Re: [iwar] [fc:Who.Lost.China's.Internet?]

From: e.r. (fastflyer28@yahoo.com)
Date: 2002-02-22 23:28:36
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From: "e.r." <fastflyer28@yahoo.com>
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Date: Fri, 22 Feb 2002 23:28:36 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Re: [iwar] [fc:Who.Lost.China's.Internet?]
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If the Government determines who gets PCs, cells and the PLA-Army- is
training hackers , the Chinese govt is using it to control its people
with contact to the outside, not forward democracy.  Regardless of what
you do in China, Bejing always is looking over your shoulder. It is not
a matter of who lost the net, it was a question of how long it would
take Bejing to gain control over it. Remember, this is not a blooming
democracy. It is still a communist nation-state that is simply learning
the new ways to communicate to the rest of the world.
--- Fred Cohen <fc@all.net> wrote:
> Who Lost China's Internet?
> From the February 25, 2002 issue: Without U.S. assistance, it will
> remain a
> tool of the Beijing government, not a force for democracy.
> by Ethan Gutmann 
> 02/15/2002 12:00:00 AM
> 
> BEIJING 
> It's not easy being the father of the Chinese Internet. Children are
> running
> by, boats are paddling, the smell of roast lamb fills the air, and
> Michael
> Robinson, a young American computer engineer, sits rigidly, facing an
> empty
> cafe on the shore of Qinghai Lake, speaking in a low voice of the
> crackdown.
> "What is better? Big brother Internet? Or no Internet at all?"
> Michael asks.
> 
> Michael was hired in 1996 by the Chinese government and Global One (a
> Sprint-France Telecom-Deutsche Telekom joint venture) to build the
> first
> network in China providing public access to the Internet. One day
> sticks in
> his mind. The Chinese engineers working with him suddenly convened a
> special
> meeting, demanding to know if it would be possible to do keyword
> searching
> inside e-mails and web addresses on the Chinese Internet. Not really,
> Michael replied; all information that travels the Net is broken up
> into
> little packets. It's hard to "sniff" packets of information,
> particularly
> coded packets. You would need to intercept packets as they travel,
> and then
> there's the problem of collating the information they contain,
> actually
> making sense of it. Yes, yes, they said, but can you do it? On the
> third
> go-round, it dawned on Michael that his fellow computer geeks wanted
> to end
> the meeting, too. But at a higher level, someone required assurance.
> Before
> Internet construction proceeded further, they would need to monitor
> what
> Chinese users did with it. For the engineers, this was just
> cover-your-ass
> stuff. As long as the foreigner assured them that down the road the
> Chinese
> would be able to build an Internet firewall against the world and
> conduct
> surveillance on its own citizens, the engineers could continue
> working with
> him. Yes, yes, it can be done, Michael told them, and they went back
> to
> work. 
> 
> Americans make dreams, and every generation carries new ones to
> China. Since
> 1979 that dream has been the fall of the Chinese Communist party and
> the
> rise of the world's largest market, an event that U.S. businessmen
> and China
> hands keep predicting is on the horizon or even imminent. Yet Michael
> was
> not naive. He understood the self-serving nature of much of the
> democracy-is-just-around-the-corner rhetoric. Working inside, he
> sensed the
> Chinese leadership's true motives in building an Internet. One of his
> friends, Peter Lovelock, author of the "Made For China Internet
> Update,"
> puts it this way: "These are Marxists. Control the means of
> communication;
> embrace the means of communication. Fill it with Chinese voices. If
> they can
> block the outside, and block relationships between Chinese forces, no
> one
> will listen." 
> 
> But for Michael, any reservations over complicity with Chinese
> government
> objectives were outweighed by a bedrock faith in the Internet's
> ingenious
> architecture. A system created to relay U.S. command messages over a
> damaged
> network after sustaining a Soviet nuclear strike could surely find a
> way to
> get messages through, securely, amid the white noise of millions of
> Chinese
> users. Resistance would be futile--even the Chinese Borg could not
> stop it.
