[iwar] [fc:Opinion.on.Bin.Laden's.Death.Part.of.Psychological.War]

From: Fred Cohen (fc@all.net)
Date: 2002-07-21 21:48:47
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Date: Sun, 21 Jul 2002 21:48:47 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: [iwar] [fc:Opinion.on.Bin.Laden's.Death.Part.of.Psychological.War]
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Opinion on Bin Laden's Death Part of Psychological War
18 July 2002 

Summary

The FBI's top counterterrorism official said July 17 that in his opinion
Osama bin Laden is probably dead. His comment came just days after the
editor of a London-based Arab newspaper said bin Laden is alive and will not
appear in another video until the United States is attacked again. Whether
bin Laden is alive or dead may actually be less important than how
Washington and al Qaeda use the current ambiguity for psychological warfare.


Analysis

FBI counterterrorism chief Dale Watson said July 17 that he believes Osama
bin Laden is dead, although he also said he has no evidence to support that
assertion. This is the first time a U.S. official has given an opinion in
public about bin Laden's status. Most officials until now have remained
neutral on the question or leaned toward the assumption that the al Qaeda
leader was still alive. 

Watson expressed his opinion just days after Abdel Bari Atwan, editor of the
London-based Al Quds Al Arabi newspaper, announced that sources close to bin
Laden said the suspected terrorist mastermind has recovered from a shrapnel
wound he received during the U.S. bombing campaign in Afghanistan last year
and is still alive and well. Atwan also explained why no videos featuring
bin Laden have been released to the media in many months, saying that he
would not appear in one until after al Qaeda carries out another attack on
the United States.

The remarks by Watson and Atwan are just the latest in a series of
conflicting reports about bin Laden's status and his whereabouts. While his
death could have some impact on al Qaeda's organizational and operational
abilities, neither side asserts it would be a decisive blow against the
group. Rather, both Washington and al Qaeda are exploiting the ambiguity
about bin Laden's status to feed into psychological warfare campaigns to
stir doubt and confusion in each other.

Shortly after Sept. 11, U.S. President George W. Bush declared bin Laden a
man wanted "dead or alive." In part this was to give Americans a rallying
point, following a tradition of personifying foreign enemies to maintain
domestic fervor for the war. Bin Laden thus joined Hitler, Tojo and Saddam
Hussein in a long list of U.S. villains. 

But unlike the nation-states Washington formerly engaged in combat, al Qaeda
has no geographical boundaries, and the military quickly realized the war
against terrorism would need to be fought long after bin Laden's death. This
is why the Pentagon, and later the White House, began changing their tune on
bin Laden, emphasizing that he was just one man in an international
organization and his life or death would have little effect on the overall
problem. 

Al Qaeda quickly grasped the strategic benefit of leaving bin Laden's status
in question. First, despite Washington's concerns about focusing too much on
a single person, it used the fear of bin Laden as a lever in domestic and
international politics. For al Qaeda, this meant there was little need to
expose bin Laden were he alive. At the same time, if indeed he were dead or
simply incapacitated, an occasional fabricated "statement" from bin Laden,
coupled with Washington's insistence that there was no evidence he was dead,
would suffice to keep his followers and sympathizers satisfied and
energized.

Yet as Washington started paying less heed to bin Laden, and repeated
terrorist warnings failed to produce another attack, al Qaeda decided it was
time to reassure supporters that he was still alive. On June 22, Sulaiman
Abu Ghaith -- an alleged associate of bin Laden -- said in comments
broadcast in Arab media that not only was bin Laden alive, but 98 percent of
the al Qaeda leadership remained intact. He also claimed an April attack on
a synagogue in Tunisia was an al Qaeda action. 

This message was meant to show al Qaeda supporters that Washington was a
paper tiger, incapable of killing one man despite its military might. Right
after Abu Ghaith's statement, Time magazine noted that Bush said he wanted
bin Laden "erased" by the Sept. 11, 2002, anniversary of the attacks, and
word came of a new U.S. military campaign to get him. At the same time, U.S.
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld reiterated that bin Laden's death would
not end the war against terrorism. 

Atwan's July 16 comments have revived the propaganda war. By saying bin
Laden wouldn't appear on video until after a new attack, al Qaeda was in
effect prodding its followers to strike at the United States if they want to
see him alive again. Washington's response was the statement by Watson
suggesting bin Laden is in fact dead. This puts the onus of proof back on al
Qaeda, because if they refuse to show bin Laden, it could lend credence to
Watson's story and begin to spread doubt among al Qaeda supporters. 

The Pentagon quickly denied it has any new information on bin Laden's
status, but even if the Bush administration has proof he is dead, it has
several reasons to hold on to that information. From a cynical political
view, waiting until closer to the November elections to reveal such a
victory could prove a boon to the Republicans. 

From a more pragmatic standpoint, Washington may not be entirely confident
in its information, and a premature announcement that the U.S. military
killed him, only to have bin Laden show up again, would be devastating for
the administration's image and for relations with other countries. A third
consideration could be that the United States may have found out whether bin
Laden is alive or dead after penetrating the al Qaeda network, but revealing
the truth may jeopardize its sources of information. 

By continuing to play the psychological warfare game with al Qaeda,
Washington hopes to avoid the potential pitfalls of an incorrect or
premature revelation of bin Laden's status. At the same time, the United
States can try to rattle the network, as it has apparently already done by
forcing al Qaeda to say once again that bin Laden is alive and well. If he
is alive, perhaps he will be forced to pop up his head to reassure his
supporters, giving the U.S. military a clean shot. 

By stirring doubt in al Qaeda, the U.S. administration can also try to
trigger a power struggle in the group. Al Qaeda has relied on bin Laden's
Saudi contacts for funding but on its Egyptian operatives for planning and
logistics. If he is dead, or even if one faction of the group thinks he is
dead, it could start a split in the group or at least disrupt its
operations.

Ultimately, whether bin Laden is dead or alive may not be the most important
question. What matters is how both sides are playing the propaganda game,
adding another layer of psychological warfare to the already hazy
battleground of the global war against terrorism.

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