[iwar] [fc:Application.security.'in.a.grim.state']

From: Fred Cohen (fc@all.net)
Date: 2002-02-23 22:27:25


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Date: Sat, 23 Feb 2002 22:27:25 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [iwar] [fc:Application.security.'in.a.grim.state']
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Application security 'in a grim state'

By James Middleton, Vnunet, 2/19/02
<a href="http://www.net-security.org/cgi-bin/news.cgi?url=http://www.vnunet.com/News/1129340">http://www.net-security.org/cgi-bin/news.cgi?url=http://www.vnunet.com/News/1129340>

Application security is "in a grim state", according to new research.
Almost half of application security vulnerabilities are readily
exploitable through entirely preventable defects. The typical ebusiness
application is at serious risk of compromise because of security flaws
introduced early in the design cycle, but these risks could easily be
reduced by as much as 80 per cent, according to security firm @stake.

While analysing 45 popular ebusiness applications, @stake found a "grim"
level of security and noted that not all applications are created equal.
The research found that "the best designed applications have one quarter
as many security defects as the worst. As a result, these applications
carry 80 per cent less business-adjusted risk than the least secure."

When contrasting the performers with regards to security, the six areas
that differentiated the top performers from the bottom ones are: early
design focus on user authentication and authorisation; mistrust of user
input; end-to-end session encryption; safe data handling; elimination of
administrator backdoors and default settings; and security quality
assurance. Dan Geer, @stake's chief technical officer, said: "Our
research shows that the primary difference between the top and bottom
performers is due to superior practices in designing, coding and
deploying secure applications." The company discovered that 47 per cent
of applications suffer from readily exploitable security flaws that fall
into nine common classes.

These are weaknesses in administrative interfaces; authentication/access
control; configuration management; cryptographic algorithms; information
gathering; input validation; parameter manipulation; sensitive data
handling; and session management. The most common application security
mistake is a lack of adequate authentication and access control.

According to the firm, user session security remains the Achilles heel
of most ebusiness applications because user input is trusted implicitly
or relies on client-side validation, rather than having the server
itself check for inappropriate data. "Many companies treat security as
'penetrate and patch' rather than employing secure software engineering
practices that would have produced a safer application from the start,"
said Andrew Jaquith, program director at @stake.


Application security 'in a grim state'

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