[iwar] [fc:Crypto.Controls.are.Spreading.Internationally]

From: Fred Cohen (fc@all.net)
Date: 2002-07-17 19:40:19


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Date: Wed, 17 Jul 2002 19:40:19 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: [iwar] [fc:Crypto.Controls.are.Spreading.Internationally]
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Crypto Controls are Spreading Internationally
Hand over that encryption key, mate, monsieur, sir, bloke.
By David Banisar Jul 15, 2002

Five years ago, when the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) released their guidelines for cryptography policy, crypto
advocates cheered and declared victory. After a hard fought battle, we had
forced the OECD to back away from the U.S. government's efforts to restrict
encryption worldwide. After the guidelines, countries around the world
issued crypto policies that called for the free and unfettered use of
encryption products to promote e-commerce and protect privacy. Eventually,
even the U.S. gave up anddropped most export controls. In the last EPIC
Cryptography and Privacy survey, written in 2000, there were only a handful
of nations that still restricted crypto, like Burma, Belarus, and Russia --
countries you really didn't want to go to anyway.

We expected a golden era of privacy and security, with encryption allowing
us to protect our computers and communications from attacks, make purchases
with digital cash, and anonymously browse the net. Once crypto was out in
the world it would become ubiquitous and could never be restricted again. We
even got complacent. We moved onto new battles.

It's time to wake up again. Worldwide, there is now a movement back towards
restrictions in the name of fighting cybercrime and terrorism. And we are
losing again.

The trend started before September 11. In the U.K., the Regulation of
Investigatory Powers (RIP) Act allows police, tax collectors and others to
imprison for two years users who refuse to hand over the plaintext of
communications, or the keys to unlock them. The government hasn't figured
out how to manage the details, so the RIP Act is not yet in force, but given
that the government recently attempted to extend the act to allow Internet
surveillance by postal workers and the local town councilors, it seems
likely that when they do implement it, it will be in the worst possible way.
Virtually none of the cryptographic killer apps we fought for are actually
being used.
Similarly, the Council of Europe (COE) cybercrime convention requires
countries that sign on to enact laws allowing police to demand keys in the
name of providing international assistance. In December 2001, the Australian
government enacted a new law on cybercrime that includes the ability to
throw users in jail who don't give up their keys. Attorney General Daryl
Williams said that Australia was required by the COE convention to adopt the
provision -- a disingenuous claim, since they are not a signatory and are
not bound by the treaty. The New Zealand Law Commission considered doing the
same, but decided to only require that third parties assist in decryption
efforts, due to concerns over forcing suspects to incriminate themselves.

It's a Small World After All
In France, advocates cheered in 1999 when the French government dismantled
what the NSA described (perhaps admiringly) as "the most comprehensive
cryptologic control and use regime in Europe, and possibly worldwide." Three
years later, the Parliament approved the "Loi sur la Sécurité Quotidienne"
(LSQ) that requires users to give up their keys, or face three years in
prison. Mon Dieu!

In South Africa, the fear of crime, wielded deftly by an increasingly
repressive government, is steering the democratic system down the road of
its totalitarian predecessor. A new Electronic Communications and
Transactions bill recently passed in the parliament and is awaiting the
president's signature. It would require that all providers of encryption
services operating in South Africa register with the government. A
"cyber-inspector" corps would be set up to investigate and ensure
compliance.

Not to be outdone, the Netherlands -- liberal by reputation, but with over
10,000 wiretaps a year quite aggressive in domestic spying -- is even
discussing key escrow again. They would require trusted third parties to
house copies of every encryption key used by anyone. It doesn't seem to
matter to them that the concept was thoroughly discredited years ago by the
rest of the world.

Meanwhile, virtually none of the cryptographic killer apps we fought for are
being used.

DigiCash is gone, PGP has been orphaned, and ZKS dropped Freedom and is
selling consulting services to stay alive. Not exactly a golden era.

About the only country where it seems safe to use crypto is the U.S. After
years of being caned by industry and privacy groups to relax export rules
and ignore the FBI's push for crypto controls, the bureaucrats and
politicians must have learned this was a no-win situation. So when Senator
Judd Gregg (R-NH) reacted to September 11 by suggesting that all crypto
without backdoors be banned, the howls were strong for him to drop the plan
within weeks, and nothing was included in the USA Patriot Act.

This shows that vigilance is still important in the U.S. But we can't afford
to be complacent internationally either. If the rest of the world adopts
restrictions, we will once again be facing the argument that America must
restrict crypto, because everyone else is doing so. It we don't use it, we
will lose it.

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