Re: [iwar] [fc:Why.Microsoft's.Open.HailStorm.promises.flatter.to.deceive]

From: e.r. (fastflyer28@yahoo.com)
Date: 2001-09-20 21:33:13


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From: "e.r." <fastflyer28@yahoo.com>
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Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2001 21:33:13 -0700 (PDT)
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Subject: Re: [iwar] [fc:Why.Microsoft's.Open.HailStorm.promises.flatter.to.deceive]
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WOW- if they didnt give it away, the courts would have taken their
power away.
--- Fred Cohen <fc@all.net> wrote:
> Why Microsoft's Open HailStorm promises flatter to deceive
> 
> By Andrew Orlowski in San Francisco
> 
> Posted: 21/09/2001 at 00:20 GMT
> 
> Today's Hailstorm announcement was cultivated to gain maximum
> favourable
> publicity for Microsoft, but Redmond's concessions amount to nothing
> it
> hasn't already conceded, in one from or another. 
> 
> In fact, seasoned watchers including Jeremy Allison - co-lead of the
> SAMBA project - interpret the "concessions" as extending the
> requirement
> for Microsoft's partners to include proprietary technology in their
> .NET
> compliant web services. 
> 
> So what was new, today?
> 
> Microsoft promised to include the 'industry standard' Kerberos 5
> protocol in Hailstorm, and HailStorm is now officially monikered
> ".Net
> My Services", if you .please.  Microsoft also said it would open
> authentication to third party brokers. 
> 
> A pre-briefed David Coursey at ZDNet was beside himself with joy.  It
> was a "stunning" announcement, he opined.  The news that "Passport
> and
> other 'federated' services would accept Kerberos 'tickets' supplied
> by
> the others," he said, was "good news for Microsoft, the industry, and
> consumers". 
> 
> Alas, there's a world of difference between authentication and
> authorization, and that's at the nub of understanding today's
> announcement. 
> 
> An authentication server takes a user name and password, and raises a
> simple yes/no flag whether the combination fits or not. 
> Authorization
> actually gives the user rights to the services on offer. 
> Authorization
> allows you to use printer Y, or access files from X, or not, and if
> you're beginning to think that web services without authorization
> rights
> are essentially meaningless, then collect $50 and pass go, because
> you're right on the button. 
> 
> Not only has this distinction - between authentication and
> authorization
> - plagued the tech community for years, but it's one that's already
> been
> exploited by The Beast, which has leapt into the open wound with its
> own
> proprietary implementation of Kerberos, which is the years-old open
> standard for authentication. 
> 
> Here's how. 
> 
> The Kerberos protocol specifies authentication clearly and simply:
> you
> go to a Kerberos server, and get a ticket.  The ticket is then
> presented
> to an authorization server, which returns it with various access
> rights
> allowed.  But the Kerberos protocol doesn't cover authorization
> itself. 
> This isn't an open standard, and in fact no one can agree on a single
> way to do it, although everyone agrees not to bugger up the Kerberos
> ticket with machine-specific details.  And so authorization evolved
> as a
> DCE (Distributed Computing Environment) standard.  When we say that
> no
> one has buggered up the ticket, there is, as you might guess, one
> exception... 
> 
> "There's no common represenation of a 'user' across all systems,
> sure,
> but the idea was that you don't pollute the Kerberos ticket with that
> local system's idea of what a user is," explains Allison. 
> 
> "Microsoft's implementation of Kerberos actually wraps the
> authorization
> in the ticket," he says. 
> 
> "They subverted it and put inside a standard ticket.  The result was
> that only tickets issued on Windows 2000 machines could be useful on
> other Windows 2000 machines, without a lot of a manual mapping, which
> is
> a massive pain and is so tedious that no one is ever going to do it."
> 
> Readers with long memories will remember the furore when Microsoft
> documented its Kerberos implementation, and then sent its legal
> mujahaddin round to our friends at Slashdot who hosted postings
> containing the details of this 'open' implementation. 
> 
> In short, it's hard to do authorization between a Windows server and
> a
> non-Windows server, and that seems to be the way Redmond likes it. 
> Nothing in today's announcements changes this in any way, in fact it
> confirms the Redmond-centric way of doing business on .NET. 
> 
> Allison summarizes the politics like this:-
> 
> "They're very clever.  They know the smallest amount of control they
> need to leverage monopoly.  If you have a server that does
> authentication and authorization, then you have the equivalent of a
> Windows Primary Domain Controller, and that's their terror," he says.
> 
> 
> "Once someone usurps the PDC they can provide the equivalent of an
> Active Directory service on Linux," he says, at a fraction of the
> cost. 
> 
> "They've won the client but no one likes using their servers. 
> Because
> they're shit."
> 
> And so it returns to the commodity protocols argument, as revealed in
> the Halloween memos and repeated ad infinitum.  Mind you, given the
> positive spin that the wires have already put on this move, it's
> halfway
> to success. 
> 
> We put a call into Sun, and got this response:-
> 
> "Sun believes that many companies should be authenticators, therefore
> providing open competition for businesses and consumers."
> 
> "In the coming weeks, Sun, along with partners such as banks and
> insurance companies, will offer their own authentication services. 
> It
> is not, however, our policy to disclose these discussions until there
> are appropriate and mutually agreed upon details to announce.  We
> have
> no formal statement at this time."
> 
> Hmm.  That suggests they're still fixed on the authentication
> distraction, not the authorization end-run.  Hopefully some one can
> lend
> them a clue. 
> 
> Microsoft had not returned our calls at press time. 
> 
> From the we-told-you-so-Dept:-
> 
> "Microsoft's holier-than-thou standards pitch for .Net could be
> undermined by its insistence on using its own, non-standard version
> of
> Kerberos" - The Register, 27 March 2001. 
> 
> That's not us, by the way - think of us as straw-sucking hayseeds who
> don't have a clue, and definitely don't get pre-briefed by the
> corporate
> PR machinery - but instead cock a hat to the prescient Mat Hanrahan
> at
> analysts Bloor Research.  We were just dumb enough to be standing
> around
> at the time.  Honest.  ®
> 
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