one cannot read, one's exposure to a
range of information is severely limited. And there is no better way of
gaining the enduring gratitude of parents who do not have the resources to
educate their children. U.S.-funded classrooms would be highly visible and
funding education would be a highly effective form of public diplomacy, as
long as the U.S. did not try to impose a curriculum on the schools.

Second, the U.S. government should establish American Studies Centers at
universities in Morocco, Egypt, Jordan or Lebanon, Pakistan and Indonesia.
It is tragic that not a single American Studies Center exists in Egypt, or
anywhere in the entire Middle East to my knowledge. Establishing such
centers would train professionals who are knowledgeable about the U.S. and
American culture, history and politics. These centers would produce local
experts, opinion-makers and educators who would be called upon by local
media to explain the U.S. and American society -- just as Middle East
experts are called upon daily in the United States. For greater credibility,
the centers should be hosted at national universities and funded through the
endowment model, with few or no strings attached. This would provide freedom
and independence, which would, in turn, ensure credibility.

We might not agree with all of the ideas of the educators and professors at
these institutions, but the fact that they will have studied in the United
States and be knowledgeable about American society, politics and history
would help to ensure that the information they provide to their societies
will not be based on ignorance.

While American policy has the single biggest role in shaping Arab and Muslim
opinion toward the U.S., public diplomacy remains important. But we must do
it effectively to make the most of our resources. Choosing real public
diplomacy over propaganda and delivering tangible benefits to ordinary
people are sure to be more effective than even the most expensive marketing
campaign.

- - - - - - - - - - - -

About the writer
Samer Shehata is an assistant professor of arab politics at Georgetown
University. He co-teaches a course entitled "The United States, the Middle
East &amp; the War on Terrorism." 

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