> With the genie of free speech out of the bottle, it would just be a
> matter
> of time before those predictions of democracy in China come true.
> 
> That vision has now been called into question, not by a failure of
> the
> Internet's architecture, but in several cases, by a failure of
> American
> corporate values. Let's start where Michael left off, with the
> expansion of
> the Chinese Internet. I treated a top Chinese engineer (who wishes to
> remain
> anonymous) to a 30-course imperial meal in Beijing. As hoped, the
> shark's
> fin soup loosened his tongue--on the subject of Cisco Systems. In the
> United
> States, Cisco is known (among other things) for building corporate
> firewalls
> to block viruses and hackers. In China, the government had a unique
> problem:
> how to keep a billion people from accessing politically sensitive
> websites,
> now and forever. 
> 
> The way to do it would be this: If a Chinese user tried to view a
> website
> outside China with political content, such as CNN.com, the address
> would be
> recognized by a filter program that screens out forbidden sites. The
> request
> would then be thrown away, with the user receiving a banal message:
> "Operation timed out." Great, but China's leaders had a problem: The
> financial excitement of a wired China quickly led to a proliferation
> of
> eight major Internet service providers (ISPs) and four pipelines to
> the
> outside world. To force compliance with government objectives--to
> ensure
> that all pipes lead back to Rome--they needed the networking
> superpower,
> Cisco, to standardize the Chinese Internet and equip it with
> firewalls on a
> national scale. According to the Chinese engineer, Cisco came
> through,
> developing a router device, integrator, and firewall box specially
> designed
> for the government's telecom monopoly. At approximately $20,000 a
> box, China
> Telecom "bought many thousands" and IBM arranged for the "high-end"
> financing. Michael confirms: "Cisco made a killing. They are
> everywhere."
> 
> Cisco does not deny its success in China. Nor does it deny that it
> may have
> altered its products to suit the special needs of the Chinese
> "market"--a
> localization scheme the company avoided elsewhere in the world--but
> it
> categorically rejects any responsibility for how the government uses
> its
> firewall boxes. David Zhou, a systems engineer manager at Cisco,
> Beijing,
> told me flat out, "We don't care about the [Chinese government's]
> rules.
> It's none of Cisco's business." I replied that he has a point: It's
> not the
> gun but the way it's used, and how can a company that builds
> firewalls be
> expected to, well, not build firewalls? Zhou relaxed, then
> confidently added
> that the capabilities of Cisco's routers can be used to intercept
> information and to conduct keyword searches: "We have the capability
> to look
> deeply into the packet." He admitted that Cisco is under the direct
> scrutiny
> of State Security, the Public Security Bureau, and the People's
> Liberation
> Army (PLA). 
> 
> Does Cisco allow the PLA to look into packets? Zhou didn't know or
> wouldn't
> say. But consider, for example, the arrest of veteran activist Chi
> Shouzhu
> last April. He was picked up in a crowded train station minutes after
> printing out online materials promoting Chinese democracy. Incidents
> such as
> this have mushroomed in China, suggesting that Cisco may not be the
> only one
> capable of looking deeply into the packets. In fact, Cisco's ability
> to
> thrive in China may well depend on cooperation with the Public
> Security
> Bureau and the PLA.
> 
> Cisco's firewall has proven to be far from foolproof. New sites on
> forbidden
> topics crop up daily, and with the proliferation of ISPs who just
> want more
> subscribers surfing, the lag time between updating the government's
> list of
> banned sites and implementation can be erratic. So Chinese security
> organs
> also needed to control the search engines through which new sites can
> be
> found. 
> 
> Enter Yahoo! The business press has painted a picture of a thriving,
> home-grown Chinese market for portals and search engines--mirroring
> such
> companies as AOL, Google, and Excite--with names like Sohu, Netease,
> and
> Sina fighting for the top spots. Chinese Yahoo!, the American
> outrider,
> trails in fifth place. A top Yahoo! representative spoke to me on the
> condition that I would not use his name or give identifying details
> other
> than that he had recently left the company. He admitted that Yahoo!
> is
> actually the most popular portal in China by a mile. Management had
> fudged
> the hit rate, because "we were viewed as extremely aggressive. We
> were seen
> as too foreign." 
> 
> Chinese xenophobia has led many other U.S. companies to play similar
> games,
> but Yahoo! was particularly eager to please. All Chinese chat rooms
> or
> discussion groups have a "big mama," a supervisor for a team of
> censors who
> wipe out politically incorrect comments in real time. Yahoo! handles
> things
> differently. If in the midst of a discussion you type, "We should
> have
> nationwide multiparty elections in China!!" no one else will react to
> your
> comment. How could they? It appears on your screen, but only you and
> Yahoo!'s big mama actually see your thought crime. After intercepting
> it and
> preventing its transmission, Mother Yahoo! then solicitously
> generates a
> friendly e-mail suggesting that you cool your rhetoric--censorship,
> but with
> a New Age nod to self-esteem.
> 
> The former Yahoo! rep also admitted that the search phrase "Taiwan
> independence" on Chinese Yahoo! would yield no results, because
> Yahoo! has
> disabled searches for select keywords, such as "Falun Gong" and
> "China
> democracy." Search for VIP Reference, a major overseas Chinese
> dissident
> site, and you will get a single hit, a government site ripping it to
> shreds.
> How did Yahoo! come up with these policies? He replied, "It was a
> precautionary measure. The State Information Bureau was in charge of
> watching and making sure that we complied. The game is to make sure
> that
> they don't complain." By this logic, when Yahoo! rejected an attempt
> by
> Voice of America to buy ad space, they were just helping the Internet
> function smoothly. The former rep defended such censorship: "We are
> not a
> content creator, just a medium, a selective medium." But it is a
> critical
> medium. The Chinese government uses it to wage political campaigns
> against
> Taiwan, Tibet, and America. And of course the great promise of the
> Internet
> in China was supposed to be that it was unfettered, not selective.
> The
> Yahoo! rep again: "You adjust. The crackdowns come in waves; it's
> just the
> issue du jour. It's normal."
> 
> But what is "normal" in China can be altered under duress. When
> Chinese
> authorities ordered Microsoft to surrender its software's underlying
> source
> codes--the keys to encryption--as the price of doing business there,
> Microsoft chose to fight, spearheading an unprecedented Beijing-based
> coalition of American, Japanese, and European Chambers of Commerce.
> Faced
> with being left behind technologically, the Chinese authorities
> dropped
> their demands. Theoretically, China's desire to be part of the
> Internet
> should have given the capitalists who wired it similar leverage.
> Instead,
> the leverage all seems to have remained with the government, as
> Western
> companies fell all over themselves bidding for its favor. AOL,
> Netscape
> Communications, and Sun Microsystems all helped disseminate
> government
> propaganda by backing the China Internet Corporation, an arm of the
> state-run Xinhua news agency.
> 
> Not to be outdone, Sparkice, a Canadian Internet colossus, splashily
> announced that it would serve up only state-sanctioned news on its
> website.
> Nortel provides software for voice and closed-circuit camera
> recognition--technology that the Public Security Bureau has already
> put to
> good use, according to the Chinese press. AOL is quietly weighing the
> pros
> and cons of informing on dissidents if the Public Security Bureau so
> requests; the right decision would clearly speed Chinese approval for
> AOL to
> offer Internet services and perhaps get a foothold in the Chinese
> television
> market. In fact, AOL signed a landmark deal with a Chinese station at
> the
> end of October. Smaller American companies and smaller nations smell
> the
> blood. Along with Chinese officials, they dominate Chinese
> Internet-security
> trade shows. China Telecom is considering purchasing software from
> iCognito,
> an Israeli company that invented a program called "artificial content
> recognition," which surfs along just ahead of you, learning as it
> censors in
> real time. It was built to filter "gambling, shopping, job search,
> pornography, stock quotes, or other non-business material," but the
> first
> question from the Chinese buyers is invariably: Can it stop Falun
> Gong?
> 
> In the wake of terrorist attacks on America, some of the byplay
> between
> Beijing and its entrepreneurial suitors has taken on new
> significance.
> According to James Mulvenon of Rand Corporation, Network-1 Security
> Solutions, a U.S. web security firm, gained entry to the Chinese
> market by
> helpfully donating 300 live computer viruses to the Public Security
> Bureau.
> The U.S. embassy has already monitored the picture.exe virus, which
> worms
> into a user's computer and then quietly sabotages the widely
> available
> encryption software Pretty Good Privacy by sending the personal
> encryption
> keys to China. Last August's notorious Code Red worm, which some
> thought
> originated in China, appears to have been little more than an amateur
> nuisance. But Chinese military reports on unconventional warfare
> explicitly
> advocate coordinated virus attacks to debilitate U.S. communication
> and
> financial systems during a crisis. America may expect a more
> sophisticated
> visit from the offspring of a Network-1 sample virus in the future.
> 
> Why has there been so little oversight of such corporate activity? As
> Michael Robinson puts it, for the first four years of the Net era,
> those
> with paranoid visions of China's government were never quite able to
> square
> their suspicions with the rapid expansion of the Chinese Internet.
> Although
> it was widely rumored in Beijing that up to 30,000 state security
> employees
> were monitoring the Internet in that city alone, the monitoring was
> also
> laughed at. Apparently the bureaucrats liked monitoring pornography
> so much
> that they had a massive backlog. State security was said to be lax,
> corrupt,
> full of holes. Chinese whiz kids could still surf through the
> firewall and
> beyond. Associations could flourish among the patrons of the cybercaf
> s,
> using anonymous monikers. Many saw the Internet as a populist river
> leading
> to the ocean of the global community. Then, the Chinese government
> abruptly
> built a cyber-version of the Three Gorges Dam.
> 
> In October 2000, the State Council ordered Internet Service Providers
> to
> hold all Chinese user data--phone numbers, time, and surfing
> history--for at
> least 60 days. In November, commercial news sites were banned. In
> December,
> the National People's Congress decreed all unauthorized online
> political
> activity illegal. January 2001 saw the criminalization of Internet
> transfer
> of "state secret information," such as reports of human rights
> violations.
> February brought "Internet Police 110," software blocking "cults,
> sex, and
> violence" while monitoring users' attempts to access such sites. By
> March,
> the surveillance started to work; hundreds of e-mails on the
> controversy
> surrounding a schoolhouse bombing in Jiangxi disappeared. Around the
> same
> time, Chinese authorities announced near completion of a "black box"
> to
> collect all information flowing across the Internet. In April,
> arrests of
> democracy activists using the web and a nationwide crackdown on
> cybercaf s
> reached critical mass. Surviving caf s had to install internal
> monitoring
> software. E-mail to Tibet now took three days to get through, if at
> all, and
> Falun Gong e-mail was completely eradicated. By October 2001, when
> President
> George W. Bush flew to Shanghai for the Asia-Pacific Economic
> Cooperation
> Summit, he was entering an Internet police state. To deflect
> criticism, but
> perhaps also as a demonstration of power, blocks on U.S. news
> websites were
> magically lifted by Chinese authorities. The minute Bush went
> airborne, the
> blocks were back in place. During Bush's current visit to China, any
> attempt
> to discuss loosening Chinese Internet controls is likely to be
> brushed aside
> using the rhetoric of our own struggle against terrorism (what,
> you're
> against surveillance?). But if the Chinese take this tack, they are
> of
> course being dishonest about their own motives.
> 
> There were urgent reasons for the Chinese Internet crackdown;
> fighting
> terrorism wasn't one of them. Instead, look to the slow-motion crisis
> of a
> leadership transition, the release of the Tiananmen papers, the
> emergence of
> a cyber-Falun Gong, and a stirring--you could feel it on the
> street--for
> greater freedom of expression, if not genuine democracy. Then again,
> there
> may be a more elaborate game afoot. Chairman Mao knew the utility of
> briefly
> loosening controls to create a dragnet. In effect, the current
> Chinese
> leadership promoted a "hundred flowers" period of relative Internet
> freedom--again, not to capture terrorists, but to expose anyone who
> disagreed with the legitimacy of their rule and to attract massive
> Western
> investment. American technologies of surveillance, encryption,
> firewalls,
> and viruses have now been transferred to Chinese partners--and might
> even
> one day be turned against our own ludicrously open Internet. We
> funded,
> built, and pushed into China what we thought was a Trojan Horse, but
> we
> forgot to build the hatch.
> 
> Consider a Chinese user in search of an unblocked news site
> (weeklystandard.com, for example). He won't expect to get through,
> and if he
> does, it will be cause for alarm, for the site may be a tripwire--not
> for
> spam, but for state security. Everything he does on the web might
> conceivably be used against him. Pornography? Potentially, a two-year
> sentence. Political? Possible permanent loss of career, family, and
> freedom.
> E-mail may be the most risky: Two years ago, working from my office
> in a
> Chinese TV studio, I received an e-mail from a U.S. friend (in a
> browser-based Hotmail account, no less, which in theory should be
> difficult
> to monitor) with the words "China," "unrest," "labor," and "Xinjiang"
> in
> queer half-tone brackets, as if the words had been picked out by a
> filter. I
> now realize that it was a warning; any savvy Chinese user would have
> sensed
> it instantly. 
> 
> Before the crackdown one could escape and surf anonymously in a
> cybercaf �or
> use a proxy server--another computer that acts as an intermediary
> between
> surfers and websites, helping to hide their web footprints and evade
> the
> filters. Not surprisingly, the most common search words in China were
> not
> "Britney" and "hooters," but "free" and "proxy." Fully 10 percent of
> Chinese
> users--about two million people--used proxies regularly in an attempt
> to
> circumvent government controls. In what Michael calls "the first sign
> of
> cleverness" by the government, a proxy pollution campaign began last
> spring
> when the Chinese authorities either developed or imported a system
> that
> sniffs the networks for signs of proxies. A user, frantically typing
> in
> proxy addresses until he finds one that isn't blocked, effectively
> provides
> the government with a tidy blacklist. After a few of these tedious
> sessions,
> many of my Chinese friends simply gave up climbing over the firewall.
> For a
> small fee, expat users could turn to a web-based proxy browser, such
> as
> Anonymizer. But credit cards are effectively blocked for Chinese
> citizens.
> Just for good measure, Anonymizer was finally blocked as well.
> 
> IS CHINA'S Internet beyond redemption? Is it destined to be a tool of
> surveillance and repression, managed by the Chinese government and
> serviced
> by cynical Western partners? Maybe not. The Great Firewall might be
> vulnerable to a few physicists at the University of Oregon. I spent a
> day
> watching Stephen Hsu diagram the Chinese web and its weaknesses. Hsu
> and his
> company, SafeWeb, have developed a proxy server system called
> Triangle Boy.
> The triangle refers to the Chinese user, to a fleet of servers
> outside of
> the firewall, and to a mothership which the servers report to, but
> the
> Chinese government cannot find. Already tens of thousands of Chinese
> users
> have connected with it; five of the top twenty Triangle Boy search
> sites are
> in the Chinese language. Every day, the Chinese user receives an
> e-mail
> listing new addresses of Triangle Boy servers, which allow the user
> to visit
> websites that they would otherwise be unable to reach. Because the
> addresses
> of the servers change constantly, the system is practically
> unbeatable. Any
> attack, especially on the mothership, requires enormous resources.
> 
> But as surely as Triangle Boy works to liberate the surfing Chinese
> masses,
> you can bet State Security is looking for a way to pounce on this
> latest
> proxy rebellion. The simplest one will be to enlist American
> companies,
> still eager to curry favor in Beijing, and get them to develop
> software
> allowing the Public Security Bureau to sniff out and block proxies as
> quickly as they are created.
> 
> The only practical solution to this puzzle is for the Bush
> administration to
> make Internet freedom in China a high priority. At the moment it is a
> laughably small priority. The Voice of America, whose website has
> been a
> high-profile target of Chinese blocking, last summer began funding
> Triangle
> Boy to the tune of $10,000 per month. VOA officials undertook that
> small
> effort in frustration; they attempt to send daily news via e-mail to
> some
> 800,000 addresses in China, with no guarantee that they are getting
> through.
> Hsu estimates that supplying one million Chinese users with Triangle
> Boy
> (approximately 600 million page views a month) would require just $1
> million
> annually. Budgeted at $300 million a year, VOA has the means and is
> wisely
> looking at several other solutions as well. But for VOA to justify an
> anti-blocking effort on a scale that will make a difference, it will
> need to
> be seen as carrying out an important plank of American foreign
> policy, not
> just acting on the margins as it is now.
> 
> And why not make this a higher profile U.S. policy? Cracking the
> Chinese
> firewall is at least as technically interesting as strategic defense.
> Triangle Boy is still theoretically vulnerable to spoof sites,
> authorization
> problems, or a Code Red-style worm attacking the servers. That
> implies a
> need for a highly technical layering operation, involving an endless
> and
> ever-changing supply of low-key web-based proxies, mirror sites, and
> encrypted e-mail and instant messenger services in Mandarin,
> Cantonese, and
> English, in sufficient volume to overwhelm the Chinese firewall.
> 
> Creative engineers, unleashed to solve the problem of bringing
> Internet
> freedom to China, might take any number of approaches. They might go
> through
> Hong Kong, where illicit cables are said to run to Guangzhou. They
> might cut
> some deals with a "loose" Chinese ISP, such as Jitong. They might use
> messages formatted as images to defeat software that sniffs out
> characters.
> They might exploit the fact that Chinese Internet addresses were
> originally
> configured in peculiar blocks. Or the fact that the government's
> proxy-hunters come from only a few locations. A shrewd native
> engineer could
> probably root out and defeat 99 percent of these government agents.
> 
> None of these measures will be cheap. Nor can we expect the U.S.
> government
> to fully manage such a multi-pronged private-and-public defense of
> Internet
> freedom. Even if they back the overall concept, administration
> officials
> will inevitably want deniability about certain parts of such an
> operation.
> This means the project will need to attract the support of
> foundations,
> human rights groups, religious organizations--any group that cares
> about a
> free China. 
> 
> But it will be worth it. Given the willingness of capitalists to work
> hand
> in hand with the Chinese regime, the Internet may be the only force
> left
> that is potentially anti-hierarchical. Think of it as a way to levy a
> web-based democracy tax on the Chinese government. Think of it also
> as a way
> around the university students and the intelligentsia, who are
> overrated as
> agents for democratic change in China.
> 
> As the father of the Chinese Internet Michael Robinson notes, "In the
> Chinese Internet's infancy, the first three sites that the government
> blocked were two anti-government sites--and one Maoist site. What
> threatens
> them? . . . The heartland." Ultimately, it won't be the intellectuals
> who
> are key to bringing democracy to China. Irate overtaxed peasants with
> Internet-enabled cell phones ten years from now are the real target
> market.
> And those whose dream is democracy in China are operating with
> diminishing
> points of entry. The American business presence in China is deeply,
> perhaps
> fatally, compromised as an agent for liberalizing change. The
> Internet
> remains the strongest force for democracy available to the Chinese
> people.
> But it remains a mere potentiality, yet another American dream,
> unless we
> first grapple with the question: Who lost China's Internet? Well, we
> did.
> But we can still repair the damage. We can, in Michael's words, "lay
> down
> the communication network for revolution." If we don't, his progeny
> may not
> forgive us. 
> 
> Ethan Gutmann, a visiting fellow at the Project for the New American
> Century, is completing a book, "Beijing Boot Camp."
> 
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